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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RESEARCH REPORT

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RESEARCH REPORT  
ON THE CHEMISTRY OF THE  
ORGANIC COMPOUNDS OF THE  
ELEMENTS OF THE PERIODIC TABLE

BY

JOHN E. HILL

1964



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THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZED NEGOTIATION: A STUDY OF THE  
ISSUE OF EVALUATION OF TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS  
FOR SALARY PURPOSES

by



JAMES THOMAS ANGUS

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Process of Organized Negotiation: A Study of the Issue of Evaluation of Teacher Qualifications for Salary Purposes," submitted by James Thomas Angus in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date. June 25, 1968 . . . . .



## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to make a case analysis of the negotiations which took place among the Alberta School Trustees' Association, The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Minister of Education to resolve an issue which developed over the redistribution of the right and responsibility for evaluation of teacher education for salary determination. Redistribution of the right and responsibility for evaluation became necessary because the University of Alberta decided to discontinue the evaluation service which it had offered to teachers for over fifteen years.

The Alberta Teachers' Association considered evaluation of teacher qualifications a professional responsibility and put forth a plan for having administration of evaluations assigned to a staff officer of the A.T.A. and policy determination to a Board to be established by an A.T.A. bylaw. The Alberta School Trustees' Association opposed the A.T.A.'s plan perceiving in it a threat to the sovereignty of elected representatives in matters of education. The A.S.T.A. recommended to the Minister of Education that evaluations for salary purposes be linked to certification and be performed by the Registrar of the Department of Education in accordance with policies laid down by a neutral body to be established by an Order-in-Council. The Board of Teacher Education and Certification and the President of the University of Alberta suggested similar courses of action to the Minister of Education. To prevent the likelihood of the evaluation function being assumed by the Department of





Education, The Alberta Teachers' Association set up a Teacher Qualifications Service, unilaterally. Thus an issue or a conflict in the objectives of the A.S.T.A. and the A.T.A. developed. A detailed analysis was made of the negotiations and extranegotiatory activities engaged in by the two parties to resolve this conflict.

A modified version of a model of political negotiation developed by Iklé and Leites was used as a major framework for analysis. Iklé's model is based on the assumption that negotiations deal with an agreement where two sides have a conflict of interest in a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. The alternatives or preferences of each party are arranged on a continuum with the preferences for the parties extending in opposite directions. In the case investigated, the range of preferences for control of evaluation of teacher education was assumed to extend from a preference for complete control of evaluations by The Alberta Teachers' Association at one extreme through control by the Universities of Alberta, to control by some body considered neutral by both parties to control by the Department of Education at the other. The preferences of The Alberta Teachers' Association extended in one direction on the continuum, while the preferences of the Alberta School Trustees' Association extended in the other.

The investigation examined the process by which each party established initial bargaining positions on the range of preferences and the subsequent strategies and tactics employed by each to modify the utilities of the other so as to induce the other party to seek terms of agreement closer to its own preference. The participation of "third parties" in



the dispute was also examined.

The issue was eventually resolved by a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Minister of Education, the President of the A.T.A. and the President of the A.S.T.A. By terms of the agreement, the A.T.A. won the right to administer evaluations; it won the largest single representation on the policy-setting board; it won the right to appoint the Chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board; it prevented control of both the administration of evaluations and policy determination from going to the Department of Education. The A.S.T.A. lost its preference for having salary determination linked to certification and administered by the Registrar of the Department of Education; it lost in its demand for equal representation with the A.T.A. on the policy-setting body and it was unsuccessful in its bid to have the policy-setting body established by Order-in-Council. However, the A.S.T.A. gained a neutral policy body which was not a creature of the A.T.A. The A.S.T.A. forced the A.T.A. to reduce the number of A.T.A. representatives from four to three. The A.T.A. lost its preference for the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board by A.T.A. bylaw.

From the analysis the following major conclusions were formed:

1. The extranegotiatory activities engaged in by both parties had a profound effect on the process of modifying utilities and determining the outcome of the issue.

2. The A.T.A. was able to modify the minimum disposition of the A.S.T.A. with respect to the administrative control of evaluations by effecting a fait accompli through the establishment of a Teacher



Qualifications Service. Through time the A.S.T.A.'s break-even point for measuring gains and losses shifted from an original status quo where A.T.A. control of evaluations was considered a loss to a new status quo represented by the fait accompli, where A.T.A. administration of evaluations was considered neither a gain nor a loss.

3. The A.S.T.A. was able to modify the minimum disposition of the A.T.A. with respect to the establishment of a policy-setting body by precipitating political action which forced the Minister of Education to establish an evaluation service in the Department of Education which, in effect, functioned in competition to the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Service. To safeguard the exclusive function of its own evaluation service, the A.T.A. was obliged to agree to terms more favourable to the A.S.T.A. on the creation of a policy body.

4. By threatening strike action by teachers and performing extranegotiatory actions to establish the credibility of a strike threat, the A.T.A. was able to increase the A.S.T.A.'s officers' and the Minister of Education's perceptions of the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s minimum terms for the composition and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board. Consequently, the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education amended their own minimum terms and agreed to terms consistent with the A.T.A.'s minimum conditions.

5. Attempts by "third parties" to help the conflicting parties to reach accommodation were largely ineffective because the normative roles played by these parties tended to weaken their accommodative functions.





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## CHAPTER I

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

#### I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study of conflict resolution in the political arena. The starting place of the inquiry was the assumption that much government policy is strongly influenced by bargaining among various individuals and leaders of interest groups in society. This assumption presupposes a pluralistic society, that is, a community composed of groups holding a variety of ideological positions, each possessing political power through being able to share in decisions regarding public policy.<sup>1</sup> Dahl points out that groups working through a common government, retaining some degree of autonomy with respect to one another can arrive at government decisions only through bargaining.<sup>2</sup> Decisions made by members of an association may affect people outside that organization. Some of the others who are affected may also be organized, and in such situations decisions acceptable to all who are significantly affected may be achieved by bargaining between or among the leaders of the organizations. But many people, who may be affected by the decisions of such groups, have no powerful organization, except the government. Therefore, government must be able to enter the bargaining arena and bargain for the goals of such people. If unlimited bargaining was permitted, the goals of a powerful minority might be imposed on the majority and, therefore, government must have enough



control to enter into the bargain, set it aside or if necessary determine the decision.<sup>3</sup>

Adrian suggests that government has become increasingly involved in the bargaining process, partly because bilateral negotiation between some organizations frequently fail (as when there is an impasse over wages in the steel industry or railway business), but also as a routine procedure, when a group seeks social change.<sup>4</sup> Many groups thus become political-interest groups, making their claims directly upon government, or indirectly upon other groups through government.<sup>5</sup> This makes government one of the significant institutions of social control, as it sets the general boundaries of social action.

Groups may employ different techniques in seeking to influence public policy and are motivated by different causes to engage in political activity. For instance, many groups may seek to use government sanctions to support their own struggle for economic advancement or to reduce anxiety concerning competition. Ideological factors may also provide strong motivation in encouraging political activity, even in cases where no economic payoff is visible. (For example, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals seeks policies which are concerned with the humane slaughter of animals, although the members expect no economic gain from the policies they support.)

Group life creates identifications, norms of behaviour and reality views that are shared in each group but not necessarily in all groups and these can easily come into conflict.<sup>6</sup> When the activities of one group are thought to be capable of adversely affecting another,



the second group is likely to protect itself by attempting to control the first.<sup>7</sup> When the objectives of one group conflict with the objectives of another group and not all the conflicting objectives can be realized, an issue develops.<sup>8</sup> Objectives which form the basis of action ending a conflict form the settlement of an issue.<sup>9</sup> The activity by which parties agitate an issue and bring it to a settlement is political activity.<sup>10</sup> One such mode of political activity is bargaining. This study investigated the bargaining activity carried on by The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association as they sought to influence government policy with respect to the evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes.

## II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

The Alberta Teachers' Association (A.T.A.) and the Alberta School Trustees' Association (A.S.T.A.) became parties to an issue over evaluation of teacher education. The issue developed when the objectives of the two associations conflicted. This conflict came about when the A.T.A. resolved to take over responsibility for evaluating years of teacher education from the University of Alberta, after the university had decided to discontinue this service.<sup>11</sup> The A.T.A. was prompted to seek this objective because it considered evaluation of teacher education as a professional task and saw itself as the most appropriate body to undertake it, in order to ensure that evaluations "be based on uniform standards, not subject to the possibility of political pressure."<sup>12</sup> This action on the part of the A.T.A. made it the offensive party in the





subsequent negotiations. The Alberta School Trustees' Association strongly opposed this resolution and appealed to the Minister of Education to establish a neutral agency to administer the evaluation of teacher education.<sup>13</sup> The A.S.T.A. apparently perceived an administrative advantage in the hands of teachers' groups in collective agreements for salary purposes, if the A.T.A. was granted the sole right to evaluate what constitutes a year of teacher education.<sup>14</sup> The A.S.T.A. perceived this advantage stemming from the fact that salary agreements negotiated between teachers and local school boards depend, in part, upon evaluation. The A.S.T.A., it seems, assumed the role of defensive party to the negotiations. Its objective was the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense that it wanted evaluation of teacher education conducted by a neutral body.

On March 23, 1967, the presidents of the Alberta School Trustees' Association and The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Minister of Education signed a memorandum of agreement establishing a Teacher Salary Qualifications Board with the responsibility for developing and establishing principles to provide a basis for evaluation of years of teacher education, for salary purposes.<sup>15</sup> The memorandum outlined other terms of the agreement previously approved by the executive councils of the two associations and representatives of the Department of Education. The signing of this agreement marked the termination of a series of negotiations which had taken place among the groups over a period of two years. The formal agreement emerging from these negotiations was implemented as public policy by the Government of Alberta.





### III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was to examine and analyse the dynamics of organized negotiation as a process of conflict resolution. Specifically, an attempt was made to analyse the bargaining activity of The Alberta Teachers' Association, the Alberta School Trustees' Association and the Department of Education for the Province of Alberta as they negotiated an agreement to a conflict situation, which developed among them over who should assume responsibility for evaluating teacher education for salary purposes. The problem was two-fold in nature. (1) What were the origins and nature of the conflict? (2) How was the agreement which resolved the conflict negotiated?

### IV. STATEMENT OF THE SUB-PROBLEMS

The following sub-problems were investigated.

1. What role did each party to the conflict play in the negotiations?
2. How did each of the parties establish initial bargaining positions? What motives prompted them to establish these positions?
3. What negotiation tactics did each party employ? How successful were these tactics? What counter tactics did the parties use?
4. Did a neutral body play a role in the negotiations? If so, what tactics did the neutral body use in attempting to accommodate the conflict?
5. By what process was the machinery for negotiation set up?



6. To what rules of accommodation did the parties adhere in negotiation?

## V. ASSUMPTIONS

This study rested on the following assumptions.

1. Assumptions about the theoretical model to be used in the analysis:

(a) It was assumed that the model of political negotiation used in the analysis of the data in this case was an appropriate one to make intelligent and account for the information obtained in the investigation.

(b) It was assumed that the various disciplines of the social sciences constitute an interdependent whole and therefore concepts developed in the fields of Industrial Relations and International Politics would be useful in the analysis of political negotiation at the provincial level.

2. Assumption about the methodology used in the study:

(a) It was assumed that an accurate and adequate analysis of the dynamics of negotiation could be obtained with the case-study method.

## VI. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Although it was assumed that a good deal of intraorganizational bargaining took place, both before and during the negotiations, in order to arrive at uniform bargaining positions, this study was delimited to the interorganizational bargaining which occurred.



The study was delimited in time from October 21, 1964, the date at which the A.T.A. made its first proposal to take over the evaluation function, to March 23, 1967, the date the Memorandum of Agreement was signed--a period of two years, five months.

## VII. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study attempted to examine the dynamics of negotiation and to discover something about the tactics and motives of the negotiators, in a specific case. Before proceeding to a description of the case, however, a caveat is required. It is to be expected that the investigation did not describe the negotiations as concretely as one might have hoped. This is because it was necessary to rely heavily, in the reconstruction of the case, on public sources of information such as The ATA Magazine, The Alberta School Trustee, newspaper reports and on certain more intimate knowledge gained from interviews with officials who were understandably reticent about revealing facts beyond those found in the publicly available data. The limitation imposed by restriction to official sources of data is that they present a purely official view of negotiations. They restrict one to the visible but not necessarily important aspects of the process of reaching agreement. They tell little about the informal and unofficial meetings or about the personalities and motives of the negotiators. They reveal little of the contest of wills, wits, and interests through which the terms of agreement are reached, and by which the parties keep revising their expectations about each other and shifting their evaluations for measuring gains and losses--





all important aspects of the negotiating process.

#### VIII. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study can make a significant contribution to the study of Educational Administration in the following ways:

##### (1) Understanding the Negotiating Process

It is expected that through examining a case of negotiations, in depth, this study will shed some light on the nature of the negotiating process and familiarize school administrators with important concepts and principles involved in preparing for and conducting negotiations. In a study conducted by Scott,<sup>16</sup> eighty-two of ninety-eight school superintendents interviewed indicated that they thought the study of and preparation in the area of collective negotiation should be offered in the graduate school programs for school administrators. Over half believed the problem of collective negotiations by teachers is one of the most pressing problems confronting school administration and most of the superintendents felt they required help in terms of how to conduct negotiations.

##### (2) Research in Educational Administration

This study used models of bargaining and negotiation from the fields of Industrial Relations and Political Science. It is expected that by introducing these models into the literature of Educational Administration incentive will be provided to other researchers in Educational Administration to use them as theoretical bases for research





into other problems of collective action by teachers.

### (3) Historical Significance of the Study

A record of the events leading up to this issue and the means by which the issue was settled may have some historic relevance to the total development of public education in the Province of Alberta.

## IX. DEFINITION OF TERMS

### Bargaining and Negotiation Distinguished

In much of the literature, the terms "bargaining" and "negotiation" are used more or less interchangeably, as if they had the same meaning. In this study, however, a distinction was made between the two. Bargaining is the process by which parties to a conflict determine and agree upon what each will give and receive in an exchange which may occur between or among them in arriving at a settlement. It involves a symbiotic relationship between parties, in which there is present both co-operation and conflict. Co-operation is essential in the bargaining process because each party, with a certain range of possible outcomes will be better off with a settlement, that is a bargain, than without one. Conflict implies that within the range of possible outcomes, the distribution of total benefit between or among the parties depends upon the particular one adopted. Thus while all parties are interested in reaching some settlement, they have divergent interests in regard to what that settlement should be.

The literature identifies two aspects of bargaining, distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining.<sup>17</sup> Distributive bargaining refers



to situations in which a fixed amount of some scarce value must be distributed. Game theorists refer to this as a "fixed-sum" situation, one party's gain is a loss to the other. Integrative bargaining refers to situations in which the objectives of parties are not in fundamental conflict but can be integrated. Integrative bargaining exists when the nature of a problem permits solutions that benefit both parties and the gains of one party do not necessarily represent equal losses for the other. Game theorists call this type of bargaining a "varying-sum" game. The sum of the gains of the parties is not fixed so that more for one inexorably means less for the other: rather both sides stand to gain by reaching outcomes that are mutually advantageous.<sup>18</sup>

Negotiation is a process by which parties to a transaction exchange information beyond the minimum amount necessary to reach a settlement.<sup>19</sup> The term negotiation has a more restricted reference than the term bargaining, in that although negotiation refers to only certain exchange transactions, it is an instance of bargaining. Negotiation is only one of different ways in which a bargain may be reached.<sup>20</sup> Negotiation is a form of explicit bargaining. To reach a settlement parties must exchange minimum information, namely the initial terms on which either is willing to agree and the subsequent rejection or acceptance of the other's terms. Parties are considered to negotiate if they exchange information relevant to the transaction beyond the minimal amount. The exchange of information need not be of the vis-à-vis variety, nor need it take the form of verbalization.<sup>21</sup> As used in this study, negotiation is a process in which explicit proposals are put



forth ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.<sup>22</sup>

Conflict is defined as a situation of competition in which parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.

Political negotiation is defined as negotiation between or among two or more interest groups for the purpose of influencing public policy.

Issues develop when there is a conflict of objectives of two or more parties.

Party is a behaviour unit involved in conflict with another party. (A behaviour unit is an organization capable of assuming a number of different positions while retaining a common identity or boundary.)

Agreement is defined as an exchange of conditional promises in which each party declares it will act in a certain way on condition the other parties act in accordance with their promises.

Negotiation tactic is defined as a "move" made by a party in an attempt to modify the preferences of another party and consequently influence its choice.

Threat is defined as that which a party "asserts that [it] will do, in a contingency, what [it] would manifestly prefer not to do if the





contingency occurred, the contingency being governed by the second party's behavior."<sup>23</sup> That is, a party asserts that it will make a special effort so as to cause an opponent to suffer a predicted loss should it fail to comply with the party's demand.

Commitment is a move to convince one's opponent that one will maintain one's current position or implement one's prediction of a future position, by making it more difficult for one not to do so. Commitments may be made to threats regarding a future contingency or to positions currently held.

Bargaining position is a demand representing more than one hopes to obtain. The purpose of bargaining positions is to move the point of compromise in one's favour.

Disposition to prefer refers to a party's estimate that it will prefer agreement at given terms to no-agreement, if and when it has to make a choice.

Minimum disposition defines the least favourable terms at which a party would prefer agreement to no-agreement at any time during negotiation.

Actual bargaining range is the area between one party's minimum disposition and the other party's minimum disposition.<sup>24</sup>

Estimated bargaining range. Because information is always incomplete, neither side can know for certain where the other party's





minimum disposition lies. It can only be estimated. Therefore, "estimated bargaining range" represents the area between a party's minimum disposition and its estimate of the other party's minimum disposition.

Sham bargaining range is represented by the area beyond a party's estimate of an opponent's minimum disposition.

Probable outcome refers to the approximate terms at which a party expects agreement.

Offensive party is a party in negotiation which wishes to change a status quo.

Prominent demand is the initial demand made by an offensive party designed to change a status quo.

Compromise is a settlement reached through concessions by both parties.

Concession is a dropped demand. By dropping a demand a party changes its proposal so as to bring it closer to that of the other parties.

Proposal is an offer describing terms that are allegedly being made to an opponent.



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup>Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, The American Political Process (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 739.

<sup>2</sup>Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), p. 327.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 508.

<sup>4</sup>Adrian, op. cit., p. 209.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Dahl, op. cit., p. 329.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 328.

<sup>8</sup>Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), p. 304.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 305.

<sup>11</sup>"Resolutions Approved," The ATA Magazine, 45:45, May, 1965.

<sup>12</sup>S. C. T. Clarke, "Evaluation of Years of Teacher Education," The ATA Magazine, 46:43, December, 1965.

<sup>13</sup>A. Kratzman, "Teacher Education, Certification and Evaluation for Salary Purposes," The Alberta School Trustee, 36:9, May, 1966.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>News item in the Edmonton Journal, March 25, 1967.

<sup>16</sup>Walter W. Scott, "Collective Negotiations: Implications for Preparation of Administrators," in Roy B. Allen and John Schmid (eds.), Collective Negotiations and Educational Administration (College of Education, University of Arkansas and University Council for Educational Administration, 1966), p. 91.

<sup>17</sup>See Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965) for a complete description of both distributive and integrative aspects of bargaining.



<sup>18</sup>Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 5.

<sup>19</sup>Carl M. Stevens, "On the Theory of Negotiation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72:78, February, 1958.

<sup>20</sup>Bargains may also be reached through "tacit bargaining" in which there is no direct communication between the parties. See Schelling, op. cit., pp. 53-80 for an extensive analysis of this type of bargaining.

<sup>21</sup>Stevens, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>22</sup>Proposals are frequently meant as an offer only toward the final phases of agreement. They are binding only to the extent that parties observe the rule of accommodation which insists that an accepted offer should not be withdrawn. Moreover, proposals are sometimes made for the purpose of producing certain side-effects, such as the spread of propaganda, that do not concern agreement.

<sup>23</sup>Schelling, op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>24</sup>This notion of bargaining range is based on the assumption that each party can recognize a constant ordering of preferences or settlement points ranging from one which is least preferred (minimum disposition) to one which is most preferred (prominent demand).





## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF SELECTED THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION AS EMPLOYED IN LABOUR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING

This study was based on a conceptual framework of political negotiation, developed by Iklé and Leites.

Since there are a number of parallels between labour-management and political negotiation,<sup>1</sup> it would seem appropriate to review some of the theories which attempt to explain the negotiation process in labour-management bargaining.

Mabry<sup>2</sup> points out that a complete theory of bargaining must yield answers to the following questions.

1. Why do parties bargain?
2. What are the essential elements in bargaining and why are they important?
3. How do the parties determine the extent of their demands through bargaining (benefit levels or goals) and how do they evaluate the terms (benefits of the bargain)?
4. How are the terms of the agreement influenced by the bargaining process?
5. Under what conditions is an agreement concluded?

The bargaining models developed by economic theorists and discussed below are attempts to provide answers to these questions.<sup>3</sup>





### Chamberlain's Model of Bargaining Power

Chamberlain has developed a concept of relative bargaining power. Bargaining power has been defined as the "capacity to effect an agreement on one's own terms."<sup>4</sup> In a bargaining situation, each bargainer will seek to advance his own aspirations and will propose terms of agreement as favourable as possible to himself and sufficiently favourable to an opponent to win his affirmative response. The effort to win the consent of the other party constitutes bargaining. A successful outcome of the bargaining process involves the movement of one or the other or both parties toward terms offered by an opponent until an agreement is finally reached on a common set of terms. Whether an agreement is reached and on what terms depends upon how much one or the other of the parties can be induced to move from some preferred position, favourable to itself, to a less preferred position, more favourable to the other party. Bargaining power is the degree of influence which one possesses over the other to force the necessary concessions to bring this about. Put another way, one party's bargaining power is another party's inducement to agree.

In Chamberlain's model, bargaining power depends, in part, upon the object sought and the costs of agreeing or disagreeing for each side relative to that objective. In a bargaining relationship, A's bargaining power is the cost to B of disagreeing on A's terms relative to the cost to B of agreeing on A's terms.<sup>5</sup> The bargaining power of B is similarly defined. A's bargaining power at any point in time is B's willingness to agree on A's terms. The relationship of the bargaining



power of the two parties can be shown in the following equation.

$$\frac{\text{Cost to B of disagreeing on A's terms}}{\text{Cost to B of agreeing on A's terms}} \quad \text{VII}$$

$$\frac{\text{Cost to A of disagreeing on B's terms}}{\text{Cost to A of agreeing on B's terms}}$$

If for both parties the cost of agreement is greater than the cost of disagreement on the other's terms no agreement is possible unless concessions are made. For a bargain to be concluded, at least one of the parties must find that the cost of agreeing on the opponent's terms is less costly than disagreement on those terms.

Chamberlain's concept of cost is used in a broad sense to mean "disadvantage" and includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements.<sup>6</sup> Pecuniary costs might include loss of wages during a strike, or loss of income in the case of a lock-out. Nonpecuniary costs may include loss of prestige incurred by public disapproval. Although all costs cannot be reduced to a common denominator, in making decisions, some sort of balance must be struck, even with respect to incommensurate matters, if action is to be taken. What the costs of agreement and disagreement may be to the bargainers can only be determined through the exploratory process of negotiation. Chamberlain points out that in terms of the agreement process, the most meaningful view of costs of one party's disagreeing with another is that party's perception of the costs.<sup>7</sup> His perception of the costs may be "right" or "wrong" but his prediction or estimate of the cost to him of agreeing or disagreeing is conclusive with him. During the course of negotiation, he may discover, or his opponent may convince him that his conception of the cost is wrong.





Therefore, bargaining power is, in part, a matter of influencing the psychological reactions of the negotiators. To influence another's estimate of the cost of disagreeing on one's terms, one may use a tactic of sheer bluff or he may use a straight factual approach.

Bargaining power, as defined by Chamberlain, is not an inherent attribute of the parties concerned or some absolute amount of power available for any and all bargaining situations.<sup>8</sup> Rather, bargaining power may change as the parties use different tactics to influence each other. The passage of time may also bring shifts in bargaining power for each party, as economic conditions change or as public opinion or government influence mobilizes for or against one of the bargainers. Since the cost of agreement and disagreement is relative to the nature of the demand, bargaining power will change with the magnitude of the demands made. In general, the greater the demand, the greater the resistance and therefore the less the bargaining power.<sup>9</sup>

#### Stevens' Conflict-Choice Model of Negotiation

Working from the premise that a theory of negotiation should provide insight into the "choice problem," Stevens has constructed a model based on a theory of individual choice behaviour, which is supposed to characterize the actors in negotiation.<sup>10</sup> Stevens' model views bargaining as a conflict situation, in which the parties are called upon to make choices between two undesirable alternatives. In his "avoidance-avoidance" model the union's goal and the company's goal represent extreme positions. The Stevens model is based on an





avoidance-avoidance model developed by Dollard and Miller to explain the neurotic behaviour of an individual placed in an anxiety inducing situation where he has available no alternative but a choice between two undesirable goals.<sup>11</sup> In the Dollard and Miller model (see Figure 1), avoidance gradient is the name given to the hypothesis that the strength of the individual's tendency to avoid a negative goal is a decreasing function of the distance from the goal. As an undesirable goal X is approached, the level of anxiety increases according to the slope of the avoidance gradient, and the subject is increasingly motivated to avoid the near goal and move toward the remote goal Y. Eventually, as he nears the other negative goal (Y), the tendency to avoid it will become stronger and he will move again in the direction of goal X. A situation of stable equilibrium, like a pendulum, results. If there is no third way out, the individual will "remain vacillating in conflict, trapped between two sources of avoidance, at the point where their gradients intersect."<sup>12</sup>




Figure 1<sup>x</sup>

#### THE DOLLARD AND MILLER AVOIDANCE-AVOIDANCE MODEL

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<sup>x</sup>From John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), p. 363.



Figure 2 illustrates a company's conflict-choice situation. Goals A and B are negative goals. The distance separating the two extreme positions is measured in terms of wage rate. If management settles on union's terms (goal A), management loses. If management settles on its own terms, a conflict situation develops and management also loses. Curve AA is an avoidance gradient for goal A, representing the increasing strength of the tendency to avoid goal A.




FIGURE 2<sup>x</sup>

#### STEVENS' AVOIDANCE-AVOIDANCE MODEL

<sup>x</sup>From Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 15.

Curve BB is an avoidance gradient for goal B. Point D1 represents a stable equilibrium position, at which the strength of the tendency to avoid goal A is equal to the strength of the tendency to avoid goal B. At position D2, the strength of the tendency to avoid goal A is greater



than the strength of the tendency to avoid goal B. The net avoidance tendency would be to drive the company from point D2 back toward goal B or the position of equilibrium D1. An analogous situation obtains in a displacement on the other side of D1 closer to goal B.

Stevens uses the avoidance-avoidance model to explain why parties negotiate. Suppose a union unilaterally demanded a wage increase on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no compromise possible, and with the threat that a strike would be a certainty, if the company did not comply. In this situation, two choices are available to the company: (1) refuse the union's demand, insisting on maintenance of prevailing terms of employment, or (2) grant the union's demand and settle on the union's terms.<sup>13</sup> This becomes a conflict-choice situation, in which the company is confronted with two negative goals, both resulting in increased costs. One choice exposes a company to a strike with the costs associated with it and the other choice brings loss of profit. Consequently, the company might be expected to make neither choice immediately but to remain, for a time, in a position of stable equilibrium. However, the symbiotic nature of the collective bargaining relationship constrains the company to make some choice. The company would probably prefer a third strategy or choice be permitted--to seek a compromise through negotiation.

The negotiation process may be analysed in terms of the avoidance-avoidance model. A union may be considered to have a set of avoidance curves with an equilibrium position, too.<sup>14</sup> A settlement can be reached only if the equilibrium positions of the parties are congruent.





The major function of the exchange of information, during negotiation is to bring about consonance of equilibrium by making the parties mutually informed about similarities of positions. (A necessary but not sufficient condition for agreement.) The question of how this communication may be accomplished is a delicate one, because one party's simple and direct announcement of its equilibrium position may cause the other party to stiffen its resistance and revise its equilibrium position downward.

The function of the negotiation task, from the union's point of view is to move the company's equilibrium position in a direction favourable to the union, that is, toward the company's goal A. This negotiation task will be accomplished by operating upon the company's avoidance gradient. This is the function of tactics employed during the negotiation process. Stevens identifies two classes of tactics.<sup>15</sup> One class of tactics is designed to raise the company's notion of the cost of a strike should one take place and thus increase the company's tendency to avoid insisting upon its own goal. The other class of tactics is intended to lower the company's avoidance gradient to the company's goal A by minimizing the company's estimate of the labour costs from higher wages. Thus the company's tendency to avoid settling on the union's terms is decreased. The application of both classes of tactics by the union has the effect of moving the equilibrium position of the company toward goal A, or if possible to make it coincident with goal A. The company may be expected to employ similar sets of tactics in order to shift the union's equilibrium position in a direction





favourable to itself. The negotiating process continues until equilibrium positions are brought into consonance and conditions for agreement become sufficient.

### Walton's and McKersie's Models of Social Negotiations

One of the more comprehensive theoretical studies of collective bargaining has been undertaken by Walton and McKersie.<sup>16</sup> They posit the thesis that labor negotiation, as an instance of social negotiation, is comprised of four systems of activity, each with its own function, internal logic and tactics.<sup>17</sup> The four subprocesses are:

1. Distributive bargaining; the process of resolution of pure conflicts of interest.
2. Integrative bargaining; the process of finding common or complementary interests and solving the problems of both parties.
3. Attitudinal structuring; the process of influencing the attitudes of the participants toward each other and to effect the basic bonds which relate the two parties they represent.
4. Intra-organizational bargaining; the process of achieving consensus within each of the interacting groups.

Each subprocess is represented in their book by a separate bargaining model and each has its own identifiable set of tactics. Walton and McKersie recognize that most bargaining situations involve a combination of the four subprocesses. They refer to this as mixed bargaining. The distributive bargaining model, which extends the theory of games of strategy to deal with the complexity of actual bargaining situations will be described briefly.




Distributive bargaining is a joint-decision process by which each party tries to maximize its own share of the total of some fixed value. In the language of game theory, it represents a "fixed-sum" situation. The parties try to influence the amount of the shares which go to each.<sup>18</sup> As such there is a fundamental and complete conflict of interest or an issue. In labor negotiations, issues generally arise around economic objectives but basic conflict may also exist around rights and obligations and relationship patterns. Economic issues typically centre on wage levels which involve decisions about a choice between giving more of the "good life" to employees or to stockholders and managers. A class of issues which illustrates a basic conflict related to rights and obligations and which reduces to a choice among basic values is that concerned with union security. In this instance, privileges and freedom accorded to union officials may enhance the status and power of the union at the expense of management's status. Relationship patterns may also be the focus of distributive bargaining. For example, one party may wish to foster a cooperative relationship, while the other may wish to preserve a more distant relationship.

Distributive bargaining is considered to take place within a range of mutual dependence. That is, a conflict of interest takes place within an area in which the parties stand to benefit from the continuing relationship. The bargaining range is bounded by outer limits, outside of which the bargaining relationship is no longer tenable. Figure 3 illustrates a possible area of mutual dependence in a wage rate issue.



The bargaining spectrum as defined in Figure 3 would consist of all possible proportions into which the scarce resources could be distributed, each represented by a point or price. However, bargaining is usually confined to a narrower range than that delimited by the outer limits of interdependency. The boundaries of this narrower bargaining range are termed target and resistance point. Target and resistance point, or what a negotiator demands and what he actually expects to achieve are functions of his subjective expected utilities (satisfactions) and disutilities (costs).

FIGURE 3<sup>x</sup>

## WAGE SPECTRUM

PR = present rate, a = point at which employees would quit the company. b = point at which the company would be forced to move or go out of business. c = point at which employees would change bargaining agent. d = point at which management would be replaced because of its failure to deal effectively with the union. c-d are outer limits of an area of mutual dependence insofar as union and management negotiators are concerned.

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<sup>x</sup>From Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 23.







Utility functions or preferences, from a union negotiator's point of view would include additional purchasing power through increased wages (for the membership) and institutional security (for him) resulting from the membership's evaluation of his successful negotiating performance. Union disutilities or costs might include loss of wages incurred by a strike, loss of institutional security, loss of goodwill with management and damage of public image.<sup>20</sup> Management's costs could involve loss of profit, loss of status with higher management if negotiations are mishandled, loss of goodwill with labour, loss of public image.<sup>21</sup>

What actually determines a party's target and resistance point is not the objective utility functions and costs but rather the subjective expected probability of attaining these. According to one school of decision theory, the subjective expected utility (SEU) of an alternative is the product of subjective utility and subjective probability of success associated with that alternative. A person will choose the alternative which maximizes subjectively expected utility.<sup>22</sup> Walton and McKersie accept this view.

Figure 4 portrays the distinction between target and resistance point in terms of utilities and probabilities. Walton and McKersie view target and resistance point as aspirations.<sup>23</sup> Level of aspiration has been defined in psychological theory as a particular achievement goal for which an individual strives when presented with a task whose outcome can be measured on an achievement scale.<sup>24</sup> Aspiration level is viewed as a point on a person's utility (achievement) scale,<sup>25</sup> but



Walton and McKersie regard aspiration as a zone bounded by a target and resistance point.<sup>26</sup> Through negotiation the zone is narrowed until the target and resistance point come together at the time of settlement.

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Factors determining locations of points on scale of outcomes	Points on scale of outcomes as viewed by union negotiators	Significance of points
Highest estimate of what is needed (utilities)		
Most optimistic assumptions about what is possible (probabilities)	Target (say $7\frac{1}{2}$ cents)	Defines complete success
Most favourable assumptions about his own bargaining skill relative to the opposition		
Lowest estimate of what is needed (utilities)		
Most pessimistic assumptions about what is possible (probabilities)	Resistance point (say $2\frac{1}{2}$ cents)	Defines minimum success
Least favourable assumptions about his own bargaining skill relative to the opposition		

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FIGURE 4<sup>x</sup>


## TARGET AND RESISTANCE POINTS

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<sup>x</sup>From Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 42.



Settlement range. The area between the parties' respective resistance points delimits the settlement range. The range may be positive or negative. Figure 5 illustrates a positive settlement range, in which the resistance points are compatible. Both parties would prefer to settle somewhere in the area between these two points. Figure 6 represents a negative settlement range. In this case, the resistance points are incompatible, and no settlement would be minimally acceptable to either party. Generally, the target of one party is set in a way that represents the best estimate about the other's resistance point.

FIGURE 5<sup>x</sup>


## POSITIVE SETTLEMENT RANGE

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<sup>x</sup>From Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 43.





FIGURE 6<sup>x</sup>

## NEGATIVE SETTLEMENT RANGE

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<sup>x</sup>From Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 43.

This rather complex model of distributive bargaining, described to this point, may be summarized in the following way. A negotiator is assumed to be influenced by the following factors as he enters a bargaining relationship. (1) He is aware of limits to a basic interdependency in the relationship of the parties, (2) within this range of interdependency, each possible settlement point represents certain





utilities for him and certain costs if he fails to agree. For each point, he estimates the other party's probability to agree. (3) A limited range of these points, with relatively high expected utilities, establishes his aspirations. He establishes a target and resistance point and conducts his bargaining behaviour to realize achievement between these points. (4) He may assume, but cannot be certain, that his opponent's target and resistance point defines the same general area so that a positive settlement range exists.

Pre-choice activities. In determining his bargaining range, whether a party chooses a "hard" or "soft" strategy, that is, sets his resistance point and target at high or low levels, will depend upon (a) his own subjective expected utility and (b) his perception of his opponent's choice. A negotiator may influence his opponent's choice by employing certain tactics to manipulate the opponent's perception of his own utilities. For example, if a negotiator can influence his opponent's perception of the cost of choosing a "hard" strategy, it will increase the likelihood of the opponent choosing a "soft" strategy, and the negotiator can then choose a "hard" one with increased confidence. Typically, two pre-choice tactics can be employed to modify an opponent's choice. These are commitment and threat.

Convergence in positive and negative ranges. A settlement can only be reached when the resistance points of the parties are congruent. Negotiation is, in part, the process by which these points are brought into congruence. This involves the use of certain tactics which serve



to manipulate an opponent's subjective assessment of his utility parameters and, hopefully, to induce him to adopt a relatively lower resistance point and to take explicit bargaining positions throughout the negotiations consistent with the lower resistance point. When a positive range exists at the outset of negotiations, the effect of the interaction will simply be to close the range between resistance points. If a negative settlement range exists at the beginning, one or both parties must modify their resistance points, if a default is to be avoided. The negative range usually exists because of differences in perceptions about the strength of respective utilities and costs. In the pre-choice activity period, a party may wish to give his opponent more realistic information concerning his utilities and intentions, to avoid a negative settlement range.

Although Walton and McKersie designed the model primarily to study labour-management negotiations, they show how it can be applied to other instances of social negotiation. A chapter of their book illustrates the application of the model in an analysis of the Cuban crisis of 1962 and an analysis of an instance of negotiation in a Civil Rights issue in the United States.<sup>27</sup>

### Game Theory and Negotiation

Game theory is a branch of decision theory that aims to analyse various situations of conflict and decision by abstracting common strategic features, for study in theoretical mathematical models.<sup>28</sup> These models are called "games" because they are patterned after actual games such as bridge or chess. They differ from pure games of chance,





however, in that their outcomes do not depend on pure chance alone, but on certain decision policies or strategies, which specify a player's behaviour for all possible circumstances that may arise during the game.<sup>29</sup> Game theory is normative rather than descriptive. Its conclusions state how "rational" people ought to behave in a situation of conflict rather than how real people do behave. Mathematicians have advanced theoretical solutions to both two-person fixed sum and variable sum games. Experimental evidence available which purports to support the proposed solutions is stronger for two-person fixed sum games than for variable sum games, where experimental evidence is more variable.<sup>31</sup> Game theory is concerned with situations that resemble certain aspects of negotiation. However, there are certain features of game theory, at its present stage of development, which provide barriers to its direct application to the study of negotiation. The limitations of game theory have been discussed by Schelling, Maccoby, Kuhn and Iklé. Schelling writes that "game theory may have missed its most promising field by being pitched at too abstract a level."<sup>32</sup> He argues that game theory has overshot the level at which its most fruitful work could be done by abstracting away such essential ingredients of bargaining as communication and enforcement.<sup>33</sup> However, Schelling also argues that "if the promise of game theory is so far unfulfilled,"<sup>34</sup> it is not the fault of the mathematicians whose proper concern is the abstract structure of theory. He claims it is the fault of the social scientists who "treat the subject as though it were, or should be, solely a branch of mathematics."<sup>35</sup>





Maccoby states that "although the game theorist will argue that his method demands isolating some variables and pretending for the sake of clarity that others remain more or less constant, he does not always appreciate the power of the hidden variables."<sup>36</sup>

Kuhn points out that one important barrier to the entry of the theory of games into the study of international negotiation has been the "preoccupation (of the critics, mainly) with the normal form of a game, or, in many cases with the normal form of zero-sum, two-person games."<sup>37</sup> He adds that "games which are presented by a single payoff matrix, model little in life beyond parlor games."

Iklé sees the limitation of game theory, in the study of negotiation from the standpoint of fixed and cardinal utilities. He writes:

. . . games theory usually assumes the existence of a real utility for each player which is stable throughout the game. In addition, it is assumed that each player knows his own utility and often that of all the other players. (If the utility functions of the other players are not known, they are at least stable.)<sup>38</sup>

Kuhn reinforces Iklé's statement in a discussion of game theory applied to international negotiation. He states that central to the analysis of a negotiated conflict is the evaluation of possible outcomes.<sup>39</sup> He adds that the "literature of game theory has treated situations in which the participants act as if they attached numerical values to these outcomes,"<sup>40</sup> and that the rules of the game assumes information about valuations to be given and constant. He asserts that this situation does not obtain in international negotiation where the evaluation of outcomes are not constant during the course of negotiation. Rather, the action of negotiators serve to estimate utilities and to try



to alter them. For instance, records of disarmament conferences indicate the purpose of offers and counteroffers to be one of probing for evaluations of outcomes or of revealing partially one's own estimates and aspirations.<sup>41</sup>

The fact that game theory contains certain limitations is not to suggest that it cannot contribute substantially to an understanding of those features of bargaining and negotiation which are analogous to it. Luce and Raiffa contend that,

. . . a case can be made for studying simplified models which are suggested by and related to the problem of interest. The hope is that by analogy, their analysis will shed light--however dim and unreliable--on the strategic and communication aspects of the real problem.<sup>42</sup>

Iklé concedes that the theory of games "may at best give us some rather broad generalizations rather removed from the interesting details."<sup>43</sup>

Kuhn claims that two abstract forms can be obtained from any conflict situation, the normal and extensive forms.<sup>44</sup> The normal form of a game is the more highly condensed version, stripped of all features but the choice of over-all strategies. The normal form, especially when represented by two-person, zero-sum games is considered too restrictive to serve as a model of real life negotiation situations. The extensive form of abstraction eliminates only those features which refer specifically to the means of playing a particular game. It really amounts to a literal translation of the rules into technical terms of a formal system designed to describe all games. It provides an abstract language to describe the options available to the players of any game by



abstracting the common elements of conflict situations such as the interrelations between the players' choices, the variety and character of information available and the effect of chance upon each player. The extensive form of game theory is not so restrictive as to prevent its encompassing such actions as threats, promises, commitments and other appropriate alternatives of strategy.

Significant examples of an extensive form of abstraction are the game models developed by T. C. Schelling.<sup>45</sup> Schelling has extended game theory to apply to the strategical analysis of wars, threats of wars, blackmail, and collective bargaining situations. In these conflict situations, bargaining is viewed as a positive-sum or mixed-motive game, frequently nonsymmetrical between parties, in which there is a combination of conflict of interest and mutual dependence. The situation demands some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation--tacit, if not explicit, even if only to avoid mutual disaster. The elements of a mixed-motive situation include: (1) the possibility that both parties may gain by concerting their actions, even though one party may gain more than the other; (2) each party has a final option, the possibility of destroying the situation by refusal to bargain; (3) each party has to act so as to take account of the outcome of the other's behaviour.

### Focal Points

Of particular interest in understanding the solution of bargaining problems is Schelling's concept of "focal point" for co-ordinating the behaviour of parties.<sup>46</sup> Bargains can frequently be struck, even when there is no communication between the bargainers, by the tacit observation





of both parties of some salient feature of a situation that makes both parties settle on the salient feature itself. Schelling illustrates with the following examples. A man and wife who have become separated in a department store, with no previous arrangement for meeting in such a contingency, gravitate to the "lost and found." People meet each other without prearrangement at the information booth in a railway station, or at crossroads on a map, or at noon if they have not previously agreed upon a time. Spoils are divided on a fifty-fifty basis and monetary settlements are usually concluded in round figures. Focal points offer cues for co-ordinating expectations. Even in explicit bargaining, that is, negotiation, where there is communication between the parties, the principle of saliency frequently governs the settlement. There appears to be some intrinsic magnetism of particular outcomes, especially those that display prominence, uniqueness, simplicity, precedent or some feature that make them qualitatively different from the total range of possible outcomes.<sup>47</sup> Thus focal points serve to reduce the alternatives that parties must consider. To quote Schelling: "The obvious place to compromise frequently seems to win by some kind of default, as though there is simply no rationale for settling anywhere else."<sup>48</sup> The acceptance of a mutually identifiable resting place may be conditioned by the need for each party to control its adversary's expectations. In making concessions, one needs a recognizable limit to his own retreat. To make a final concession that is not to be interpreted as capitulation one needs an obvious place to stop.<sup>49</sup> Bargaining skill involves the ability to set the stage for negotiation in such a





way so as to give prominence to some particular outcome that would be favourable to oneself.<sup>50</sup>

### Phases of Negotiation

The literature on negotiation theory suggests that the negotiation process develops certain formal patterns and that attempts to bypass these may destroy the outcome.<sup>51</sup> At least three phases in the negotiation process have been identified, each involving different kinds of strategies and tactics.

Establishing the bargaining range. In the initial stage opponents establish a bargaining range by assessing each other's resistance points and making commitments.<sup>52</sup> This phase generally lasts a considerable time. The parties proceed with somewhat bombastic initial statements that set the initial boundaries to the "stretch of territory within which the parties propose to move around while they search for consensus on a single settlement point."<sup>53</sup> Negotiators, at this stage, are seen as representing their respective organizations rather than as contenders in their own right.<sup>54</sup> Bargaining positions are established through initial demands and offers, counter-demands and counter-offers. Parties know, however, that these are not absolute commitments, otherwise negotiations would break down.

Reconnoitering the range. In phase one, the negotiators are concerned with auditing the range of disagreement, but in phase two, they seek out those areas that hold promise of agreement. Both offensive and defensive tactical maneuvers are employed as each party "jockeys



for position" on the negotiation range.<sup>55</sup> Each side now searches earnestly in the background for signs of tacit agreement. Parties must pull back from original positions. A process of trading takes place by which mutual concessions are made. Ann Douglas points out that,

. . .the second phase is brought on by the fact that inevitably each side has to pull back from this public show of strength in order (1) to form some estimate of the real strength of the other--how far can the opponent be safely pushed for concessions before it will turn from negotiating to force a show down? and (2) to decide how long and how far to continue pressing its own claims--when would it become institutional suicide to get caught in a show down with the opponent?<sup>56</sup>

Generally, in phase two negotiators are relieved of a great deal of direction from their organizations and are granted considerable autonomy to act and react on their own around the bargaining table.<sup>57</sup>

Convergence. It is during the final phase that negotiators try to converge on a settlement point. Each party must decide upon both the timing and the size of the concessions which have to be made to reach the settlement point. Information is more complete, each side having a fairly good understanding of the other's "resistance point" and whether a settlement is in fact possible. Each party tries to approach the settlement point in such a way that it does not show weakness or allow its opponent to seize the initiative and revise its aspiration upward.<sup>58</sup> In labour negotiation, timing of the final concession usually takes place very close to the deadline.<sup>59</sup> The timing of these concessions late in the negotiations gives them finality.<sup>60</sup> The amount of the last concession should be such that it just meets the best estimate of the resistance point of the opponent, although knowledge of that point will



never be complete.<sup>61</sup> When an agreement has been reached, by the negotiating teams, organizations again take prominence and bring the interaction to an end by announcing a formal agreement.<sup>62</sup>

### The Role of a Mediator

The role of a third party in the bargaining process is a highly complex one with a whole spectrum of possible degrees of intervention into the conflict. At one end of the spectrum is simple conciliation in which the conciliator tries to clear up misunderstandings. By acting as a go-between, the conciliator can transmit messages and thereby eliminate the possible distortion of perception that one party has of the other's position.<sup>63</sup> Messages transmitted directly between the parties generally pass through an intense emotional field. The conciliator has the advantage of being outside the emotional field created by the conflict.

At the other end of the mediation spectrum is direct involvement on the part of the mediator in the process of agreement, especially if there is no obvious salient position or "focal point" to which the parties can gravitate. The mediator can create saliency through one or more of the following functions.<sup>64</sup> (1) The mediator can act as broker, bringing the two parties together and seeing that trading opportunities are not missed through ignorance or failure to communicate.<sup>65</sup> (2) The mediator can widen the agenda by introducing new positions that neither party had previously contemplated. (3) The mediator can provide salient suggestions, within the existing bargaining range, around which an agreement may crystallize.







## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>The parallels between political negotiation and labour-management negotiation include the shifting evaluation of terms, the effects of personalities and the influence of environmental factors.

<sup>2</sup>Bevars Dupré Mabry, "The Pure Theory of Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 18:479, July, 1965.

<sup>3</sup>In addition to the bargaining and negotiation models described in this chapter, the reader is referred to other bargaining models contained in the following references: J. Pen, The Wage Rate Under Collective Bargaining (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); John R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages (London: McMillan, 1932).

<sup>4</sup>Neil W. Chamberlain, A General Theory of Economic Process (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 81.

<sup>5</sup>Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951), p. 200.

<sup>6</sup>Neil W. Chamberlain and James W. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 171.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 13.

<sup>11</sup>John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), p. 363.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Stevens, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Walton and McKersie, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. p. 4.



<sup>18</sup>Walton and McKersie distinguish between distributive and integrative bargaining in terms of their potential payoff structures. Distributive bargaining involves a fixed total objective value, which can be allotted between the parties in varying proportions. Integrative bargaining refers to a "variable-sum" relationship, in which a wide range of possible total values is available to the parties. Items appropriately handled by integrative bargaining are classed as problems. The integrative bargaining model is essentially a problem solving model.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>See Ward Edwards, "Behavioral Decision Theory," Annual Review of Psychology, 12:473-98, 1961, and Sidney Siegel, "Theoretical Models of Choice and Strategy Behaviour: Stable-State Behavior in the Two-Choice Uncertain-Outcome Situation," in Samuel Messick and Arthur H. Brayfield (eds.), Decision and Choice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 147-60.

<sup>23</sup>Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>24</sup>Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker, "The Effect of Level of Aspiration on Differential Payoff in Bargaining by Bilateral Monopolists," in Messick and Brayfield, op. cit., p. 136.

<sup>25</sup>Selwyn W. Becker and Sidney Siegel, "Utility of Grades: Level of Aspiration in a Decision-Theory-Context," in Messick and Brayfield, op. cit., p. 131.

<sup>26</sup>Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., Chapter XI.

<sup>28</sup>W. H. Kuhn, "Game Theory and Models of Negotiation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:1, March, 1962.

<sup>29</sup>Ewald Burger, Introduction to the Theory of Games (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 2.

<sup>30</sup>Anatol Rapoport and Carol Orwant, "Experimental Games: A Review," Behavioral Science, 7:1, January, 1962.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Schelling, op. cit., p. 119.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.



<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Michael Maccoby, "Social Psychology of Deterrence," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 17:280, 1961.

<sup>37</sup>Kuhn, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>38</sup>Fred Charles Iklé and Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:19, March, 1962.

<sup>39</sup>Kuhn, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Duncan R. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 115.

<sup>43</sup>Iklé and Leites, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>44</sup>Kuhn, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>45</sup>Schelling, op. cit.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 67-73.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>50</sup>See Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 213-14, for examples of the use of "focal points" in concluding international treaties.

<sup>51</sup>See, for example, Ann Douglas, Industrial Peacemaking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 14.

<sup>52</sup>Walton and McKersie, op. cit.

<sup>53</sup>Douglas, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 33.





<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 90.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>60</sup>Stevens, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>61</sup>Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>62</sup>Douglas, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>63</sup>Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 316.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 317.

<sup>65</sup>For an illustration of this function, see Douglas, op. cit., p. 57, in which an actual recorded mediation proceeding is quoted.



## CHAPTER III

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

#### I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The value of any model of bargaining lies in its potential to explain the bargaining procedure and how a settlement is reached. Viewed in this way, all the models described in the last chapter contribute in varying degrees to an understanding of the bargaining process. In choosing one particular model over others, as a basis for analysis in a particular case study, one assumes that the chosen model will explain the bargaining behaviour more completely than the others. It would seem that although the models described above may be suitable for explaining bargaining behaviour over economic issues, in a labour-management context, they are not adequate to study the dynamic elements of bargaining in a political setting, where utilities are not stable<sup>1</sup> and evaluation of terms change through negotiation. Therefore, none of the models discussed was used as a guiding frame of reference in this study. Instead, a model of political negotiation, proposed by Iklé and Leites<sup>2</sup> was chosen for purposes of analysis and interpretation.

#### The Model

This model of political negotiation between two parties is based on the following simple assumption: negotiation deals with an agreement where two sides have a conflict of interest in only one set of mutually



exclusive alternatives, A, B, C, . . . N; one side always prefers A to B, B to C, . . . (n-1) to N; the preferences of the other side are in the reverse order. (This constant ordering of preferences does not imply constant utilities.) At the beginning of negotiation (see Figure 7), Blue's minimum disposition lies somewhere between the alternatives represented by the numbers eleven to thirteen, that is, Blue estimates that it would prefer no agreement to an agreement that allows fewer than thirteen, twelve or eleven. (Blue is not sure just where its minimum lies.) Blue estimates that Red's minimum disposition lies between alternatives eighteen and twenty-one. Blue's estimated bargaining range extends from eleven to twenty-one. Red's estimated bargaining range extends from twenty-two to fifteen. In converging on agreement, the parties may ignore the bargaining range and concentrate, instead, on a probable outcome of the negotiations. In Figure 7, Blue's estimate of probable outcome occupies the area between alternatives fifteen and seventeen. Red's estimate of probable outcome lies somewhere between alternatives sixteen and eighteen.

### The Negotiating Process

The principal objective of each party is to seek terms of agreement favourable to itself by modifying the opponent's estimate of probable outcome and minimum disposition. (A party's own minimum disposition and estimate of the probable outcome may change as its opponent seeks to modify its utilities. This is not a perturbation to be randomized or held constant in the study of negotiation but is the very essence of the negotiating process.) Evaluations of outcomes are








FIGURE 7\*

MODEL OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATION

\*From Fred Charles Ikle and Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6(March, 1962), p. 21.



not constant during the course of negotiation. In fact, apart from the final single moves made by negotiators to reach an agreement, negotiating activity serves primarily to estimate the utilities of an opponent and to alter them.<sup>3</sup> If negotiators concentrate on estimating a bargaining range, agreement will be possible when the minimum dispositions of the parties coincide. If negotiators think in terms of probable outcomes, however, the convergence of these points create sufficient condition for agreement. If Red pays more attention to its estimate of probable outcome than to an estimate of the bargaining range, Blue will direct its attention toward the former. Blue may try to convince Red that its estimated probable outcome lies outside the bargaining range or represents an "unfair" division of the bargaining range.

### Negotiation Tactics

To modify Red's minimum disposition and estimate of probable outcome, Blue has available two classes of tactics. (1) It may attempt to modify Red's minimum disposition by making Red feel that it would prefer an agreement to no-agreement on terms more favourable to Blue. (2) Blue may attempt to modify Red's estimate of Blue's minimum disposition by making Red believe that terms at which Blue would prefer no-agreement are less favourable to Blue than Red had first thought.

### Tactics Designed to Modify Opponent's Minimum Disposition

Blue may modify Red's minimum disposition by attempting to alter the actual situation on which Red's minimum disposition is based. For this purpose one or more of the following tactics might be used.



Threats and warnings. The purpose of threats and warnings is to make an agreement seem more urgent to an opponent by increasing his perception of the cost of no-agreement. To warn or threaten means to predict to an opponent that he will suffer certain loss, if he makes a certain move or does not comply with a demand. The difference between warning and threat lies in the role played by the warning or threatening party in the causation of predicted loss.<sup>4</sup> In warning, a party points out to an opponent the natural consequences or costs that are likely to follow from the opponent's noncompliance. When a party threatens, it asserts that it will make a special effort to cause loss to the opponent should he fail to comply. The predicted loss results from the threatener's course of action, although that action may not necessarily be in the threatener's best interest. Threats are generally accompanied by actions designed to increase their credibility. Typical examples of this sort of action are taking a strike vote in labour negotiations and massing troops on an opponent's border in international disputes.

Persuasion. Through the use of argument, Blue may attempt to persuade Red to agree to its proposed terms by pointing out the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages of agreement. In this way Blue may be able to convince Red that the cost of agreement is less than Red first thought.

Reference to negotiation mores.<sup>5</sup> Blue may demonstrate to Red that it has made many concessions (although these may be sham concessions)







and convince Red that it should reciprocate. In this connection, Blue may convince Red that violating negotiation mores may cause political damage by arousing public displeasure, aggravate relations with Blue and thus impair future negotiations.<sup>6</sup>

#### Tactics Designed to Modify Opponent's Estimate of One's Own Minimum Disposition

Blue may modify Red's estimate of Blue's minimum disposition or estimate of probable outcome by attempting to alter the criteria by which Red estimates Blue's minimum disposition or probable outcome. Accordingly, Blue will choose tactics that will alter Red's expectations about Blue's future conduct by changing its own incentives. Typically, tactics of commitment, argument and display of appropriate attitudes are involved in this process.

Commitment. A commitment is a tactical move designed to induce the other party to choose in one's favour. By affecting the other party's expectations, it constrains his choice. If Blue can make an irrevocable commitment to a position near Red's minimum disposition or estimated probable outcome in a way that is unambiguously visible to Red, Blue may be able to force an agreement on terms more favourable to itself. Commitments may be minimal indicating flexibility or maximal indicating firmness. Making a firm commitment has great potential advantage for Blue because it works directly on Red's perception of its own probabilities of success since it conveys information about Blue's intentions. Thus commitment is a way of arbitrarily altering



probabilities in order to influence the position of an opponent. Making firm commitments presents certain risks, especially if the other party's minimum disposition is not known, or if the other party makes a firm commitment which is incompatible with one's own. This situation may lead to an impasse. An impasse may also occur if an irrevocable commitment made without prior knowledge of the opponent's minimum disposition falls outside the bargaining range.

In making a commitment a party has three tactical decisions to consider:<sup>7</sup> (1) it must consider the degree of commitment appropriate to the situation; (2) it must communicate the appropriate commitment to an opponent; (3) it must establish the credibility of its commitment. Among practices common in negotiation, to establish credibility, is the device of "nailing a particular demand to a general principle of presumed importance."<sup>8</sup> After a demand has been nailed to a principle, especially in accompaniment with considerable publicity, to make a settlement which can be interpreted as a defection from that principle involves severe penalties such as "loss-of-face" or loss of future negotiating effectiveness. A party may consider these penalties severe enough to achieve real commitment.

To minimize the eventuality of an impasse resulting from commitment, a party must periodically perform one or more of the following tactical manoeuvres: prevent an opponent from becoming committed, enable an opponent to revise its commitment and abandon one's own commitment.<sup>9</sup>



Arguments. A party may use legal or technical arguments in an attempt to convince the opponent that it would be disastrous or impossible for it to agree on any terms less than the proposed ones.

Bargaining attitudes. Blue may exhibit attitudes consistent with a minimum disposition more favourable to itself than Red estimates. Blue's negotiators may show coolness toward the negotiations suggesting they will terminate them, if Red does not put forth proposals more favourable to Blue, or they may show total disinterest to any proposals that are below Blue's actual or faked minimum disposition by refusing to discuss them or treating them with scorn.

#### Establishing Bargaining Positions

In terms of the model, the principal objective of each party is to win terms favourable to itself by modifying the opponent's estimate of probable outcome and minimum disposition. In this regard, bargaining positions play an important role. Bargaining positions take form through initial demands, counter-demands, offers and counter-offers. In many negotiations, one may clearly distinguish between an offensive and a defensive side. The offensive side, wanting to change the status quo, often starts with a prominent demand, which is combined with a clear threat, elaborate justification and usually maintained throughout a large part of the negotiations, if not to the end.





## II. METHODOLOGY

### The Case-study Method

This presumed to be an empirical study based on the case-study method. The basic approach of a case-study is to deal with all pertinent aspects of one thing or situation with a view to making a careful and comprehensive analysis of the development and present status of the unit under study.<sup>10</sup> The investigator usually identifies as a "case" for investigation some individual, group or institution. A case-study is usually undertaken for one or two purposes. Its purpose may be clinical. That is to say, the researcher, in analysing the data, searches for causes of the current condition or status of the subject studied with the hope of finding a solution to some specific problem.<sup>11</sup> Case studies may also be exploratory in nature, seeking insights for research and theory building. In this connection Selltitz points out that:

Scientists working in relatively unformulated areas, where there is little experience to serve as a guide, have found the intensive study of selected examples to be a particularly fruitful method for stimulating insights and suggesting hypotheses for research.<sup>12</sup>

As a technique for theory building, the case-study method has been approached in two different ways.<sup>13</sup> One way has been the preparation of many case reports which attempt to capture history. The other way has been the thorough study of cases (not written case reports but events that could be the subject of case studies) for the purpose of furthering the goals of social science. Both approaches aim for the goal of "generalization," but each seeks it in a different way. For the



purpose of clarity, these two approaches will be termed the case-reporting approach and the case-analysis approach.

### The Case-reporting Approach

This method has been used extensively in the study of public administration. A program for the purpose of producing case studies, in public administration was first made by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council in the years 1934 to 1945.<sup>14</sup> The aim of the case studies prepared by this committee was to build up a body of recorded incidents of problems and solutions in public administration, which would ultimately reveal the "principles and rules of administrative action."<sup>15</sup> The theory of the committee has been described by Anderson as follows:

Case reporting. . .postulates an administrative process carried on by human beings in relationship to each other. This process and these human beings, it assumes, are potentially if not the same everywhere and at all times. Given a certain set of facts you will get substantially the same results by making a certain change therein no matter when or where the action takes place. . . .  
[If] enough cases can be fully and accurately described, it is believed that principles and rules of administrative action can be discovered from the cases by an inductive process.<sup>16</sup>

### The Case-analysis Approach

The case-analysis method has been used by sociologists and anthropologists in explicit theory building. Phillip Selznick's study of the Tennessee Valley Authority<sup>17</sup> and Peter Blau's investigation of two government agencies<sup>18</sup> are good examples of the use of this approach. Whereas the case-reporting approach is a straight narration of events, the case-analysis approach involves the interpretation and



analysis of the events, in order to set up hypotheses as a basis for further theorizing.<sup>19</sup> Selznick draws the distinction between the case-analysis approach and the historical narrative approach in the following caveat with respect to the use of the former.

[An] empirical analysis of a particular organization, of its doctrine, of a phase of policy in action, of its interactions with other structures, was our objective. But in order to trace the dynamics of the events, it has been necessary to attempt a reconstruction, which is to say a theory, of the conditions and forces which appear to have shaped the behavior of the participants.

Theoretical inquiry, when it is centred upon a particular historical structure or event, is always hazardous. This is due to the continuous tension between concern for a full grasp and interpretation of the materials under investigation as history, and special concern for induction of abstract and general relations. Abstractions deal harshly with "the facts," choosing such emphases and highlighting such characteristics as may seem factitious, or at least distorted, to those who have a stake in an historically well-rounded apprehension of the events themselves.<sup>20</sup>

Selznick accordingly approached the case with a theoretical frame of reference which he describes as "a set of guiding ideas which at once justify and explain the kind of selection which the sociologist will make in approaching organizational data."<sup>21</sup> He elaborates on the use of the theoretical framework as follows:

. . .the inquiry. . .was shaped by sociological directives, more especially by a frame of reference for the theory of organization. These directives are operationally relevant without, however, functioning as surrogates for inductive theory itself. That is while they provide criteria of significance, they do not tell us what is significant; while they provide tools for discrimination, they do not demand any special conclusions about the materials under investigation.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, while Selznick approached his material with a guiding frame of reference, he was not committed by the framework to any special hypotheses about the actual events,<sup>23</sup> but was committed to develop







hypotheses inductively from the empirical data.

Blau describes how, in his study of government agencies, his a priori theoretical conceptions were modified and refined in the course of research and the interpretation of data, without invalidating the need for a conceptual scheme of analysis.

. . .the pre-field-work conception typically underwent fundamental changes as a result of the research experience. The field situation is rife with serendipity; new insights are gained, and they can often be corroborated with empirical evidence, yet these insights can typically be traced back to earlier theoretical conceptions and thus serve to refine them.<sup>24</sup>

The case-study method suffers from serious defects but also lends itself to major advantages as a research technique. Its defects include the possibility that its findings may not be representative and that it is restricted to impressionistic evidence, which, while serving as a good source of insight is not reliable for the testing of hypotheses.<sup>25</sup> A number of cases dealing with the same class of phenomenon is necessary for adequate testing of hypotheses and also for discriminating between promising and misleading insights. A single case, at best, can only concentrate on contrasting the elements within it.

Notwithstanding the above limitations, Blau points to the major advantages of the case-study method.<sup>26</sup> These are: (1) Social processes can be examined directly in a case-study; (2) It is capable of yielding more reliable systematic data than other methods, since the availability of a variety of data-gathering techniques makes it possible to use the most reliable one; (3) It provides the opportunity for shuttling back and forth between analysis and data-gathering, thus propositions can be tested immediately, facilitating the confrontation between theoretical



ideas and empirical evidence.

### Methodology Used in this Study

The methodology employed in this study involved a case-analysis approach. Although no hypotheses were developed, Iklé's model of political negotiations was used as a guiding frame of reference by which to collect, organize, analyse and interpret the data. Concepts formalized in other models were used as well. For example, Chamberlain's model of bargaining power and Schelling's "theory of commitment" were used to try to explain the bargaining power possessed by each party at various points throughout the negotiations.

Sources of data. The data used in the study were derived from two main sources--documentary materials and semi-structured interviews with members of the organizations who were directly involved in the negotiations. The sources of documentary evidence included articles from The ATA News, The Alberta School Trustee, organization newsletters, bulletins, correspondence and newspaper reports.

Attempts were made to minimize error by checking verbal statements against documentary evidence, by appraising the consistency of information supplied by interviewees and by avoiding reliance on any single source of information.

### Outline of the Report

Chapter IV describes the setting and background of the issue and reviews the technical and legal framework within which the problem developed. Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII deal with the case itself.



Chapter V shows how each party became committed to an initial bargaining position. Chapter VI describes a period of stalemate following commitment and the extranegotiatory activity engaged in by each party to try to break the deadlock. Chapter VII discusses the first stage of direct negotiations between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. and, with the help of third parties, the search for agreement. Chapter VIII describes the method by which the parties came to terms on each of the sub-issues. Chapter IX attempts to analyse and interpret and Chapter X summarizes and states conclusions.





## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> Although there is a possibility that known and stable utilities do exist in political negotiations, generally speaking, in the political realm where the consequences of choices are so complex and where intuition plays such a large role, utility as defined by economists (that is the act of preference of one choice over another) is unlikely to remain stable during the process of negotiation. For this reason, each negotiator is considered to have, for any given point of time during negotiation a "disposition to prefer." This refers to a negotiator's estimate that he will prefer agreement to no-agreement, at given terms, if and when he is called upon to make a choice.

<sup>2</sup> Iklé and Leites, op. cit.

<sup>3</sup> Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Iklé, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>5</sup> Negotiation mores refer to the conception generally regarded as the "proper" conduct in negotiations. These conceptions or rules include the following: recognition that a concession made by an opponent should be reciprocated, that negotiators should adhere to an agreed agenda, that a concession made should not be withdrawn.

<sup>6</sup> See Walton and McKersie, op. cit., Chapter VI, for an example of a model for analysing "attitudinal structuring."

<sup>7</sup> Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>8</sup> Stevens, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>10</sup> Carter V. Good, Essentials of Educational Research (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 310.

<sup>11</sup> Tyrus Hillway, Introduction to Research (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 217.

<sup>12</sup> Claire Selltitz, et al., Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 59.

<sup>13</sup> James Heaphy, "The Problem of Theory and Case Research," in Jack A. Culbertson and Stephen P. Hencley (eds.), Educational Research: New Perspectives (Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1963), p. 276.



<sup>14</sup>Harold Stein, "Introduction," Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1952), p. xxxix.

<sup>15</sup>William Anderson, "Report of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, 1934-1945," Part I of Research in Public Administration (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1945), p. 52.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Philip Selznick, T.V.A.: Democracy at the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).

<sup>18</sup>Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955).

<sup>19</sup>Heaphey, op. cit., p. 271.

<sup>20</sup>Selznick, op. cit., p. 250.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 250.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 251.

<sup>24</sup>Blau, op. cit., p. 287.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 302.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE SETTING AND BACKGROUND OF THE EVALUATION ISSUE

#### I. INTRODUCTION

To clarify the various factors involved in the issue over evaluation of years of teacher education and to provide an understanding of the positions to which each party became committed, it is necessary to review the technical and legal framework within which the problem developed. By making reference to pertinent legislative enactments, orders-in-council and departmental regulations, this chapter will endeavour to indicate the involvement of the Department of Education, school boards, teachers and the universities of Alberta in the matter of evaluation.

Since evaluation purposes and practices are inextricably connected with the determination of teachers' salaries, certification, payment of Provincial Foundation Program funds and admission to courses of advanced standing in the universities, provincial policies and practices in these areas will be described. Brief descriptions of The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association will be given. Finally, the reasons for the decision of the University of Alberta to dissolve its Teacher Evaluation Committee will be outlined.





## II. CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF EDUCATION

### IN THE PROVINCE OF ALBERTA

Education in Canada was assigned to provincial jurisdiction under Section 93 of the British North America Act of 1867 which states, in part: "in and for each province the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to education. . . ." This power was subsequently assigned to the Province of Alberta by Section 17 of The Alberta Act of 1905 which created the Province of Alberta out of territory that was formerly part of the Northwest Territories. With possession of complete autonomy in educational matters, the Provincial Legislature was free to set up whatever kind of educational system it chose. The Legislature of Alberta, following the pattern established in other provinces of Canada and taking into account the educational system which already existed at the time the Province was created, set up a system of education which is partly centralized and partly decentralized.<sup>1</sup> Centralized functions are administered by the Department of Education. Decentralized functions have been delegated to local school boards by Provincial statutes such as The School Act. The Legislature of Alberta has permitted other educational agencies to develop, such as The Alberta Teachers' Association, the Alberta School Trustees' Association and universities' Faculties of Education, for training teachers. These agencies have been allowed to participate in educational decision-making in the province. It is necessary to understand, however, that delegation of function to a local school board or any other agency does not relieve the Provincial Legislature of ultimate legal responsibility for all



aspects of public education.<sup>2</sup>

### The Department of Education

The Department of Education is a part of the Executive Branch of the Government of Alberta and as such performs general administrative activities related to the operation of the educational system. Recognized as the central authority, it has traditionally been expected to provide leadership to the system. One of its major concerns is to ensure the maintenance of high educational standards to meet the needs and expectations of the people of the Province while striking a politically acceptable balance between expenditures and services. Another concern of the Department of Education is the mollification and satisfaction of the many interest groups which exert pressure on the Government with respect to educational policies and practices.

The Department of Education Act. The Alberta Department of Education was created by the Department of Education Act which states:

There shall be a department of the public service of the Province which shall be called the Department of Education, and over which there shall reside the member of the Executive Council appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council under the seal of the Province to discharge for the time being the functions of the Minister of Education.<sup>3</sup>

The Department of Education Act outlines those functions which are considered best administered by the central authority and makes clear the legal responsibility of the Department for:

. . .the control and management of all kindergarten schools, public and separate schools, technical schools, commercial schools and teachers' institutes and the education of deaf mute and blind persons.<sup>4</sup>

Aspects of public administration

## The Department of Education

The Department of Education is a part of the Executive Council of the Government of the Province of Alberta. It is responsible for the administration of the Department of Education and for the execution of the policies and programs of the Department. The Department is also responsible for the maintenance of high educational standards and for the provision of educational services to the people of the Province. The Department is also responsible for the maintenance of a balance between expenditures and services. Another concern of the Department of Education is the mobilization and satisfaction of the many interest groups which exert pressure on the Government with respect to educational policies and practices.

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... the control and management of all kindergarten schools, public and separate schools, technical schools, commercial schools and teachers' institutes and the education of deaf, mute and blind persons.<sup>4</sup>



The Act also specifies those areas over which, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the Minister may make regulations. Two of these areas are relevant to this study. Section 7(a)(iii) gives the Minister the power to make regulations,

. . .for the examination, licencing and grading of teachers and for the examination of persons who wish to possess certificates of having completed courses of study in any school.

Section 7(d) gives the Minister the power to "make due provision for the training of teachers."

Other powers and duties of the Department of Education are spelled out in The School Act. The School Act makes very clear the prerogative of the Minister of Education with respect to certification of teachers. It states:

Except as hereinafter provided, no person shall be employed as a teacher in any school unless he holds a permanent or temporary certificate of qualification issued by the Minister under the Department of Education Act.<sup>5</sup>

Only an act of the Provincial Legislature could change or remove these powers of the Minister of Education.

The Board of Teacher Education and Certification. To assist in making and implementing regulations in relation to the authority granted in Section 7(a)(iii) of the Department of Education Act, the Minister set up by Order-in-Council<sup>6</sup> a Board of Teacher Education and Certification. In general this board acts as an advisory body. It advises the Minister and the presidents of all institutions of higher learning which provide teacher education courses on matters pertaining to teacher education and certification. Specific powers allow the Board to make





recommendations with respect to the following: standards of teacher education, types of certificates, regulations and principles governing certification in all acceptable institutions, setting up of criteria for granting charters to institutions that propose to offer teacher education programs and to conduct studies in all matters related to teacher education and certification. This board is the principal forum in the Province of Alberta for debate on activities and problems related to teacher education and certification. Few changes occur in these fields without first being discussed by the board.

The Board is composed of a chairman<sup>7</sup> appointed by the Minister of Education and eighteen other members; three representatives from each university and four representatives from the A.T.A., the A.S.T.A. and the Department of Education.

Salary Appendix Committee. A committee apart from the Board of Teacher Education and Certification known as the Salary Appendix Committee was set up by the Deputy Minister of Education,<sup>8</sup> and given responsibility for establishing procedures and principles for the evaluation of teacher education. This committee consisted of four members: one each from the Department of Education, the University of Alberta, the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. The chairman was the Registrar of the Department of Education. The policies developed by this committee were approved by the four bodies represented on it and published in a document known as the Appendix to Salary Schedules. The "Appendix" was the authority by which teachers' qualifications were evaluated for



salary purposes by the Teacher Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta (see page 78). The Registrar of the Department of Education also relied on the criteria developed by the Salary Appendix Committee for purposes of evaluation for certification of immigrant teachers. Therefore, both the Registrar of the Department of Education and the Teacher Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta made evaluations from the same base so that discrepancies were kept to a minimum.<sup>9</sup> The Salary Appendix Committee ceased to exist after the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board was established, on March 23, 1967.

#### The Alberta Teachers' Association

The Alberta Teachers' Association is the exclusive professional organization for teachers in all publicly supported schools in the Province of Alberta. Originally named The Alberta Teachers' Alliance it was formed in 1918 as an offshoot of the Alberta Educational Association.<sup>10</sup> As its first name suggests it represented a rebellion of Alberta teachers "against sub-standard working and living conditions imposed by local school boards."<sup>11</sup>

The objectives of the A.T.A. were clearly spelled out at its first annual meeting, held during Easter week in 1918. These related to security of tenure for teachers, improved salary schedules, better teacher contract forms, full teachers' citizenship rights, a professional code of ethics, a pension scheme and other welfare measures.<sup>12</sup>

The emergence of the A.T.A. onto the educational scene, with its welfare objectives and professional aspirations brought it into sharp



conflict with the Department of Education and the Alberta School Trustees' Association. There followed a lengthy period during which the A.T.A. fought uncompromisingly and with varying degrees of success for the realization of its goals, against the traditional power structure for education in the Province. Most of this struggle has been documented elsewhere.<sup>13</sup>

The passage of The Teaching Profession Act in 1935 by the Alberta Legislature and the amendment of 1936 marked a turning point in the A.T.A.'s striving for recognition and representation. Not only did The Teaching Profession Act provide adequate financial resources but its compulsory membership provision and disciplinary powers gave its leaders the necessary support to speak with a unified and powerful voice on behalf of the membership in the struggle for improved social and economic status.

The A.T.A. first directed its newly-won power toward the achievement of economic objectives. Many were realized in the period from 1935 to 1941. Kratzmann lists the main achievements as follows:

1. Continuous contracts, with severance only upon the mutual agreement of both parties, and the right of the teacher to appeal against dismissal to a neutral board of reference.
2. Abolition of the individual form of contract, and teacher acceptance by letter assuring the positioning of the teacher on a group salary schedule.
3. The right to bargain collectively with school boards for salaries and living and working conditions, as well as the right, in extreme conditions, to strike.
4. The legal definition of a salary schedule, making provision for a minimum salary and annual increments for teaching experience.





5. Increase in the statutory minimum teachers' salary for Alberta.
6. A joint teacher-school board contributory retirement plan.<sup>14</sup>

Having achieved most of its initial long-range economic goals, the A.T.A. has since directed its efforts toward setting up new goals. Odynak<sup>15</sup> suggests the following four broad directions as representative of present-day A.T.A. objectives: (a) consolidation and some extension of its gains, (b) maintenance of the organization and prevention of incursions on its status, (c) extension of its influence into other areas in education, and (d) encouragement of the rank and file to participate in the Association's activities.

Government of the A.T.A. The legislative body of the A.T.A. is the Annual Representative Assembly which meets annually during Easter week. At this assembly resolutions submitted by local associations or the Executive Council are debated and voted upon. Also, elections are conducted, here, for positions on the Executive Council and District representation.

The business of the Association is carried on by the Executive Council. It consists of a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Past-President and ten district representatives elected on a regional basis. The Executive Secretary is appointed. The administrative staff consists of the Executive Secretary, an Assistant Executive Secretary and nine Executive Assistants.

Services. Services provided to members include a summer conference where training is given in collective bargaining and public



relations techniques, seminars, workshops, publication of professional materials and the provision of consultative services for upgrading teaching performance.

The A.T.A. is able to exert influence on policy decisions at the provincial level by virtue of its representation on such Departmental committees as the Board of Teacher Education and Certification and on provincial curriculum committees. The A.T.A. submits annual briefs to the Provincial Cabinet with recommendations for change in the Alberta educational system. The professional staff of the A.T.A. maintain friendly and personal relationships with high level administrative personnel in the Department of Education and other education interest groups such as the faculties of education and the A.S.T.A. The success of the A.T.A. in accomplishing its objectives seems to depend upon the expertise of its leaders who realize the value of long-range planning, the need to initiate proposals, to understand issues and reach consensus on various courses of action.

#### The Alberta School Trustees' Association

The Alberta School Trustees' Association is a voluntary association of school boards. Originally called The Association of School Trustees for the Province of Alberta, it was formed in 1907 because trustees became convinced that "they needed an arena in which problems could be discussed and a vehicle by which their recommendations could be carried to the provincial government."<sup>16</sup> The basic objectives spelled out at the first annual convention held in Edmonton, in January, 1907 have remained about the same since. They were:



1. To provide a medium of communicating to the Minister of Education the views of the people of the Province on educational questions and of pressing the same on his attention.
2. To consider all matters having a practical bearing on education and the school systems.<sup>17</sup>

On March 31, 1939 the present Alberta School Trustees' Association was created as a corporation by an Act of the Alberta Legislature.<sup>18</sup> Roberts<sup>19</sup> claims that the trustees were motivated to seek corporate status to give greater effectiveness and stability to the association because of (1) the inability of the trustees to prevent the establishment of larger units of administration, in 1935; (2) the establishment of compulsory membership in The Alberta Teachers' Association; and (3) the failure of the trustees' organization to affect the government's decision to maintain continuous teacher contracts and the Board of Reference. In order to cope more effectively with the strengthened position of The Alberta Teachers' Association as a result of the passage of The Teaching Profession Act, the A.S.T.A. requested provision for compulsory membership and automatic collection of fees.<sup>20</sup> These were denied, but the Department of Education assists the Association financially by matching the annual fee paid by each member school board.

Organization. In December, 1967, the Annual Convention approved a plan to reorganize the Association to provide greater representation from its membership and better channels of communication between the Executive and the member school boards. As constituted by the new organization the A.S.T.A. is divided into seven zones, six of which are geographic; the seventh comprises all Roman Catholic Separate School





Boards in the Province.

Government of the A.S.T.A. The legislative body of the A.S.T.A. is the Annual Convention usually held during the first week in November. All school trustees are eligible to attend. Resolutions are debated and voted upon by a show of hands. Bylaws are voted on by secret ballot. Ballots are apportioned at the rate of one ballot for each thirty-six teachers employed. The Executive Council which conducts the business of the Association consists of a President, a Past-President, and two Vice-Presidents elected at large, one representative from each of the seven zones, one representative from each of the Calgary and Edmonton Separate School Boards and two representatives from each of the Calgary and Edmonton Public School Boards. The principal administrative officers are the Executive Director, a General Secretary and two Executive Assistants.

The A.S.T.A. participates in decision-making at the provincial level through its representation on the B.T.E.C. and provincial curriculum committees. The A.S.T.A. submits annual briefs to the Provincial Cabinet and sponsors research into fields of interest to school boards.

#### Teacher Education in Alberta

A detailed description of the teacher education program in Alberta is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief statement of the organization of teacher education is relevant because there is a significant relationship between teacher education and the matter of evaluation for salary and other purposes. As pointed out earlier, the



Minister of Education has been granted the power by Section 7 of The Department of Education Act to make "due provision for the training of teachers." In 1945, in accordance with this authority, the Minister entered into agreement with the University of Alberta to take over responsibility for all teacher training in the Province. The two normal schools which had been operated by the Department of Education, for training elementary school teachers, were incorporated into a Faculty of Education of the University of Alberta, which had formerly, as a College of Education, provided only secondary school training and graduate work. In 1966, the Minister of Education for the Province of Alberta and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the new University of Calgary signed an agreement which extended the relationship to that university. The agreement states:

1. The Board of Governors agrees to provide courses and programs required for the certification of teachers for Alberta schools.
2. The Dean of the Faculty of Education shall recommend to the Minister for certification those students who have satisfactorily completed the said courses and programs and are deemed acceptable for certification.
3. This agreement shall remain in effect subject to cancellation by notice in writing from either party to the other at least one year before the cancellation is to become effective.<sup>21</sup>

Teacher education and certification is clearly a joint enterprise shared by the Department of Education and the universities. The universities train teachers and the Department of Education issues certificates on the recommendation of the universities, but ultimate responsibility for providing for teacher training rests with the Minister of Education.



The teacher training program in the Alberta universities has been the bench mark by which qualifications of teachers entering the Province from other jurisdictions have been evaluated. For an immigrant teacher to qualify for a Standard Certificate or be credited with two years of teacher education for salary purposes, his training received in another jurisdiction must be considered equivalent to two years of the Alberta education program.

## II. PURPOSES AND PRACTICES OF EVALUATION OF TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS

The structure of education in Alberta has necessitated the evaluation of years of teacher education for four main purposes: (1) certification of teachers, (2) placement of teachers on salary schedules, (3) payments to school boards under the Foundation Program, and (4) admission to advanced courses at the universities. There was no formal or legal provision for the evaluation of teacher education before the Memorandum of Agreement among the A.T.A., the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education was signed. The need for evaluation grew gradually with the growth in complexity of the Alberta educational system. It was assumed and all groups tacitly agreed that the University of Alberta was the logical institution to perform this service. Dean Coutts has written: "It was early agreed that evaluation in terms of the criteria as set forth in the 'Appendix to Salary Schedules' should be made by the University of Alberta."<sup>22</sup> It was only after the University of Alberta decided to discontinue its evaluation service that





the question of legal authority and responsibility for evaluation became paramount.

### Certification of Teachers

The statutory provisions which grant to the Minister of Education prerogative for certification of teachers have already been cited. Although the Minister has legal prerogative for issuing certificates, this function has been assigned to the office of the Registrar of the Department of Education. Teachers join the teaching force of Alberta from two main sources: graduates from the universities of Alberta and immigrant teachers. In the case of graduates of the universities of Alberta who are recommended for certification by the institution concerned, the issuance of certificates is almost completely automatic. However, a teacher from outside the province is required to make application to the Minister of Education for permission to teach. The application is referred to the Registrar of the Department of Education who examines the teacher's qualifications, on behalf of the Minister of Education, and decides upon the eligibility of the teacher for certification. In performing this function, the Registrar may seek the assistance of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. He sometimes sought the assistance of the Teacher Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta when that committee existed.<sup>23</sup>

Table I lists the general classes of teaching certificates issued by the Minister of Education, in 1967.



TABLE I  
TEACHING CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION

Classes of certificates	Academic and professional training	Grade-range validity	Interim validity
Junior E <sup>x</sup>	Grade XII and one year in Faculty of Education	I - IX	Three years
Standard E	Matriculation and two years in Faculty of Education	I - IX	Three years
Standard S	Matriculation and two years in the Faculty of Education	IV - XI	Three years
Professional	Matriculation and three years in the Faculty of Education	I - XII	Three years

<sup>x</sup>University program discontinued in 1962.

SOURCE: The Alberta Teachers' Association, The A.T.A. Handbook, 1967, p. 200.

### Placement of Teachers on Salary Schedules

Collective bargaining between teachers and school boards for salary purposes provides a further need to evaluate years of teacher education. The School Act grants to teachers and school boards the right to bargain collectively. It states:

Teachers may bargain collectively with the board of a non-divisional district or of a division and may conduct such bargaining through a bargaining agent pursuant to The Alberta Labour Act.<sup>24</sup>

Subject to the Provisions of The Alberta Labour Act, The Alberta Teachers' Association is the official bargaining agent for all teachers



employed by school districts, divisions and counties. Subject, also, to the bylaws of the A.T.A. and statutory provisions as outlined by The Alberta Labour Act, teachers may bargain locally with school boards but agreements negotiated must be countersigned by the Association as bargaining agent.<sup>25</sup>

By law, school boards are compelled to adopt a salary schedule which must be forwarded with amendments to the Department of Education within ten days of its adoption.<sup>26</sup> All salary schedules adopted in the province base teachers' salaries on a combination of experience and number of years of teacher education. To determine a teacher's salary, it is necessary to calculate his or her teacher education in terms of years, determine the number of years of experience and place these against the salary grid worked out by collective bargaining between teachers and the school board in the jurisdiction in which the teacher is employed. The Alberta Teachers' Association's Handbook advises teachers that "evaluation of teachers' credentials for salary purposes should be done by the body stipulated in the applicable collective agreement."<sup>27</sup> Prior to the development of the issue under investigation in this study, the body generally named in collective agreements was the Teacher Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta.<sup>28</sup>

The fact that teachers and school boards generally agreed to name the Teacher Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta in collective agreements was not to suggest that this committee was the only one that could be used. There is, in fact, no legal barrier to prevent a





school board from setting up its own evaluation committee to determine years of teacher education for salary purposes. All that is required by law is for teachers and school boards to accept the evaluations done by such a committee and to name it in a collective agreement. Cardston and Taber School Divisions, in Alberta, have had evaluation committees which evaluated teacher qualifications for both salary determination and placement within the school divisions with no assistance from outside bodies.<sup>29</sup>

#### Payments to School Boards Under the Foundation Program

Public education in Alberta is financed largely through a School Foundation Program Fund. Section 304(a) of The School Act provides the authority for the Minister of Education to establish and administer this fund. This section states:

From the Fund the Minister shall pay to each school district, school division and county, such sums as may be authorized by regulations established by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

By virtue of the authority granted in this clause, regulations have been promulgated by Order-in-Council regulating payments from the Foundation Program Fund to the school boards of the Province. Financial entitlement to school boards with respect to teachers is based on the number of years of professional and academic training. Section 2(a) of Part A of Schedule A of the Foundation Program regulation states:<sup>30</sup>

With respect to each teacher employed by the division to teach pupils enrolled in Grades I to XII inclusive, the division shall be paid a sum which shall be related to the years of professional and academic training in accordance with the following schedule:



<u>Years of Training</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Less than two years	\$ 900
Two years but less than three	1,600
Three years but less than four	2,400
Four years but less than five	3,400
Five years but less than six	3,600
Six years or more	3,900

Until the University of Alberta discontinued its evaluation service, evaluations done by the Teacher Evaluation Committee were accepted by the Department of Education and payments from the Foundation Program Fund were made on the basis of these evaluations.

#### Admission to a University and Advanced Standing on a University Program

Since each university of Alberta is an autonomous institution, it performs its own evaluation of individual transcripts to determine eligibility for admission to undergraduate programs and programs of advanced standing.

#### Evaluation of Teacher Education Prior to the Development of the Issue

Teacher Evaluation Committee. Prior to its dissolution on October 31, 1966, the Teacher Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta consisted of six members appointed by the President of the University of Alberta. It was constituted as follows: three members from the University of Alberta, one member from the University of Calgary, one member from The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Registrar of the Department of Education.

Evaluation process. The structure of the committee and the method by which the committee performed the evaluation process evolved



over a period of about fifteen years.<sup>31</sup> Originally all evaluations were made by the Dean of the Faculty of Education and his clerical staff. At the time of dissolution the following approach was used.<sup>32</sup> The first evaluation was made by the secretary of the Teacher Evaluation Committee and a statement of evaluation issued by him in the name of the committee. The committee met once a month to review only evaluations that had been questioned or challenged. Appeals to the committee had to be channeled through the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. and could be made either in person or by proxy. When in the judgement of the Evaluation Committee an appeal was justified, a much broader based committee was set up to consider it. The Appeal Committee consisted of the Dean of Education, the President of the A.T.A., one other A.T.A. member, who generally acted as secretary, the Registrar of the University of Alberta, and the Assistant Registrar of the University of Alberta. Other members of the Teacher Evaluation Committee were available for consultative purposes.

Policies. Evaluations were done in accordance with the policies laid down by the Salary Appendix Committee. Dean Coutts has outlined the basic ones. They were:

1. The quality of the student body sets the character of a teacher education institution.
2. Credit for years of teacher education should be based on course work and related experience in arts, science, pedagogy and the like which can be equated with university level work as offered or previously offered by the University of Alberta.
3. The evaluation of the teacher education and qualifications of teachers who have been prepared in other jurisdictions must be





made on the basis no less but no more favourable than is applicable to teachers who have been prepared or are currently being prepared through the program of the University of Alberta.

4. Not all university education is teacher education either for credit toward the University of Alberta professional bachelor of education degree nor for salary entitlement.
5. Possession of authority to teach in Alberta must precede an evaluation for salary entitlement.
6. Credit beyond that allowed for undergraduate degrees should be based on work completed at senior or graduate level with graduate level standing.<sup>33</sup>

Legal basis of Teacher Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta was a quasi-legal body. Its status was derived from the fact of its inclusion in (a) collective agreements stipulating it as the body with authority to evaluate teachers' credentials, and (b) the School Foundation Program Fund Regulations giving it recognition by the Department of Education as the body authorized to evaluate years of teacher training for the purposes of Foundation Program payments to school boards. Its only function was to evaluate teachers' qualifications for salary entitlement, and only after an applicant for such evaluation had been issued a teaching authority in the Province of Alberta, by the Minister of Education.

### III. DISSOLUTION OF THE TEACHER EVALUATION COMMITTEE

As early as 1963 the Dean of Education had warned the parties concerned of the intention of the University of Alberta to discontinue its evaluation service.<sup>34</sup> On November 30, 1965, the Dean of Education met with the officers of the University of Alberta directly concerned



with evaluations to discuss "the continuing increasingly annoying problem of evaluation."<sup>35</sup> The group decided at this meeting that the University should no longer provide the service of evaluation. The Dean wrote the President of the University on behalf of the group outlining the several reasons why the group believed the University should opt out of the evaluation service and recommended that the President advise the Minister of Education of the University's intention of doing so.

Reasons for University's discontinuance of evaluations. The reasons for the university to discontinue its evaluation service were outlined in the Dean's letter to the President as follows:

1. This is not a university function. There are indeed many university functions which ought to have priority for the staff in the office of the Dean of the Faculty of Education and for the staff of the Registrar.
2. The evaluation of documents of teachers for salary entitlement continue to engender considerable illwill on the part of those whose evaluations are not to their liking. There is a mounting dissatisfaction with our making the evaluations in terms of University of Alberta programs. We could not, of course, agree to any other basis if the evaluation is to be made by the University.
3. The services which we are providing are in fact costing the University more than the returns received on the basis of the fees paid.
4. The load of evaluations has increased to the point that a considerable amount of staff time has to be deployed to do the work. In spite of this there have been delays, especially this fall. These naturally have added to the dissatisfaction, yet we are not in a position to provide additional competent staff for this purpose.
5. The Faculty of Education desperately needs the space which the Evaluation Committee is using in the General Office of the



Education Building. At the same time the Salary Evaluation Committee does not have adequate space at present for its operation. As long as there has been but one Dean of the Faculty of Education and indeed one Faculty of Education in the University of Alberta there might have been some justification for our making the salary evaluations. Now that there are two Faculties of Education and the possibility of more there are many reasons why the Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, Edmonton, should be freed of this task. With the proposed limitations to be placed upon the enrolment of the Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, Edmonton, the nature of our function is bound to change. We will be assuming a smaller share of responsibility for actual basic teacher education. Why should we then be placed in the unenviable position of having to sit in judgment on transcripts from sister institutions?

6. A large number of those whose documents we evaluate for salary purposes never become students in the University of Alberta.
7. We are convinced that there is a better way of arriving at salary entitlement of teachers. I proposed such a solution to the Royal Commission on Education as early as 1958. The group which met this morning agrees with me that a solution could be reached were there to be a correspondence between stages of certification and salary entitlement.
8. We do not provide a similar service for other professions.<sup>36</sup>

In compliance with the Dean's request, the President of the University of Alberta wrote to the Minister of Education on December 3, 1965, advising him that the University of Alberta would discontinue its evaluation service and urging the Minister to make arrangements "for this function to be carried on by the Department of Education beginning April 1, 1966."<sup>37</sup>

On January 10, 1966 a meeting was held between senior administrators in the Department of Education, the President of the University of Alberta and the Deans of Education.<sup>38</sup> It was decided at this meeting that the University of Alberta would continue evaluations until a permanent solution to the problem could be worked out. The University







made it quite clear, however, that it did not intend to perform the evaluation task indefinitely.<sup>39</sup> After November 1, 1966, the Teacher Evaluation Committee ceased to receive any new requests for evaluation and cleaned up its unfinished business by mail from a secret office at the University with an unlisted telephone number. On December 29, 1966, the President of the University of Alberta wrote to the Chairman of the Teacher Evaluation Committee informing him officially of the intention of the University to "bring to a close the services provided by the Committee, effective December 31, 1966."<sup>40</sup> The President pointed out that the Appeal Board had decided to accept appeals from decisions of the Committee up to February 15, 1967, so that the whole file of cases could be dealt with by that date.<sup>41</sup>



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>Frederick Enns, The Legal Status of the Canadian School Board (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>The Department of Education Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 93, s. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., s. 5.

<sup>5</sup>The School Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 297, s. 331.

<sup>6</sup>General Regulations Under the Department of Education, O.C. 1398/66.

<sup>7</sup>The chairman of the Board has traditionally been the Chief Superintendent of Schools, of the Department of Education. The secretary is the Registrar of the Department of Education.

<sup>8</sup>M. Fenske and G. Loken, "An Examination of the Issue of Evaluation of Teacher Education in the Province of Alberta" (Edmonton: Department of Educational Administration, University of Alberta, 1966), p. 5. (Mimeographed.)

<sup>9</sup>Interview with the Registrar of the Department of Education on September 26, 1967.

<sup>10</sup>John W. Barnett, "A Brief Historic Record of The Alberta Teachers' Association," in The A.T.A. Handbook, edited by W. Roy Eyres (Edmonton: The Alberta Teachers' Association, 1966), p. 12.

<sup>11</sup>Arthur Kratzmann, "The Alberta Teachers' Association--A vision Vindicated," Phi Delta Kappan, 45:289, March, 1964.

<sup>12</sup>Barnett, op. cit.

<sup>13</sup>See for example: C. K. Brown, "The Development of Teacher Tenure Legislation in Alberta" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1963; Steve N. Odynak, "The Alberta Teachers' Association as an Interest Group" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1963).

<sup>14</sup>Kratzmann, op. cit., p. 290.

<sup>15</sup>Odynak, op. cit., p. 52.

<sup>16</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Bits and Pieces from the Records (Edmonton: The Alberta School Trustees' Association, 1966).



<sup>17</sup>William Glyndwr Roberts, "The Alberta School Trustees' Association -A Study of the Activity of a Social Organization in the Alberta Education System" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1966), p. 116.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Memorandum of Agreement, dated July 18, 1966, signed by the Minister of Education for the Province of Alberta and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the University of Calgary. On file in the office of the Minister of Education.

<sup>22</sup>H. T. Coutts, "Evaluation of Years of Teacher Education," The ATA Magazine, 45:27, March, 1965.

<sup>23</sup>Interview with the Registrar of the Department of Education on September 26, 1967.

<sup>24</sup>The School Act, R.S.A. 1955, s. 358.

<sup>25</sup>The A.T.A. Handbook, op. cit., p. 263.

<sup>26</sup>The School Act, R.S.A., 1955, s. 359.

<sup>27</sup>The A.T.A. Handbook, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>News item in The Lethbridge Herald, November 7, 1966.

<sup>30</sup>The General Regulations Under the Department of Education, O.C. 436/56.

<sup>31</sup>Coutts, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>S. C. T. Clarke, "Evaluation of Years of Teacher Education," The ATA Magazine, 46:43, December, 1965.

<sup>35</sup>Letter from the Dean of Education to the President of the University of Alberta, dated November 30, 1965.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.





<sup>37</sup>Letter from the President of the University of Alberta to the Minister of Education, dated December 3, 1965.

<sup>38</sup>"Association Representatives Meet with the Minister of Education," The ATA Magazine, 46:20, February, 1966.

<sup>39</sup>Interview with the Dean of Education on March 1, 1967.

<sup>40</sup>Letter from the President of the University of Alberta to the Admissions Registrar of the University of Alberta, dated November 29, 1966.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.



## CHAPTER V

### ESTABLISHING INITIAL BARGAINING POSITIONS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the activity of The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association as each became committed to an initial bargaining position, as a first stage in the negotiations which resolved the issue over evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes.

Typically, in establishing bargaining positions, parties employ two major tactical manoeuvres. These are assessment and commitment. Assessment implies the probing or seeking out of the other party's utilities with a view to determining its minimum disposition. Commitment to one's own bargaining position involves an implicit or explicit pledge regarding a future course of action and is generally made after a party has carefully assessed the minimum disposition of the other party or parties. Thus, through commitment to one's own position and an estimate of the opponent's minimum position each party estimates a bargaining range within which it hopes to reach an agreement on terms consistent with its own objective. The activity usually begins with a move by one party which sets out to change a status quo. This often involves making a prominent demand, usually in the form of a concrete proposal, which may, or may not, be accompanied by a threat, but is frequently supported by some elaborate justification. There generally



follows a series of counterdemands, offers and counteroffers and finally commitment as the bargaining position of each party is clearly established.

## II. THE INITIAL PROPOSAL OF THE ALBERTA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION

The Alberta Teachers' Association clearly made the first move toward commitment in this case. After it had become apparent that the University of Alberta wished to discontinue its evaluation service, the A.T.A. Executive Council decided that it would be appropriate and consistent with the Association's long-range professional aspirations to take over this task. Accordingly, at a meeting of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification held on October 21, 1964, the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. read a prepared statement outlining a proposal which indicated the desire of the A.T.A. to take over responsibility for evaluation, if the University of Alberta should divest itself of this chore.<sup>1</sup>

### The A.T.A. Plan<sup>2</sup>

The A.T.A. proposed setting up an evaluation office at Barnett House (A.T.A. Headquarters) in the charge of an A.T.A. staff officer, with assistants and clerks as required. This staff would evaluate years of teacher education on request, from official transcripts and would base evaluations on policies agreed to by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, represented by the four interested parties--Universities, the Department of Education, the A.S.T.A. and the A.T.A. In addition, there would be a small committee which would meet





regularly to deal with difficult cases and develop detailed guidelines for decision. This committee would be chaired by the A.T.A. staff officer with the assistant as non-voting secretary and would include representatives named by the Faculties of Education of the University of Alberta, Edmonton and Calgary,<sup>3</sup> the Department of Education and the A.T.A. The committee would report to the Executive Council of The Alberta Teachers' Association. There would also be an appeals committee responsible for appeals from the evaluation committee. The appeals committee would be appointed by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification and would be responsible to it.

Through the plan, the A.T.A. envisioned entering into a partnership with the University of Alberta and the Department of Education, in which the Department of Education would certificate teachers, the University of Alberta would admit (and evaluate for advanced standing) and the A.T.A. would evaluate years of teacher education for salary purposes.<sup>4</sup>

The proposal did not make provision for A.S.T.A. representation on the "small committee" nor for participation in any way at the administrative level of the evaluation process. The A.S.T.A.'s influence would be restricted by limiting its participation to a voice on the policy-setting committee and the appeals committee through its membership on the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. This arrangement was consistent with the A.T.A.'s statement of principle by which it justified its proposal to take over the evaluation function, namely, that "evaluation of years of teacher education is a professional task which



should be done by professionals."<sup>5</sup>

Motions of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification.

After some debate, the Dean of Education, University of Alberta, Edmonton moved "that the proposal would seem to be feasible and not inappropriate as far as the B.T.E.C. is concerned."<sup>6</sup> The motion carried unanimously. A second motion dealing with the proposal was moved and carried. It instructed "that the ATA proposal be submitted to the Minister of Education, to the President of the University of Alberta, to the President of the ASTA and to the President of the ATA for consideration and report to the next meeting of the Board."<sup>7</sup> In accordance with the direction given by the second motion the Chairman of the B.T.E.C. forwarded the A.T.A. proposal on December 10, 1964 to the persons named in the motion, for their consideration.

Response to the A.T.A. proposal. The President of the A.T.A., as might be expected, endorsed the plan. The President of the University of Alberta also endorsed it in a letter to the Chairman of the B.T.E.C. This letter stated in part:

. . . This proposal seems quite satisfactory to me and I am happy to endorse it. As I believe you know, the University has for some time been concerned at the growing body of work involved in this matter and feel that the Alberta Teachers' Association might be the best place to centre the Committee's activities since it involves members of the Association.<sup>9</sup>

The President of the A.S.T.A. did not immediately reply but at the next meeting of the B.T.E.C., May 31, 1965, the Executive Director indicated orally the opposition of the A.S.T.A. to the A.T.A.'s proposal.<sup>10</sup>



Approval by the A.T.A. annual representative assembly. In the meantime, the Executive Council of the A.T.A. sought the approval of the general membership of The Alberta Teachers' Association for the plan. It introduced the following policy resolution at the Annual Representative Assembly, held in Edmonton, April 19 to 21, 1965.

BE IT RESOLVED that, should the University of Alberta discontinue evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes, The Alberta Teachers' Association assume responsibility under terms of reference determined by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification.<sup>11</sup>

The resolution was passed by the Annual Representative Assembly.

### III. DEBATES OF THE BOARD OF TEACHER EDUCATION AND CERTIFICATION

At a meeting of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification on May 31, 1965 a lengthy discussion took place regarding what was commonly referred to as the "triple threat" in matters of evaluation, that is, evaluation for admission to advanced standing on University programs, evaluation for certification and evaluation for salary purpose. The view was expressed by some that a single evaluation for all purposes would be desirable but the discussion was inconclusive.<sup>12</sup>

#### A Meeting of the "Umbrella Committee"

An Executive Committee of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification known as the "Umbrella Committee" was constituted and assigned the responsibility for drawing up a framework for a program for teacher education and guidelines for evaluation. Changes were necessary because of the pending autonomy of the University of Calgary. The







committee consisted of the Chief Superintendent of Schools, as chairman, the Deans of Education from the University of Alberta, Edmonton, and Calgary, the Dean of Arts, Edmonton, the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A., the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. and the Registrar of the Department of Education, who acted as secretary. The committee met on October 12, 1965 to consider the problems related to certification, degree programs and evaluations.

Recommendations of the "Umbrella Committee." The idea of linking requirements for certification, evaluation of years of teacher education and advanced standing to University programs was discussed thoroughly. One proposal presented by the Dean of Education, Calgary, called for all three evaluations to be done by a committee of the Department of Education representative of various groups. All teachers from outside the province would approach this committee for evaluation of credentials, but teachers in Alberta would approach the committee for salary evaluations only. The committee would give general statements of advanced standing, each university being responsible for final decision.<sup>13</sup> At the meeting a list of three principles related to teacher education programs and evaluation was drawn up and forwarded to the whole Board of Teacher Education and Certification for approval at a meeting on October 25, 1965. The three principles were:

1. That some control of programs leading to certification should reside in a body outside the institutions which prepare teachers.
2. That degree programs should be the prerogative of the institution concerned provided only that, normally, the minimum requirements for certification be observed.



3. That salary evaluations and certification be hinged together and handled by the same body and that this body reside outside the Universities.<sup>14</sup>

The B.T.E.C. endorsement of the "Umbrella Committee" report. The wording of the third principle, listed above, caused some misunderstanding when the committee report was presented to the meeting of the B.T.E.C. on October 25, 1965. The Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., a member of the "Umbrella Committee" placed a different interpretation on the statement than the other members of the committee did. To his mind, the statement "salary evaluations and certification be hinged together" meant that evaluation for certification and evaluation for salary purposes be hinged to the same criteria. For example, ten university courses would entitle an individual to both a teaching certificate and an evaluation statement of two years for salary purposes. The statement did not indicate what group would do the evaluation. The A.T.A. representative anticipated that the body that "reside outside the Universities" be the body which the A.T.A. was contemplating setting up to implement the policy resolution adopted in April. When the committee report was presented to the regular meeting of the B.T.E.C. for its approval, it became clear that the other members of the committee had interpreted "hinged" to mean that the Department of Education would evaluate teachers' credentials for both certification and salary purposes.<sup>15</sup> The three A.T.A. members of the B.T.E.C. rejected this view. The wording of the third principle was therefore changed to read:

3. That salary evaluations and certification be handled by the same body and that this body reside outside the Universities.



The Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. moved and the Dean of Arts, Edmonton, seconded, "that the Board approve the three principles enunciated by the Committee."<sup>16</sup> The motion was carried but the three A.T.A. members asked to have their negative votes recorded.<sup>17</sup>

### Conflicting Views in the B.T.E.C.

Within an interval of slightly more than one year, October 21, 1964 to October 25, 1965, the Board of Teacher Education and Certification had approved two different policies with regard to the locus of the administration of evaluation, that is, the office of The Alberta Teachers' Association and the offices of the Department of Education. Although the Board of Teacher Education and Certification seems to have been able to form a consensus on the fact that one body should be responsible for performing the evaluation function, it could not agree to whom that body should be. The B.T.E.C., charged with the responsibility for advising the Minister of Education on all aspects of teacher education and certification, generally attempts to accommodate the different interests of the four constituent bodies, through debate, so that unified recommendations can be submitted to the Minister on any one subject. However, in the case of evaluation, so intense was the conflict of interests among the different groups that the Board failed to agree, although it was generally held that the Department of Education had a residual responsibility in the matter. Apparently, the A.T.A. was the only body that actually wanted to evaluate years of teacher education but the other groups could not agree unanimously to the A.T.A.'s request.





Position of the University of Alberta. The University of Alberta had found the task of evaluation onerous and distasteful from the point of view of criticism from dissatisfied teachers. The University wanted to discontinue its service and was therefore happy to endorse the A.T.A.'s proposal a year earlier. However, in view of the October 25, 1965, stand of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, which was interpreted as meaning the Department of Education should evaluate for both certification and salary purposes, the University of Alberta changed its position.<sup>18</sup> The President of the University of Alberta wrote to the Minister of Education on December 3, 1965 outlining the decision of the University to discontinue its evaluation service. In part the letter said:

. . . For some time, as you know, the University of Alberta has been made responsible for evaluation of years of professional and academic education of teachers for salary purposes. This has been a very difficult and demanding task and one which, we feel would be more appropriately carried out by the Registrar of the Department of Education and handled in connection with certification of teachers. The Board of Teacher Education and Certification has already indicated its view that such a move should be made.<sup>19</sup>

From the opinions expressed by the President of the University of Alberta in his letters of December 10, 1964 and December 3, 1965, it appears that the University officers did not particularly care which body evaluated teacher education for salary purposes. The Dean of Education, Edmonton was determined that that body would not be the University of Alberta.<sup>20</sup>

Position of the Department of Education. The Department of Education did not want to undertake the task of evaluation at that time



either. In fact, the Minister of Education had expressed the view, many times, that evaluation of teachers' qualifications, for whatever reason, was a proper function of a university.<sup>21</sup>

Position of the A.S.T.A. The A.S.T.A. was adamantly opposed to the A.T.A. taking over the evaluation function, but it did not want to perform the function itself. In February, 1966, the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. is reported to have said, "We could have offered to do it [evaluate] too, as a political manoeuvre. . .but we really don't want any part of it."<sup>22</sup>

#### Influence of the Debates of the B.T.E.C. on the Evaluation Issue

After the matter of evaluation became a hot issue between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A., discussion related to the resolution of it moved from the aegis of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification into the public arena and eventually into bilateral negotiations mediated by the Minister of Education. The debates about evaluations conducted by the B.T.E.C. clearly determined the direction in which the issue between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. developed, especially in the early stages. The Board of Teacher Education and Certification is the principal nexus of the communication channels among the various bodies interested in the major problem of teacher education and the related questions of certification and evaluation. In the debates, at the board meetings, information was exchanged and the objectives of the various bodies made known, either explicitly through formal proposals or implicitly through casual statements made by organization representatives. Actions taken by the



B.T.E.C. and opinions expressed there influenced organizational decisions and actions of the groups outside the B.T.E.C. It is fairly certain that it was the unanimous endorsement by the B.T.E.C. of the A.T.A.'s proposal on October 21, 1964 which induced the University of Alberta to support it and thereby provide encouragement to the A.T.A. to prepare the policy resolution for consideration by the Annual Representative Assembly, in April 1965. Later, the stand taken by the B.T.E.C. in October 1965 appears to have caused the University of Alberta to withdraw its support (temporarily) from the A.T.A. proposal and throw its weight behind a suggestion that the Department of Education take over the evaluation function. Presumably, too, this provided encouragement for the A.S.T.A. to pursue its policy of attempting to secure a neutral agency under the Minister of Education.<sup>23</sup> The A.T.A. eventually decided upon a unilateral approach to setting up a Teacher Qualifications Board rather than a policy of evaluating years of teacher education "under terms of reference determined by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification" because it became disenchanted by the inability of the B.T.E.C. to come to grips with the problem.<sup>24</sup>

Many stormy sessions of debate by the B.T.E.C. convinced the A.T.A. representatives that that body would not be an appropriate one to determine evaluation policy. Furthermore, the A.T.A. had become discouraged by the position taken by the University representatives on the B.T.E.C. The A.T.A. had rooted its claim to the right to evaluate teacher education in the assertion that evaluation of teachers' qualifications is a professional task which should be performed by







professionals. The A.T.A. had opposed this service falling into the hands of the Department of Education because of the fear that evaluation policy and practice could easily become a target of political pressure groups.<sup>25</sup> The A.T.A. had hoped for the support of the University of Alberta on this principle and was therefore somewhat shocked when the University of Alberta representatives on the B.T.E.C. backed a recommendation that the Department of Education be assigned the evaluation task.

The points made above have been mentioned here because it seems appropriate to emphasize the importance of the meetings of the B.T.E.C. in providing a locus of information exchange, allowing each party to assess the utilities of the other in the early stages of the issue. Basic strategies later developed by the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. seem to have been substantially influenced by the assessments made by organization representatives at the meetings of the B.T.E.C.

#### IV. THE INITIAL PROPOSAL OF THE ALBERTA SCHOOL TRUSTEES' ASSOCIATION

During the period in which the B.T.E.C. debated the problem of evaluation, the Executive Council of the A.S.T.A. worked on a proposal of its own.<sup>26</sup> The Executive officers of the A.S.T.A. had become concerned about what organization would take over the evaluation service from the University of Alberta. The Executive's concern in this matter was apparently intensified, when it learned that the A.T.A. was proposing a plan to have the evaluation service assigned to The Alberta Teachers' Association. The A.S.T.A. proposal was presented to the delegates to



the 1965 Annual Convention for their consideration and endorsement. The convention was held in Edmonton during the first week in December. The proposal, in the form of a policy resolution, was worded as follows:

BE IT RESOLVED THAT,

1. A single regulatory body be established under the Minister of Education with representation from the Department of Education, Alberta School Trustees' Association, Alberta Teachers' Association and the Universities of Alberta for purposes of evaluating the University education of teachers for certification and salary determination.
2. Evaluations for salary purposes and certification be conducted by the same agency.
3. The agency be guided by a Certification and Evaluations sub-committee of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification which would act as a policy-setting and appeals body.
4. The parties represented on the Board of Teacher Education and Certification be also represented on the Certification and Evaluations Committee.
5. The Department of Education provide appropriate staff to administer the certification and evaluations requirements.
6. The Registrar of the Department of Education be responsible for such administration with appropriate Executive assistance.
7. The Department of Education bear any cost in excess of monies recouped through charged fees.
8. A detailed certification and evaluation guide be prepared for the Registrar's guidance.
9. Such a guide provide for a basic core in teacher education to be expected of all applicants, as well as flexibility to permit a variety of patterns of elective academic and professional courses.
10. A list of accredited institutions be established and reviewed periodically by the Certification and Evaluations Committee from which transfer credits is made at face value, and that equitable criteria be established for any transfer from non-accredited institutions.<sup>27</sup>



Background statement. In seeking the endorsement of the delegates to the Annual Convention for the resolution, the Executive Council prepared the following background statement:

The Alberta School Trustees' Association has been quite concerned with this problem for better than twelve months, ever since the University of Alberta at Edmonton indicated its unwillingness to continue with the evaluation of credentials for salary purposes beyond that point in time when the University of Alberta, Calgary would be granted autonomy. Our concern was further emphasized by the fact that The Alberta Teachers' Association was, and is interested in undertaking the administration of such a program of evaluation. The matter has been discussed on a number of occasions by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, on which we have representation, and there has evolved no clear-cut solution. We wish to continue pressing for the ten points outlined in the resolution, and the Executive seeks endorsement of the approach by the delegates to the convention.<sup>28</sup>

The resolution was adopted by the convention, with a substantial majority.

Reaction of the Minister of Education. As is customary with A.S.T.A. resolutions adopted by the Annual Convention, this resolution was presented formally to the Minister of Education and later to the Provincial Cabinet by a delegation from the A.S.T.A. a few days after the Convention. No immediate response was given by the Minister of Education to the proposal.<sup>29</sup>

#### Comparison of A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. Proposals

A comparison of the A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. proposals reveals the following differences:

1. The A.S.T.A. wanted evaluations to be administered by the Registrar of the Department of Education; the A.T.A. wanted the administration done by an A.T.A. staff officer.







2. The A.S.T.A. wanted evaluations for salary purposes and certification done by the same agency; the A.T.A. did not treat the matter of certification in its proposal.

3. The A.S.T.A. recommended that the evaluation service be housed at the Department of Education; the A.T.A. wanted it housed at Barnett House.

4. The A.S.T.A. wanted representation on all bodies related to the evaluation process except on the administrative staff; the A.T.A. proposal made no provision for direct A.S.T.A. representation except such appointments of A.S.T.A. representatives as might be made by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification to the Appeals Committee.

5. The A.S.T.A. wanted the Evaluation Committee to be responsible to the Minister of Education; the A.T.A. wanted the Evaluation Committee to report to the Executive Council of the A.T.A.

The proposals were similar in that each one recommended that policy determination be a responsibility of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. Neither proposal spelled out the number of representatives from each party to be appointed to the Evaluation Committee.

#### The A.S.T.A.'s Objection to the A.T.A. Proposal

Annually, the Executive officers of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. meet in a joint-committee to discuss items of mutual interest. In 1965, the joint-committee met on December 9, a few days after the A.S.T.A. Annual Convention.<sup>30</sup> One of the twenty-three items on the agenda was the problem of evaluations. The A.S.T.A. Executive officers were



asked why they were not in favour of The Alberta Teachers' Association doing evaluations.<sup>31</sup> The A.S.T.A. Executive gave the following reasons for rejecting the A.T.A. proposal and for advancing its own:<sup>32</sup>

1. Evaluations determine the salaries payable to teachers. Salaries are negotiable and therefore the A.S.T.A. could not accept the possibility of teachers having an administrative advantage in negotiating a collective agreement with a school board.
2. With administrative control in the hands of The Alberta Teachers' Association, it would be possible for the A.T.A. to limit the number of immigrant teachers through harsh evaluation procedures and thereby aggravate a teacher shortage for the purpose of inflating salaries.
3. Even with a committee of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification setting policy, as recommended by both proposals, the A.S.T.A. argued that a gap would inevitably exist between policy determination and policy administration and this could be used by the A.T.A. to the advantage of teachers.
4. As a rule employers evaluate employees' qualifications and not the employees. Since teachers are employees of school boards trustees could not accept evaluations done by the A.T.A.
5. To prevent the above possibilities from occurring, the A.S.T.A. wanted a neutral agency to administer teacher evaluation. The agency advocated by the A.T.A. was not a neutral one.

The trustees were not in general agreement, at this time, with the A.T.A. claim that evaluation of teachers' credentials is a professional task. When asked about the reaction of the A.S.T.A. officers to this claim, in an interview, the President of the A.S.T.A. (1965-66) replied,

We did not accept the view that evaluation at the administrative level is a professional task. We held the view that evaluations at that level are a mechanical process which, with the proper guidelines can be done by a clerk. Our position was that we wanted an independent body under the Minister of Education, representative of all groups to set those guidelines and we wanted administration of evaluations done in the Registrar's office.<sup>33</sup>



The trustees clearly tended to view the matter of evaluation from a local bargaining point of view. They perceived the possibility of an Evaluation Committee operated by teachers used against trustees at the bargaining tables.<sup>34</sup> The aim of the A.S.T.A. was to prevent control of the evaluation function from falling into the hands of teachers.

#### V. THE A.T.A.'S ASSESSMENT OF A CHANGING SITUATION

Events which took place during the fall and early winter of 1965, both within and without the B.T.E.C., induced the Executive Council of the A.T.A. to make an urgent and careful appraisal of the developing situation and to reassess its own position. The appraisal and reassessment terminated in a confirmation of the original position, the formulation of basic strategy designed to achieve the A.T.A. objective and the development of a sound rationale to justify the strategy. In a special issue of The ATA News, released in February 1966, the A.T.A. Executive informed officials of the local associations what this basic strategy was to be and the reasons for it. An editorial stated:

The Executive Council of the Association will place before the 1966 Annual Representative Assembly a series of resolutions reaffirming policy that evaluations of years of teacher education and membership eligibility are primarily the prerogative of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The resolutions will propose bylaws under which evaluation policies established by a board composed of representatives of the Universities, the Department of Education, the Alberta School Trustees' Association and The Alberta Teachers' Association, will be administered by the A.T.A.<sup>35</sup>

After confirming that the action of the Executive Council was "triggered by events,"<sup>36</sup> the editorial went on to establish a justification for the proposed action.







[T]he decision, which has been under consideration for several years, is based in the conviction that the public interest and the needs of education will both be best served if the Association administers evaluations. It is founded in the principle of high standards in teacher education. Maintenance of high standards will ensure high quality education. Standards can be maintained only when responsible professional judgment is brought to bear on what constitutes a year of acceptable professional education. Quality education is of vital importance to pupils, parents, and employers.<sup>37</sup>

The editorial concluded by stating the conviction that because the Association is ready to assume responsibility for evaluation, it indicates "both a developing maturity and a growing sense of professional responsibility."<sup>38</sup>

A.T.A. strategy. The position of the A.T.A. Executive was that evaluation of years of teacher education is a prerogative of the A.T.A. To exercise this prerogative the A.T.A. had chosen a basic strategy of taking the initiative in setting up an evaluation service. This service would administer evaluations from policies determined by an evaluations board to be established by A.T.A. bylaws.

### Review of Events

Before proceeding to a detailed description of the proposed bylaws and the evaluation service which these bylaws would establish, a review of the events which "triggered" the Executive Council's action would seem to be in order. The original proposal that The Alberta Teachers' Association be given responsibility for evaluations was approved unanimously by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. The proposal was also endorsed by the President of the University of Alberta. For a time, the prospect of the A.T.A. assuming



responsibility for the evaluation function with the approval of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification appeared very bright, indeed. However, from May 31, 1965 onward, the possibility of evaluations going to the A.T.A. seemed to diminish steadily as support for such a policy shifted and began to fall away. On May 31, 1965, the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. announced the opposition of the A.S.T.A. to the plan. On October 25, 1965 the B.T.E.C. approved in principle that evaluation and certification be "handled by the same body." (This implied the Department of Education because only the Department of Education has legislative authority for issuing certificates.) On November 30, 1965, the Dean of the Faculty of Education, University of Alberta met with the Teacher Evaluation Committee which decided to recommend to the President of the University of Alberta that the evaluation service be discontinued. On December 1, 1965, the A.S.T.A. Annual Convention adopted a resolution requesting the Registrar of the Department of Education to take over the evaluation function. On December 3, 1965 the President of the University of Alberta wrote to the Minister of Education informing him of the intention of the University of Alberta to close its evaluation office and recommended that evaluations be "carried out by the Department of Education and handled in connection with certification."

#### A.T.A.'s Perception of the Events

The A.T.A. Executive Council became extremely apprehensive about these developments since they seemed to be pushing the evaluation function in the direction of control by the Department of Education. In the



December issue of The ATA News the Executive expressed this fear to officials of the local associations. Referring to the letter by the President of the University of Alberta and the resolution adopted by the A.S.T.A. an editorial stated:

[The President of the University of Alberta] was not content to so advise the Minister of Education but went further and gave it as his opinion that the Registrar of the Department of Education should do evaluations along with certification.

The Alberta School Trustees' Association, at its recent convention took the same stand.

Whether these moves are connected we do not know.<sup>39</sup> What we do know is that our policy is clear: in the event that the University relinquishes evaluations The Alberta Teachers' Association proposes to do the task. We are adamantly opposed to this function reverting to the Department of Education.<sup>40</sup>

In the same issue of The ATA News two conclusions formulated from an appraisal of the previous events were stated:

Our conclusion with respect to the present situation is that we can no longer count on evaluations being done by the University of Alberta, Edmonton. A second conclusion is that there are pressures to have the Department of Education do evaluations along with certification.<sup>41</sup>

#### A.T.A.'s Assessment of the Position of the University of Alberta

The source of pressure to have the Department of Education do evaluations which seemed to cause the greatest concern to the A.T.A. at that particular time was the pressure from the University of Alberta. From the beginning, the A.T.A. had hoped that the issue over responsibility for evaluation could have been resolved within the "educational family."<sup>42</sup> The A.T.A. had hoped for the support of the University of Alberta in exerting the right to keep the evaluation function among the professional members of the family. (The A.T.A. had no desire to joust







with the A.S.T.A. over the evaluation issue in the public arena because the wider political power base enjoyed by the A.S.T.A. was recognized.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the A.T.A. anticipated that the newspapers would not be sympathetic to the A.T.A. stand.)<sup>44</sup> The A.T.A. had considered it unnecessary for the A.S.T.A. to agree to any proposal that would allow the A.T.A. to take over the evaluation function. A.T.A. representatives had argued that trustees had not agreed to the introduction of collective bargaining and there was, therefore, no need for them to agree to a system of evaluations. The A.S.T.A. resolution, although not entirely unexpected, was distressing. However, when the A.T.A. Executive perceived the University of Alberta, perhaps the most influential member of the educational family, allied with the A.S.T.A. in deed if not in fact, in pursuit of an objective which was totally unacceptable to members of the Association, an even greater feeling of distress was created. To the A.T.A. that wanted the issue solved, hopefully in its favour, within "the family" it appeared as if the family was forming a coalition against it. To see the power of the A.S.T.A. with its many channels of political influence to the Legislature and Provincial Cabinet augmented by the status and prestige of the University of Alberta seemed to give great cause for concern to the A.T.A. Executive.

#### The A.T.A.'s Response to the Position of the University of Alberta

The Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. responded immediately with a letter to the President of the University of Alberta. The letter, which reiterated the position of the A.T.A. and gave reasons why the A.T.A. should legitimately assume responsibility for evaluations, is



quoted here in part:

In your letter to the Minister of Education you offered the opinion that the Department of Education should do evaluations, along with certification. As we understand it, the Department of Education is the Minister of Education and his officials, although I have heard high departmental officials say that the Department of Education is the Minister.

We hold the view that it is the proper function of the University to do evaluations and, failing this, that The Alberta Teachers' Association should do so. Evaluation of the preparation of a professional is properly a professional function rather than a political or civil service function.

Our Association has long stood for high standards in teacher education and can be counted on to continue this stand. We are convinced that individual teachers and the profession would both be equitably served by the Association doing evaluations, since the pressure of individuals to lower standards for their own unique case would be countered by our pressure to maintain high standards. We have been urged, as an Association, to 'accept responsibility for the competence of our members' (Cameron Commission), but can hardly be expected to accept responsibility if the Department of Education both certificates and determines what constitutes a year of preparation for teaching. We receive a steady stream of complaints about evaluations from our members and believe that, if we are going to be held accountable by our members, we should be accorded the responsibility of doing the evaluations.

Starting in 1963, we proposed to do evaluations and developed a plan whereby we would administer a scheme. A committee representative of the faculties of Education and the Department of Education would advise regularly on difficult cases and the Board of Teacher Education and Certification would set policy and hear appeals. We have your letter of December 23, 1964 endorsing this plan.

We believe that this proposal is as sound now as it was then and that in the future it will be much more in accord with the trend of events than what we regard as the retrograde step of handing over evaluations to the Department of Education. Therefore, in response to your letter, we reiterate our contention that evaluations should be done by The Alberta Teachers' Association.<sup>45</sup>

#### A.T.A. Reasons for Seeking the Evaluation Task

The reasons advanced by the A.T.A. for seeking the evaluation task may be summarized as follows:





1. The Alberta Teachers' Association is and will continue to be committed to high standards of education.
2. Evaluation is rightfully a professional task.
3. Since the Association had been urged to accept responsibility for the competence of its members, it needed a voice in evaluating the preparation of them.
4. Evaluation by The Alberta Teachers' Association would ensure that improper and unwarranted political pressures could not be exerted to lower standards.

#### A.T.A. Bases of Commitment

Professional basis. In seeking the support of the membership for its stand on the evaluation of teacher education, the Executive Council stressed the nature of evaluation as a "professional task." The A.T.A. nailed its commitment to take over the evaluation function on the principle of professionalism. This commitment to principle was stated publicly at every opportunity, communicated to the other parties and maintained throughout the total period of the negotiations. The Executive Council was confident that it won the support of its membership on the basis of this principle.<sup>46</sup>

Political basis of commitment. On the other side of the commitment coin was perceived the negative values, the costs to standards if the professional association did not win the right to evaluate teacher education and this function reverted to the Department of Education. The belief that pressure could be exerted politically on the Department of





Education to lower standards was a very real concern of the A.T.A. officers but one which they were reluctant to voice too strongly, in public. To contest the evaluation issue on the grounds that the Department of Education is an easy target for political influence would have served to impugn the integrity of incumbent officials of the Department of Education by implying that they would be capable of duplicity in the administration of the provincial education system. A.T.A. representatives were loath to do this both for ethical reasons and from a tactical point of view. To have alienated any sympathetic understanding for the A.T.A. position on the part of officers of the Department of Education would have served no useful purpose. However, the fear of political pressure appears to have motivated the A.T.A. to resist attempts to have the evaluation function revert to the Department of Education. Another related reason was expressed by the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. in an interview with the writer. He said:

We were adamantly opposed to the Department of Education evaluating teacher qualifications for both certification and salary determination because in that case only officials of the Department of Education would have access to teacher documentation.<sup>47</sup>

These concerns were discussed by the Executive Council of the A.T.A. when it met on December 3 and 4, 1965. Having been informed that the Alberta School Trustees' Association had proposed that evaluations be done by the Registrar of the Department of Education along with certification, the Executive Council gave instructions "that priority be given to implementing Association policy on evaluations."<sup>48</sup>



## VI. THE A.T.A.'S COMMITMENT STRATEGY--DEFENSIVE TACTICS

The first tactical manoeuvres employed by the A.T.A. after perceiving that pressures were being exerted to have the Department of Education take over the evaluation function were defensive. These defensive manoeuvres took the form of meetings with the Minister of Education and senior officers of the Department of Education in which the A.T.A. Executive officers presented the case for The Alberta Teachers' Association taking over the evaluation function and voiced strong opposition to the Department of Education performing the task.

### Meeting with the Minister of Education on December 13, 1965

On December 13, 1965 representatives of The Alberta Teachers' Association held their regular annual meeting with the Minister of Education and senior officials. The major topic of discussion was evaluation of years of teacher education.<sup>49</sup> The A.T.A. representatives were informed of the concerns and plans of the Department of Education regarding the evaluation problem.

Legal basis for evaluation. The Deputy Minister expressed the concern of the Department of Education about the legal basis of evaluation.<sup>50</sup> He pointed out that there was no provincial law which gave legal status to the University's Evaluation Service. The Deputy Minister stressed the view that it would be desirable to establish some basis in law for an evaluation service, especially since the Department of Education requires evaluations for the payment of grants under the Foundation Program. The need to regularize and legalize the practice



through some sort of legislative action seemed to be desirable.

Department of Education's position. The Chief Superintendent of Schools summed up the position of the Department of Education with regard to evaluation for salary purposes. He suggested that the onus for evaluation for salary purposes was a local responsibility as between teachers and school boards.<sup>51</sup> If no satisfactory system existed or if a conflict developed between teachers and school trustees the Minister of Education would have to exercise his residual responsibility to settle the issue. He saw the problem as one of developing some kind of working arrangement which could be easily administered and which would be acceptable to both trustees and teachers.

The Department of Education's plan. The Registrar of the Department of Education indicated that the problem of evaluation could be divided administratively into two levels--one of expediency at the local level and one of expert evaluation by some centralized committee.<sup>52</sup> Because of the time involved in getting evaluation statements, especially for immigrant teachers, school superintendents had difficulty placing teachers on salary grids the first year. The Department officials therefore suggested a possible two-level approach as a solution to the evaluation problem.<sup>53</sup> (1) a local arrangement enabling school superintendents and representatives of the A.T.A. to make an ad hoc evaluation for the first year, thus taking the time urgency out of evaluations, and (2) an expert evaluation made by an independent board, established by order-in-council to give it legal status, with a full-time chairman and







having representatives from teachers and trustees. The A.T.A. representatives were asked for their reactions to such a plan.

The A.T.A.'s reaction to the Department's plan. The A.T.A. representatives reacted negatively to the Department of Education's plan, and spelled out the position of the A.T.A. The Department's plan was unacceptable because evaluations done for expediency at the local level could mean that teachers could be hired on a one-year basis at a salary above proper entitlement.<sup>54</sup> An independent body established by order-in-council was unacceptable because the A.T.A. regarded what constitutes a year in the preparation of a teacher as a professional responsibility and if the University of Alberta was going to give up the task then the A.T.A. deemed it the responsibility of the professional organization and not any board external to and beyond the control of the profession.

The A.T.A. representatives questioned the feasibility of a neutral body doing evaluations on the ground that such a body would have difficulty to determine "who would hire, promote, demote and fire the staff of any so-called neutral body."<sup>55</sup>

The A.T.A. representatives made clear the following additional points:<sup>56</sup>

1. The A.T.A. was opposed to the Department of Education performing the task of evaluation.

2. Although it was desirable for the trustees to agree to a plan for evaluating years of teacher education, the A.T.A. did not consider it necessary for the trustees to agree, in view of the fact that trustees had not agreed to many practices currently in use, for example, collective



bargaining.

3. The A.T.A. wanted the Department of Education to "take no action" or to intervene in any way in the evaluation dispute.

4. The A.T.A. representatives made it clear that the A.T.A. "proposed to do evaluations when the University stopped."<sup>57</sup>

A Meeting with the Minister of Education on January 24, 1966

On January 24, 1966 members of The Alberta Teachers' Association presented a brief to the Minister of Education. The brief dealt with "evaluation of years of teacher education" and "university preparation of teachers."<sup>58</sup>

The brief commented on the recent agreement between the University of Alberta and the Department of Education for the University to continue its evaluation service for at least another year. Referring to the meeting on January 10, 1966 at which time this agreement was reached, the brief stated:

We regret that you called a meeting on a matter which we regard as being of vital concern to teachers and their professional organization without inviting representation from The Alberta Teachers' Association.

With respect to the decision of the meeting, we observe that the proposal that the University continue is only temporary and simply postpones the day when the issue must be resolved.<sup>59</sup>

The A.T.A. position reiterated. The brief reiterated the position of The Alberta Teachers' Association and communicated to the Minister the intention of the A.T.A. to take over the evaluation function.



If the University discontinues the evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes, the Association proposes to undertake the task. We believe that this decision is right because the determination of what constitutes a year in the preparation of a professional is a matter for the profession to decide. The Association has a long history of standing for high standards in teacher education and has every intention of continuing that stand in the interest of the public which it serves. The Association is determined to undertake the responsibility for making evaluations of years of teacher education if and when the University abdicates this function.<sup>60</sup>

## VII. THE A.T.A.'S COMMITMENT STRATEGY--OFFENSIVE TACTICS

Following the Executive Council's decision to implement Association policy on evaluations the A.T.A. Table Officers and Staff Officers prepared an action strategy by which the Association became progressively committed to set up an evaluation service. The strategy involved four steps. These were: (1) the revision of former policy and the preparation of new policy resolutions, (2) development of a plan for the administration of evaluations and membership eligibility, (3) communication of the plan to the membership and the public and acquiring the endorsement of the policy resolution by the Annual Representative Assembly, (4) implementation of the administration of the evaluation service and a service for issuing membership eligibility certificates.

### Revision of Former Policy and Preparation of New Policy Resolutions

At the A.T.A. Executive Council meeting in January, 1966, the decision was made to revise policy with regard to evaluations and to begin developing new policy statements on evaluations and membership eligibility and to prepare a plan for implementing these. The former policy on evaluations (Policy Resolution 1.12a) stated that The Alberta







Teachers' Association should assume responsibility for evaluations under terms of reference to be determined by the B.T.E.C. New policy on evaluations developed by the Executive Council would permit the A.T.A. to administer evaluations under the guidance of a Board of Teacher Qualifications to be established by A.T.A. bylaws. Eligibility membership policy pointed to a Membership Eligibility Board to be established by Association bylaws with authority to issue certificates of membership in The Alberta Teachers' Association. As indicated earlier, the development of these policies was catalyzed by the Executive Council's assessment of the events in the fall of 1965 which sought to assign evaluation responsibility to the Department of Education.

The new policy developed by the Executive Council reflected the professional aspiration of teachers. The decision to set up a Teacher Qualifications Board and Membership Eligibility Board, independent of the B.T.E.C., which is advisory to the Minister of Education, was consistent with the normative value shared by members of the Executive Council that "a professional organization ought to establish criteria for evaluating the qualifications of people who are going to be members of the organization."<sup>61</sup> The Executive Council believed that only through the establishment and operation of such machinery could the A.T.A. attest to the qualifications and competence of its members and be in a position to defend the profession from such political influences and pressures which might attempt to lower professional standards.

Endorsement of new policy by the A.T.A. The Executive Council had no authority to set up a Teacher Qualifications Board or Membership



Eligibility Board until it had the consent of the Annual Representative Assembly. Therefore appropriate policy resolutions were drafted and presented by the Executive Council to the Annual Representative Assembly held April 11 to April 13, 1966. The following resolutions were approved by the A.R.A.:

48E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that, having due regard to the interests of the Minister of Education and the Universities of Alberta, and consistent with the responsibilities which The Alberta Teachers' Association has for maintaining high standards of teacher preparation, the Association holds that the evaluation of years of teacher education is primarily the prerogative of The Alberta Teachers' Association.

49E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that bylaws governing the evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes be established.

50E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that this Annual Representative Assembly instruct the Executive Council to submit to members of the Association the necessary electoral ballots to establish evaluation bylaws.

51E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that the memorandum 'Draft Evaluation Bylaws, 1966' be the basis for such action on evaluations as is deemed necessary by the Executive Council until such bylaws are approved by the next Annual Representative Assembly.

53E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that policy resolution 1.12a be deleted from Association policy.

54E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that policy resolutions in which reference is made to the evaluation of years of teacher education by the University of Alberta, be amended by adding the words 'or by the Teacher Qualifications Board'.

55E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that The Alberta Teachers' Association holds that membership certification of teachers is the prerogative of the Association.

56E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that bylaws governing membership certification of teachers be established.

57E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that this Annual Representative Assembly instruct the Executive Council to submit to members of the Association the necessary electoral ballots to establish membership certification.





58E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that the memorandum 'Draft Membership Certification Bylaws, 1966' be the basis for electoral ballots.

59E/66 BE IT RESOLVED, that the memorandum 'Draft Membership Certification Bylaws, 1966' be the basis for such action on certification as is deemed necessary by the Executive Council until membership certification bylaws are approved by the next Annual Representative Assembly.<sup>62</sup>

#### Plans for Administration of Evaluations and Membership Eligibility

Detailed plans for the administration of evaluations and membership eligibility were prepared and outlined in two bylaws, "Draft Evaluation Bylaws, 1966" and "Draft Membership Certification Bylaws, 1966." These were printed in a document entitled Brochure on Qualifications and Membership Eligibility<sup>63</sup> and distributed to representatives to the Annual Representative Assembly. The bylaws became the basis for action taken by the Executive Council.

#### The Teacher Qualifications Board

Rationale. The establishment of the Teacher Qualifications Board was based on the following rationale:

The Alberta Teachers' Association believes that the determination of what constitutes a year of teacher education is a matter which is properly the right and responsibility of the profession. The Association recognizes that the University of Alberta, the University of Calgary, the Department of Education, and the Alberta School Trustees' Association each has interests in such determination. A basic interest of the Universities is that they prepare approximately three-quarters of the teachers in the Province. A basic interest of the Department of Education is that at present foundation grants are partially based on years of teacher education. A basic interest of the Trustees' Association is that one of the factors which determines teachers' pay is years of teacher education. The interest of The Alberta Teachers' Association is in maintaining high standards of teacher education and in efficient, speedy and equitable evaluation of years of teacher education.<sup>64</sup>





Composition of the Board. The Board was to consist of not more than eight members of whom one was to be chairman. The chairman of the board was to be the President of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The other seven members were to be appointed as follows: three from the A.T.A.; one each from the University of Alberta, the University of Calgary, the Department of Education and the A.S.T.A. Four members personally present at any meeting would constitute a quorum of the Board.

Duties of the Board. The Teacher Qualifications Board was assigned four principal duties. These were:

- (a) to meet not less than once in each calendar year and at such other times as may be necessary to conduct its business;
- (b) to prepare principles for the evaluation of years of teacher education; the said principles shall be submitted to a vote of the locals and the Annual Representative Assembly in the same manner as an amendment to the Association's general bylaws;
- (c) to formulate regulations and to make recommendations to The Alberta Teachers' Association regarding the administration, personnel and facilities required for evaluation of years of teacher education;
- (d) to hear and act upon appeals.<sup>65</sup>

Qualifications Committee. In addition to the Teacher Qualifications Board, there was to be a Qualifications Committee consisting of five persons including the chairman who was to be the Teacher Education and Certification Officer of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The other four members of the committee were to be appointed as follows: one each from the University of Alberta, the University of Calgary, the Department of Education and The Alberta Teachers' Association. The



function of the Qualifications Committee was to review the case of any teacher who was dissatisfied with a Statement of Qualifications issued by the Qualifications Secretary.

Qualifications Secretary. The Qualifications Secretary was to be an employee of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The responsibility of the Qualifications Secretary was to issue Statements of Qualification "as soon as practicable after receipt of any application."<sup>66</sup> The Qualifications Secretary was also to serve as the secretary of the Qualifications Committee. His function on that committee was to explain and elaborate on any Statement of Qualifications up for review.

Appeals. Provision was made for appeals to the Teacher Qualifications Board. Decisions on appeal were to be "final and binding."<sup>67</sup>

Procedures for obtaining a Statement of Qualifications. The procedure to be followed by a teacher requiring a Statement of Qualifications consisted of four stages. First, the teacher was required to submit an application to the Qualifications Secretary, at Barnett House, the ATA Central Office, along with all required documents. On the basis of the documents submitted and the principles established by the Teacher Qualifications Board, the Qualifications Secretary was to issue a Statement of Qualifications. For most applicants the procedure would end there. However, a teacher who was dissatisfied with the Statement of Qualifications or who did not understand it could request a review of the statement by writing to the Qualifications Secretary and requesting that the Statement of Qualifications be reviewed by the Qualifications



Committee. The teacher was to supply additional information and to specify the matter which the committee was requested to consider. After the Qualifications Committee had reviewed the statement, another statement was to have been issued either confirming or revising the original statement. If a teacher was still dissatisfied with his Statement of Qualifications, he could initiate an appeal by writing to the Executive Secretary of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The teacher was to be permitted to make a personal representation before the Appeal Board. The Statement of Qualifications issued by the Appeal Board was to be final and binding.

One of the major points of disagreement between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. focused on the composition of the Teacher Qualifications Board. As might be expected, the trustees objected to the number of A.S.T.A. representatives on the Board as compared to the number from the A.T.A. The composition of the Board as outlined in the bylaw represented an internal compromise of position among members of the A.T.A. Executive Council. Some thought the Board should be composed solely of A.T.A. representatives and questioned the propriety of having any A.S.T.A. representatives on the Board at all. However, all agreed that education is central to the public interest and in order to satisfy the public interest representation was needed from other organizations as well. The organizations to be given representation on the Board were arranged in order of preference, the A.T.A., the Universities, the Department of Education and the Alberta School Trustees' Association. These organizations are named in this order in the "Rationale" (supra.







p. 118) but significantly no mention was made of the "interest" of the A.S.T.A. in policy resolution 48E/66 approved by the Annual Representative Assembly. Possibly between the writing of the resolution and the structuring of the Board, the Executive Council amended its attitude with regard to the A.S.T.A. representation. One might speculate that the Executive Council felt disposed to allow one A.S.T.A. representative on the Board because with four A.T.A. and two University representatives control of the Board by professionals was assured.

#### The Board of Membership Eligibility

The decision by the A.T.A. to establish a Board of Membership Eligibility caused as much concern on the part of the A.S.T.A. officers as the decision to set up a Teacher Qualifications Board.<sup>68</sup> It also caused a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion on the part of teachers who questioned the power of the A.T.A. to deny membership in the Association to anyone to whom the Minister of Education had issued a teaching certificate.<sup>69</sup>

Rationale. The following statement preceded the Draft Membership Certification bylaw, 1966:

The Teaching Profession Act, section 5, membership, states that a teacher may not be employed by a school board unless the teacher is an active member of The Alberta Teachers' Association. It is proposed that principles for membership eligibility shall be established so that the profession can begin to issue membership certificates. It is proposed that in the first instance the possession of a teaching certificate issued by the Minister of Education be one principle of membership eligibility.

Since membership in the professional association is a matter of concern almost exclusively to the profession, it is proposed that the Board of Membership Eligibility consist of representatives



of the Association and of the Faculty of Education in each of the two Universities. This Board would develop principles of membership eligibility. These will be subject to approval by the Annual Representative Assembly in the same manner as our Association bylaws.<sup>70</sup>

This brief rationale was elaborated upon by statements made in interviews with Executive Officers of the A.T.A. The resolution to establish a Membership Eligibility Board was tied philosophically to the resolution to establish a Teacher Qualifications Board. The President of the A.T.A. expressed the hope that if the Membership Eligibility Board worked out as planned it could be a control on certification.<sup>71</sup> The resolution on membership eligibility grew out of a long-standing A.T.A. policy resolution related to the cancellation of interim certificates. Policy resolution 1.8, 1961 states:

BE IT RESOLVED, that a member of The Alberta Teachers' Association, who after three years employment as a teacher has been unable to secure a permanent certificate because of a question of professional competence, be encouraged to seek professional advice from the Association, and further

BE IT RESOLVED, that in the event of failure to secure the permanent certificate because of a question of professional competence within a further three year period, the Association request the Minister of Education to cancel the existing interim certificate.<sup>72</sup>

The Teaching Profession Act had granted the A.T.A. disciplinary powers for investigating and dealing with members suspected of unprofessional or unethical conduct. However, the Association did not have a satisfactory mechanism for investigating or dealing with members suspected of incompetence in teaching. The Board of Membership Eligibility was intended to fill this need by implementing Policy Resolution 1.8 noted above. Hopefully, the Board would serve two functions:





1. A watchdog function, giving the A.T.A. an apparatus for determining if requirements for certification were, in fact, being honoured by the Minister of Education in issuing Certificates of Authority to teach;
2. A control function, providing the A.T.A. with a mechanism which could be used to prevent an individual from teaching whose professional competence was in question.<sup>73</sup>

The effectiveness of the control function of the Board would depend on how successfully the A.T.A. could invoke section 5 of The Teaching Profession Act to keep incompetent teachers out of the classroom.

Section 5 of The Teaching Profession Act states:

Subject to this section the employment of a teacher by a school board other than as a superintendent is conditional upon the teacher being and continuing to be an active member of the association.<sup>75</sup>

Composition of the Board of Membership Eligibility. The Board of Membership Eligibility was to consist of five members of whom one was to be the chairman. The chairman was to be the President of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The other four members were to be appointed as follows: one from each of the Universities of Alberta and two from the A.T.A.

Duties of the Board of Membership Eligibility. The duties of the Board were outlined in the Draft Membership Certification Bylaw as follows:

- (a) to meet not less than once in each calendar year and at such other times as may be necessary to conduct its business;
- (b) to prepare principles of eligibility for membership in the Association; the said principles shall be submitted to a vote of the locals and the Annual Representative Assembly in the same manner as an amendment to the Association's general bylaws;





- (c) to formulate regulations and to make recommendations to The Alberta Teachers' Association regarding the administration, personnel and facilities required for the determination of eligibility for membership in the Association;
- (d) to hear and act upon appeals.

Membership Committee. A smaller committee to be called the Membership Committee was provided for in the bylaw. This committee was to be made up of three representatives, one from each of the universities and The Alberta Teachers' Association. Its function was to deal with and rule upon applications for Statements of Membership Eligibility referred to it by the Qualifications Secretary by an applicant or by the Executive Council of the A.T.A.

Statement of Membership Eligibility. A statement of Membership Eligibility was defined as a "certificate which sets forth whether or not the person therein named is eligible for membership in the Association."<sup>76</sup>

Procedure and review. The procedures for obtaining a Statement of Membership Eligibility, a review and an appeal were to be similar to those for obtaining a Statement of Qualifications, review and appeal except that in the case of the Statement of Membership Eligibility, the Executive Council could initiate review action.

Communication of the Plan and Its Justification to the Membership of the Association

The membership of The Alberta Teachers' Association was kept fully informed about the plans of the Executive Council regarding



evaluations, the background of the developing issue and the positions taken by the A.S.T.A., the universities and the Department of Education. Mention has already been made of an announcement to the membership in the February, 1966 issue of The ATA News that the Executive Council would introduce resolutions on Evaluations and Membership Eligibility. Other channels of communication used by the Executive to keep the membership informed were The ATA Magazine, regional conferences, newsletters and addresses to teachers at area conventions. In February, 1966, representatives of the local associations were provided with copies of the Executive Council's resolutions on Evaluations and Draft Evaluation Bylaws, at regional conferences. Views of the local associations were solicited and the Executive Council's position clarified. Plans to set up an evaluation service by Association bylaws were also announced in The ATA Magazine.<sup>77</sup>

Public announcement of the A.T.A.'s plan. The first public announcement of the A.T.A.'s decision to take over the evaluation task was made during the Second Edmonton District Teachers' Convention held in February, 1966. An outline of the A.T.A.'s proposal for administering evaluations was made at the convention by an Executive Assistant of the A.T.A. and reported in The Edmonton Journal, along with reactions by the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education.<sup>78</sup> In an article headed "ATA Plans Discredited," The Edmonton Journal made the public aware of the developing conflict between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A.

When interviewed by the newspaper reporter who wrote the story, the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. called the A.T.A.'s action



"presumptuous." He said, "They're presumptuous in saying they're going to take it over. . . .There's no authority for them to do so. I don't think the Minister of Education will agree to it."<sup>79</sup> He pointed out that the A.S.T.A. was opposed to the scheme for a number of reasons and wanted an impartial and neutral agency to perform the evaluations.

The A.T.A. staff officer countered with the argument, "It certainly is not presumptuous for us to say what a year of teacher education is. After all, we are the professional body of teachers, and if we can't say who can?"<sup>80</sup>

The Minister of Education called the A.T.A.'s proposal "premature"<sup>81</sup> because the University of Alberta was still evaluating years of teacher education and the Minister hoped it would continue indefinitely.<sup>82</sup>

Public controversy. The news story in the February 26 edition of The Edmonton Journal and subsequent stories precipitated a certain amount of public debate on the evaluation issue. In a story entitled "Storm Looms Over Teacher Evaluation," on February 28, 1966, The Edmonton Journal listed some questions which the leader of the opposition planned to ask the Minister of Education when the Legislature met in the afternoon. The opposition leader wanted the Minister to explain "if he agrees with evaluation by the ATA or a neutral body?"<sup>83</sup> He also wanted to know from the Minister "whether the ATA or the Alberta School Trustees' Association has authority to establish an evaluation centre?"<sup>84</sup> He said, "There could be danger here. . . .The teachers and trustees must be able to work together. We must not disrupt the good







relationship between the two."<sup>85</sup>

The response of the Minister of Education. In answer to the questions posed by the leader of the opposition, the Minister of Education informed the Legislature that arrangements had been made for the University "to continue the work for another year."<sup>86</sup> He also expressed the view that it would be unlikely that the University would withdraw from the field although University officials had indicated that they would prefer not to carry on. "The evaluation should be done by the people who do the training," the Minister said.<sup>87</sup>

A.T.A. reaction to the public controversy. The A.T.A. did not become directly involved in the public controversy through the public press but commented on the news stories in a special issue of The ATA News distributed in March, 1966 to executive officers of the local associations. In this issue an editorial commented that:

The controversy which has erupted in the press about the proposal that The Alberta Teachers' Association evaluate years of teacher education has smoked out into the open the real reasons for opposition to the proposition. It is alleged that, if the Association administers evaluations, it will control the supply of teachers and that teachers will be determining their own salaries.

Stuff and Nonsense!

The Association is on record that the evaluation of programs and years of teacher education should be based on the principle that teachers who have taken their teacher education outside Alberta should have their qualifications evaluated on a basis no less, but no more favourable than that which is applied to teachers who have been prepared within this province.<sup>88</sup>

Commenting on the Minister of Education's statement to the press that the Association's action would be premature because the University



had agreed to continue for a year, the editorial in The ATA News claimed that:

Officials of the University of Alberta in Edmonton have assured us that the University does not want to do evaluations. In addition we have learned that -

- The evaluations office has been moved out of the Faculty of Education to temporary accommodation.
- The office now has silent telephone numbers.
- The fee for evaluations has been increased from \$2 to \$5.
- The evaluations officer is now responsible to the registrar rather than to the dean of education as was formerly the case.

.....

The Association was not consulted with respect to any of these changes and is now requested to inform teachers.

From these changes and the Minister's statement it can be inferred that the University of Alberta is continuing perhaps unwillingly to do evaluations on a temporary basis. This lends an even greater sense of urgency and importance for the Association to develop viable plans for performing this service.<sup>89</sup>

#### Implementation of the Evaluation Service

A.R.A. approval of Evaluation and Membership Eligibility Resolutions. The delegates to the Annual Representative Assembly held in Calgary, April 11 to April 13, 1966 debated the Executive Council's resolutions on Evaluations and Membership Eligibility and voted "overwhelmingly in favour of the proposals."<sup>90</sup> Having received the endorsement of the A.R.A. for its plan, the Executive Council acted quickly to implement it. The authority to proceed immediately with plans to implement administration of the evaluation service was contained in Policy Resolution 52E/66 which stated:

BE IT RESOLVED, THAT the memorandum 'Draft Evaluation Bylaws 1966' be the basis for such action on evaluations as is deemed necessary by the Executive Council until such bylaws are approved by the next Annual Representative Assembly.



The administrative plan. An administrative plan for implementing the Evaluation Service had been prepared by the A.T.A. staff officers in the expectation that the Annual Representative Assembly would approve the resolution, in April. The knowledge that such a plan had been prepared prompted the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. to predict on the day the policy resolutions were approved by the A.R.A. that "the A.T.A. Service would start by June 1."<sup>91</sup> The plan for implementing the Evaluation Service included hiring personnel, securing adequate space and equipment at Barnett House, establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board and Qualifications Committee, drafting necessary application forms, establishing administrative procedures for evaluation and requesting local authorities of the A.T.A. to urge members to get free "conversion statements."

Appointment of a Teacher Education and Certification Officer. A new Teacher Education and Certification Officer was appointed at the Executive Council meeting of April 23, 1966, to replace the incumbent, who had been granted leave of absence for education purposes.<sup>92</sup> The announcement of this officer's appointment made in The ATA Magazine indicated that:

One of the immediate and pressing duties of his new position will be supervision of the initial stages in the development of the Association's teacher qualifications and membership eligibility office, which is now being organized following the decision of the 1966 Annual Representative Assembly that the Association should evaluate teachers' qualifications as a service to members and their employing boards.<sup>93</sup>







Establishing Teacher Qualifications Board and Committee. The Draft Evaluation Bylaws called for representation of the Teacher Qualifications Board from the A.T.A., the universities, the Department of Education and the Alberta School Trustees' Association. The Qualifications Committee allowed for representation from each of the universities and the Department of Education as well as the A.T.A. The A.T.A. Executive Council appointed the following as A.T.A. representatives: the President of the A.T.A. as chairman, a teacher from Medicine Hat, the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. and the superintendent of the Calgary Public School System. The Assistant Executive Secretary was appointed as A.T.A. representative to the Qualifications Committee. On April 27, 1966 letters signed by an Executive Assistant of the A.T.A. were sent to the other groups inviting each to appoint the allotted number of representatives to the Qualifications Board and Qualifications Committee. None of the other groups requested was prepared to name representatives to the Teacher Qualifications Board or Qualifications Committee at that time, because of the controversy which had been generated by the A.T.A.'s action.

Response from the A.S.T.A. The General Secretary of the A.S.T.A. responded to the A.T.A.'s invitation in a letter as follows:

Your letter of April 27 and enclosures relative to your Association's progress in the organization of an office for the evaluation of years of teacher education were carefully considered at a meeting of the A.S.T.A. Executive on May 7.

Please be advised of the following motion as recorded in the minutes of that meeting:



"That The Alberta Teachers' Association be advised that in light of the directives from the Annual Convention the Alberta School Trustees' Association cannot appoint a member to the Board of Teacher Qualification."

The purpose of this letter is to advise you of the above which declines your request as forwarded under date of April 27.<sup>94</sup>

Response from the Dean of Education, Edmonton. In a letter dated May 7, 1966, the Dean of Education, University of Alberta, wrote:

In reply to your letter of April 27, 1966, although I would personally be willing to cooperate in any plan that will make more effective the evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes I am deferring any commitment on the part of the Faculty of Education until first the matter has been cleared with [the President] who is interested in this whole matter from a broader University point of view and secondly until after the meeting which the Minister of Education has called and to which I expect all interested parties have been called on the afternoon of May 16th.<sup>95</sup>

Response of the Minister of Education. The Minister of Education addressed his reply to the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. because he thought it was "perhaps more appropriately so directed."<sup>96</sup> In part the Minister's letter stated:

The letter invites me to name one representative to each of two bodies which the A.T.A. proposes to establish in connection with teacher qualification evaluations. This I do not feel that I can do at this stage for reasons, some of which are outlined below.

First, may I say as far as the arrangements proposed are concerned, in terms of a board to establish policy, or guidelines, an evaluation committee and a procedure for appeal, these seem to be acceptable, and, in fact, are only removed in detail from the present arrangements.

There appear to be two rather important questions:

- (1) How should new, more formalized arrangements be brought into existence?
- (2) By what authority are powers vested in the new bodies?





We are assuming that what is proposed relates to the evaluation of qualifications for salary schedule purposes, although nowhere in the draft bylaw is this stated. It could be interpreted as having application to certification, university credit, or school foundation program payments. This is obviously something very much in need of clarification.

It is noted that clause 10(2) states that the decision of the Board on appeal "shall be final and binding." Our question is binding upon whom, and by what authority is it binding? This seems to indicate some of the problems inherent in a proposal that bylaw of one organization or body be established that has a regulatory or control function over others who are not part of that organization.

Considering it from another point of view, we have some concern that a number of bodies, each of which is an entity in its own right, should be constituted as part of an organization by virtue of a bylaw of one of them.

It seems to us that a new body to concern itself with evaluations for salary purposes might come into existence by one of two procedures,

- (a) By statute;
- (b) By agreement among the interested parties.

While there have been some meetings between some of the parties interested in the matter in question, at no time, I think, has there been a meeting of all those concerned. This has perhaps been unfortunate. In my opinion such a meeting should be held.

Consequently I am inviting The Alberta Teachers' Association, the Alberta School Trustees' Association, and the two faculties of Education to send representatives to meet with us in the Department of Education on Monday, May 16, at 2:00 p.m. to see whether it is not possible to arrive at arrangements which would be more mutually acceptable. We trust that representatives of the A.T.A. will be present.

In my opinion the A.T.A. proposal should be fully explained and discussed at the meeting, as well as other possibilities including that of having the universities continue to render service in this regard, though I am fully aware of their reluctance to do so.<sup>97</sup>





Confusion over "purpose" of the Teacher Qualification Board. The A.T.A. spelled out very clearly the purpose of its Evaluation Service in a brief to the Provincial Cabinet on December 16, 1966. The brief stated: ". . .The Alberta Teachers' Association is now offering a Teacher Qualifications Service to evaluate years of teacher education for salary purposes."<sup>98</sup> However, the purpose of the A.T.A. Evaluation Service was not clear in April, 1966 and some of the parties speculated that the A.T.A. had in mind purposes additional to the purpose of evaluation for salary entitlement. The Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. pointed out in The Alberta School Trustee "their literature stresses evaluation often unattached from the salary qualifier."<sup>99</sup> The Minister of Education remarked in the letter quoted above that nowhere in the Draft Evaluation Bylaw was it stated that the evaluation of qualifications was for salary purposes and that it could be interpreted as having application to certification, university credit, or school foundation program payments. The Minister asked for clarification on this point. The Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. did not directly answer the Minister's question of purpose but stated only that:

. . .The Association's teacher qualification board is designed to provide a service. It is not intended that this service be imposed on any institution or body or group. For this reason, we believe that, as is at present the case for university evaluations, no special authority or power is needed.<sup>100</sup>

The President of the A.T.A. indicated in an interview during the course of research for this study that a statement of purpose had been omitted from the bylaw because to the A.T.A. "the purpose was obvious, since Teacher Qualifications Board was established as a replacement for



the University of Alberta's Evaluation Committee."<sup>101</sup> The Teacher Qualifications Board, in his opinion, could not have been used for certification because later one of the principles established by the Board was that an evaluation would not be undertaken until the applicant held a certificate to teach in Alberta issued by the Department of Education. The A.T.A. had hoped from the beginning that its Evaluation Service would be used by the Department of Education for Foundation Program payments, as the University of Alberta's Evaluation Committee had been used for this purpose.

Meeting with the Minister of Education on May 16, 1966

In response to the Minister's invitation representatives of the universities of Alberta, the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. met on May 16 with the Minister of Education and senior officers of the Department of Education to discuss the issue which had developed over the matter of evaluation of teacher education. The meeting ended in a deadlock with no change in the position of either party. The Chief Superintendent of Schools told a newspaper reporter when asked about the meeting, "We didn't get anywhere."<sup>102</sup> The Chief Superintendent (subsequently appointed Deputy Minister) informed the writer in an interview that he had been shocked at the amount of tension and emotion which was generated at the meeting, especially between representatives of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A.<sup>103</sup> The President of the A.S.T.A. (1966) said, "The tension at the meeting was extremely high. I had never attended a meeting with A.T.A. people like it before."<sup>104</sup>



The position of the Minister of Education. The Minister of Education, who acted as chairman of the meeting, expressed the hope that the Faculty of Education would continue to provide an evaluation service for teachers and school boards.<sup>105</sup> The Minister indicated that he would not be able to use the evaluations done by the proposed A.T.A. Evaluation Service for the purposes of Foundation Program payments.<sup>106</sup>

Position of the Dean of Education, Edmonton. The Dean of Education rejected the view held by the Minister that the University should continue to provide an evaluation service. The Dean reiterated the point which he had made many times before which was that in his opinion the evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes was not a proper function of a university. He advanced the suggestion that evaluations should be done by a body representative of all parties. He saw the problem as one of finding a de facto solution to the establishment of an Evaluation Board, rather than a de jure solution as was being advocated by some.<sup>107</sup> The Dean argued that the University Evaluation Committee which had no legal basis worked quite well and that it should be possible to establish a similar body which would be acceptable to all concerned.<sup>108</sup>

The Dean of Education, University of Calgary, agreed that evaluations should be done by a single body representative of all interested parties. He considered it appropriate that this body function under the direction of the Registrar of the Department of Education.







Suggestions by senior Department of Education officials. The Chief Superintendent of Schools pointed out that different bodies were used to evaluate teacher education in other jurisdictions. He informed the meeting that in British Columbia the Department of Education did evaluations along with certification and that this seemed to be acceptable. The Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation provided an evaluation service which was accepted by Ontario school boards for salary determination. In Alberta, all parties had been willing to let the University of Alberta perform the evaluation function. The Deputy Minister of Education questioned the suitability of setting up an evaluation board by A.T.A. bylaws. He suggested that evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes was of primary interest to the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. and of only secondary interest to the universities and the Department of Education. Therefore, it might be logical to set up a body through complementary bylaws of both the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A.<sup>109</sup>

Objections of the A.S.T.A. to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board. The President of the A.S.T.A. indicated that the Teacher Qualifications Board proposed by the A.T.A. was completely unacceptable to the A.S.T.A. and that school trustees would not likely accept evaluation statements issued by it for salary determination. He said, "The A.T.A. want to write the rules and umpire the game." He gave the following as his main objections to the A.T.A. proposal: (1) the policy board was an A.T.A. board, set up by A.T.A. bylaws and subject to control by the Annual Representative Assembly, (2) the A.T.A. had more



representatives on the Board than the A.S.T.A., (3) the A.S.T.A. had no representation on the Qualifications Committee, and (4) nowhere in the A.T.A. bylaw did it state that the Qualifications Secretary was to be subject to the policies of the Qualifications Board or decisions of the Qualifications Committee.<sup>110</sup>

A.S.T.A. proposals. Two proposals were put forth by the A.S.T.A. representatives. The Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. reiterated the A.S.T.A. policy resolution of November 1965 which called for a policy-setting body representative of all groups and a neutral administration committee operated by the Department of Education which would evaluate credentials in accordance with the guidelines set down by the policy body. The President of the A.S.T.A. suggested that a board with authority to evaluate for both certification and salary determination be set up by legislation with equal representation from all parties. Evaluations done by this board could be used for Foundation Program payments as well.

Position of the A.T.A. The A.T.A. representatives explained the organization of the A.T.A. Evaluation Service and how it was intended to function. The Vice-President of the A.T.A. stated that the Evaluation Service was scheduled to go into operation on June 1 and asked if the various proposals meant that the A.T.A. was being asked to delay the commencement of its service. The A.S.T.A. representatives questioned the source of authority for the A.T.A. for setting up an Evaluation Service without the consent of the other parties and especially at a



time when the University of Alberta was still providing this service. The A.T.A. Vice-President then stated very emphatically that the A.T.A. was going to proceed with its plan to establish an evaluation service, whether the University continued or not, or whether the other parties agreed or not.<sup>111</sup> At that point a high level of hostility developed among the parties. The Dean of Education, University of Alberta stated that since the A.T.A. was firmly committed to this position there was no point in continuing with the meeting. He said it was his understanding that the meeting had been called to try to find some mutually acceptable solution to the problem. The meeting broke up soon after. The Minister of Education asked the representatives to go back to their respective associations and "search out your souls."<sup>112</sup>

The A.S.T.A. representatives explained in interviews with this writer the reason for their hostility toward the A.T.A. at that time. The Executive Director (1967) said,

We considered that the A.T.A. Executive officers were exceeding the authority given to them by their Annual Representative Assembly. It was our understanding that their Evaluation bylaws would have to be ratified by the next A.R.A. before their service could be put into operation. We thought we had a whole year in which to work out a compromise in our respective positions. We went to the meeting prepared to negotiate in good faith, but the A.T.A. said that the evaluations were non-negotiable.<sup>113</sup>

The President of the A.S.T.A. said, "It was their uncompromising attitude that made us angry. In effect they said, 'Here is our service. Take it or leave it.'"<sup>114</sup>







# VIII. THE A.S.T.A.'S ASSESSMENT OF THE A.T.A.'S PROPOSAL

## Perception of the Costs of Acceptance of the A.T.A.'s Proposal

The A.S.T.A. staff officers made a systematic and detailed analysis of the statement of "rationale" which preceded the Draft Evaluation Bylaws and Draft Membership Eligibility Bylaws.<sup>115</sup> From this analysis the A.S.T.A. estimated the costs, both economic and non-economic, involved in the A.T.A.'s proposal. From the analysis, the A.S.T.A. eventually determined the position to which it became firmly committed and developed strategy for attaining its objective.

Perception of economic costs. In assessing the implications of the A.T.A.'s original proposal (1964), the A.S.T.A. had considered mainly the economic costs associated with it. The trustees perceived a disadvantage at the bargaining tables, if teachers were permitted to administer the evaluation of teacher education, even under policies determined by the B.T.E.C. In the 1966 proposals, the A.S.T.A. saw an even greater possibility of economic advantage in the hands of teachers; A Salary Bulletin conveyed these fears to the membership. It stated that the essence of The Alberta Teachers' Association proposal was:

- (1) That evaluations be carried out by an Alberta Teachers' Association agency and Alberta Teachers' Association personnel guided by a governing board on which Alberta Teachers' Association will have 50% of members. However, the policy of the governing board would not bind the evaluations staff and is subject to review of The Alberta Teachers' Association. Obviously, this proposal would allow Alberta Teachers' Association to dominate and effectively control teacher qualifications and evaluations and therefore the supply of teachers.



- (2) That qualifications for membership in Alberta Teachers' Association be controlled by principles developed by a committee on which A.S.T.A. would not be represented and on which Alberta Teachers' Association representatives would form a majority. These principles would be reviewed by Alberta Teachers' Association. . . . Alberta Teachers' Association would therefore have a second control on teacher supply.<sup>116</sup>

Perception of non-economic costs. In the 1966 proposals advanced by the A.T.A. costs more far-reaching and ominous than monetary ones, from the A.S.T.A. point of view, were perceived. The trustees feared that control of public education was being threatened by the unilateral approach of the A.T.A. to evaluations and membership eligibility. The decision of the A.T.A. to set up its own Evaluation Service and Membership Eligibility Board was assessed in relation to the perceived militant professional activity of teachers all across Canada. The A.S.T.A. claimed that teacher organizations everywhere in Canada were developing blueprints to modify the locus of control of public education.<sup>117</sup> The activities of the A.T.A. with respect to teacher evaluations was considered to be a "startling example of such a pattern."<sup>118</sup> The A.S.T.A. believed that the calculated attempts of teachers to gain control of public education were being made under the guise of "professionalism." An editorial in The School Trustee stated:

. . . If such professionalism means the mastery of a unique set of knowledge and skills and the attendant confidence such competence evokes in the teachers' clientele; or if it means an unswerving devotion to the goals of education and soundly developed policies of those agencies legally empowered to formulate them; or if it means the rendering of such services for an established salary; or if it means collectively guaranteeing the improved conduct and competence of the membership--well and good! But if it means effecting control over educational services through deciding teacher eligibility; or if it means more than





normal political organizational influence over teacher education and certification--then we vigorously protest.<sup>119</sup>

The editorial summarized the A.S.T.A.'s assessment of the A.T.A.'s activity in the following way:

The recent A.T.A. proposals with respect to teacher evaluations and membership eligibility must be viewed as a threat to public control. This unilateral development by an agency which has more than a passing interest in the relationship of teachers' economic welfare to the supply of teachers could curtail the flow of immigrant educators to this province with drastic accumulative effect over a number of years. . . .

But this is not our major concern. We are convinced (and a recent television statement by a teachers' official confirms our position) that the teacher organization is bent on control of teacher certification and is being watched and encouraged by other teacher bodies as an avant garde institution in this respect. We view the recent proposals regarding evaluations and membership eligibility as the first bold thrust in direction of such control.<sup>120</sup>

## IX. THE A.S.T.A.'S COMMITMENT

### Commitment to Principle

The A.S.T.A. nailed its commitment to a principle of presumed importance. The principle was that ultimate control of public education should rightfully reside in the hands of elected politicians. The A.S.T.A. wanted the Minister of Education to take over evaluations to ensure that principle. In a brief to the Minister of Education on May 19, 1966, the A.S.T.A. stated its very firm commitment in the following way:

The A.S.T.A. is more than ever committed to two principles: (1) That the Department of Education is the only body which can determine teaching eligibility for the teachers of Alberta's publicly-supported schools, and (2) That the Department must assume a leadership role with respect to the evaluation of teachers' credentials for salary purposes lest any developing structure makes inroads upon determining teacher eligibility.<sup>121</sup>





Communication of Commitment to the Membership of the A.S.T.A.

The commitment was communicated to the membership of the A.S.T.A. in a newsletter in May, 1966, which stated: "A.S.T.A. will push for the task of evaluations to be assumed by the Department of Education. . . ."122

Addressing the general membership in the "President's Column" in The Alberta School Trustee, the President of the A.S.T.A. said:

As trustees, we subscribe to the view that our educational system must remain under public control. . . .We believe that the determination of years of training for certification and salary purposes must be a responsibility shared with the Department of Education and the trustees who represent the public.123

Commitment through the Annual Convention. The A.S.T.A. commitment was endorsed by the Annual Convention held in Calgary during the first week of December, 1966. The following emergent resolution introduced by the Grande Prairie School Division was approved:

WHEREAS the control of public education is of concern to all citizens; and

WHEREAS it is evident that continuous evaluation of teacher training is necessary; and

WHEREAS it is desirable that a list of accredited institutions be established and reviewed and that criteria be established for the certification and evaluation of teachers' credentials;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that a neutral body be established under the Minister of Education for the purpose of evaluating the university education of teachers for certification and salary determination.124

A.S.T.A. Proposals

In keeping with its commitment that evaluation of teacher education must remain a public prerogative, the A.S.T.A. submitted two proposals to the Minister of Education.



Proposal A. The A.S.T.A.'s first proposal grew out of the 1965 policy resolution. It provided for an agency, under the Minister of Education, "neutral as between teachers and trustees" to evaluate teacher education. Since this proposal was rejected by the A.T.A. and did not seem to win favour with the Minister of Education, the A.S.T.A. prepared a second proposal which was presented to the Minister of Education a few days after the meeting on May 16 with the Minister of Education and representatives of the other groups.

Proposal B. The second proposal was patterned closely after the system used in British Columbia and was related to a structure approved by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification in May, 1965, which determined for certification purposes what constitutes two, three and four years of teacher education. Proposal B would hinge salary evaluation and certification and extend certificates to include five and six years of teacher education. The salary paid to a teacher would depend upon the certificate held. The Department of Education would remain responsible for granting teaching certificates.

In presenting the proposal, the A.S.T.A. representatives pointed out that it was based on a structure which had the unanimous support of the B.T.E.C. on which the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. are represented. The pattern also recognized the autonomy of the universities of Alberta and presented a "quality core with sufficient flexibility to take into consideration the particular programs of teacher education of universities within and without Alberta."<sup>125</sup>



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup>Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, dated October 21, 1964.

<sup>2</sup>The Alberta Teachers' Association, "Evaluation of Years of Teacher Education, 4th Draft Plan," June 1, 1964. (Mimeographed)

<sup>3</sup>At this time there was only one University of Alberta with two campuses at Edmonton and Calgary.

<sup>4</sup>"Evaluation of Years of Teacher Education," op. cit.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Minutes of a meeting of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, dated October 21, 1964.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>The ATA News, 1:3, December, 1965.

<sup>9</sup>Letter from the President of the University of Alberta to the Chief Superintendent of Schools, Department of Education, dated December 23, 1964.

<sup>10</sup>The ATA News, op. cit.

<sup>11</sup>"Resolutions Approved," The ATA Magazine, 45:45, May, 1965.

<sup>12</sup>Minutes of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, dated May 31, 1965.

<sup>13</sup>Report of the Teacher Education and Certification Committee of The Alberta Teachers' Association, October, 1965.

<sup>14</sup>Minutes of a Committee of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, dated October 12, 1965.

<sup>15</sup>The ATA News, 1:3, December, 1965.

<sup>16</sup>Minutes of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification dated October 25, 1965.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.





<sup>18</sup>The Dean of Education explained in an interview on November 23, 1967, that the University supported the transfer of evaluations to the Department of Education because it was The Dean's understanding that the A.T.A. was in favour of this move as well.

<sup>19</sup>Letter from the President of the University of Alberta to the Minister of Education, dated December 3, 1965.

<sup>20</sup>Interview, Dean of Education, University of Alberta, November 23, 1967.

<sup>21</sup>This point of view was expressed by all the persons interviewed in connection with this study, including the Minister of Education.

<sup>22</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, February 26, 1966.

<sup>23</sup>For example, the following statement appears in an A.S.T.A. document, Crisis in Alberta Education: "Public control can be retained if the Department of Education retains responsibility for certification and salary evaluation. The President of the University of Alberta wrote the Minister of Education in December 1965, urging that teacher evaluation and certification be carried out by the Registrar of the Department of Education."

<sup>24</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 24, 1967.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Interview with the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A., November 21, 1967.

<sup>27</sup>Policy 104, Policy Handbook, 1967, The Alberta School Trustees' Association.

<sup>28</sup>Resolution Handbook, 1965 Convention. The Alberta School Trustees' Association.

<sup>29</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.

<sup>30</sup>The ATA News, op. cit., p. 7.    <sup>31</sup>Ibid.    <sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.

<sup>34</sup>Later events demonstrated that not all trustees and not all members of the A.S.T.A. Executive Council had this fear. However, in December, 1965, the view appears to have been a corporate view of the A.S.T.A.



<sup>35</sup>The ATA News, 1:1, February, 1966.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.      <sup>37</sup>Ibid.      <sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>The Dean of Education and representatives of the A.S.T.A. assured this researcher that there was no connection between these moves.

<sup>40</sup>The ATA News, 1:1, December, 1965.      <sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 24, 1967.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.      <sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Letter from the Executive Secretary to the President of the University of Alberta, dated December 8, 1965.

<sup>46</sup>This point of view was expressed by all members of the A.T.A. who were interviewed.

<sup>47</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 24, 1967.

<sup>48</sup>The ATA News, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>49</sup>The ATA News, 1:5, February, 1966.      <sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>From unofficial transcript of the meeting made by A.T.A. representatives. Confirmed in an interview with the former Chief Superintendent of Schools on October 5, 1967.

<sup>52</sup>Interview with the Registrar of the Department of Education on October 31, 1967.

<sup>53</sup>The ATA News, op. cit.

<sup>54</sup>Unofficial transcript of the meeting made by the A.T.A. representatives. Confirmed in an interview with the Executive Secretary on November 7, 1967.

<sup>55</sup>The ATA News, op. cit.      <sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 6.      <sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Brief to the Minister of Education of the Province of Alberta, January 24, 1966. The Alberta Teachers' Association, Edmonton, Alberta.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.      <sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 29, 1967.



<sup>62</sup>"Resolutions Approved," The ATA Magazine, 46:48, May, 1966.

<sup>63</sup>The Alberta Teachers' Association, Brochure on Qualifications and Membership Eligibility (Edmonton: The Alberta Teachers' Association, March, 1966).

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 1.      <sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 7.      <sup>66</sup>Ibid.      <sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>68</sup>Interview with the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. on December 20, 1967.

<sup>69</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 29, 1967.

<sup>70</sup>Brochure on Qualifications and Membership Eligibility, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>71</sup>Interview with the President of the A.T.A. on December 1, 1967.

<sup>72</sup>Policy Resolution 1.8/61, Policy Handbook, The Alberta Teachers' Association, Edmonton, Alberta.

<sup>73</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 29, 1967.

<sup>74</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.T.A. on November 28, 1967.

<sup>75</sup>Section 5(1), The Teaching Profession Act, R.S.A., 1955.

<sup>76</sup>Brochure on Qualifications and Membership Eligibility, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>77</sup>"Issues in Teacher Education and Certification," The ATA Magazine, 46:17, March, 1966.

<sup>78</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, February 26, 1966.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.      <sup>80</sup>Ibid.      <sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education on December 12, 1967.

<sup>83</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, February 28, 1966.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.      <sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, March 1, 1966.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.







<sup>88</sup>The ATA News, 1, March, 1966. <sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, April 13, 1966.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup>"New Staff Appointment," The ATA Magazine, 46:28, May, 1966.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Letter from the General Secretary of the A.S.T.A. to The Alberta Teachers' Association, dated May 10, 1966.

<sup>95</sup>Letter from the Dean of Education, University of Alberta to The Alberta Teachers' Association, dated May 7, 1966.

<sup>96</sup>Letter from the Minister of Education to The Alberta Teachers' Association, dated May 5, 1966.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>The Alberta Teachers' Association, Teacher Qualifications Service of The Alberta Teachers' Association (Edmonton, Alberta, December 14, 1966) (mimeographed).

<sup>99</sup>"Teacher Education, Certification and Evaluation for Salary Purposes," The Alberta School Trustee, 36:9, May, 1966.

<sup>100</sup>Letter from the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. to the Minister of Education, dated May 6, 1966.

<sup>101</sup>Interview with the President of the A.T.A. on December 1, 1967.

<sup>102</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, June 7, 1966.

<sup>103</sup>Interview with the Deputy Minister of Education on October 25, 1967.

<sup>104</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.

<sup>105</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education on December 12, 1967.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid.

<sup>107</sup>Interview with the Dean of Education, University of Alberta on November 23, 1967.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.



- <sup>109</sup> Interview with the Deputy Minister of Education on October 25, 1967.
- <sup>110</sup> Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.
- <sup>111</sup> This point confirmed by all who were interviewed in connection with this study.
- <sup>112</sup> Interview with Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 24, 1967.
- <sup>113</sup> Interview with the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. on December 20, 1967.
- <sup>114</sup> Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.
- <sup>115</sup> The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Crisis in Alberta Education (The Alberta School Trustees' Association, July, 1966), p. 10.
- <sup>116</sup> The Alberta School Trustees' Association, A.S.T.A. Salary Bulletin, May 20, 1966.
- <sup>117</sup> "Editorial," The Alberta School Trustee, 36:2, July, 1966.
- <sup>118</sup> Ibid.      <sup>119</sup> Ibid.      <sup>120</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>121</sup> The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Brief to the Minister of Education, May 19, 1966.
- <sup>122</sup> The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, 5, May 13, 1966.
- <sup>123</sup> The Alberta School Trustee, op. cit., p. 3.
- <sup>124</sup> The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Unofficial Transcript of the 1966 Annual Proceedings.
- <sup>125</sup> Crisis in Alberta Education, op. cit., p. 6.



## CHAPTER VI

### A PERIOD OF STALEMATE

#### I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE A.T.A. TEACHER

##### QUALIFICATIONS BOARD

At first, the groups asked to name representatives to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board and Teacher Qualifications Committee refrained from doing so. The reason the University of Alberta and the Department of Education declined to appoint representatives was because of the opposition of the A.S.T.A. to the plan, rather than because of direct antipathy of the groups to the A.T.A.'s scheme. From the beginning of the conflict, the Minister of Education took the position that he could only accept a plan that was agreed to by both teachers and trustees. On June 7, 1966, after the failure of the May meeting to find an arrangement which would be mutually acceptable, the Minister said, "I doubt if we could use A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program grants in the face of opposition from the trustees."<sup>1</sup>

The President of the University of Alberta expressed the basis of his doubts about the A.T.A.'s action in a letter to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., on September 30, 1966:

As you know, I have had some doubts in my mind as to whether this move on the part of The Alberta Teachers' Association was wise in view of the strong objections from the Alberta School Trustees' Association.<sup>2</sup>





Meetings of the Teacher Qualifications Board

As predicted by the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., at the Annual Representative Assembly, and confirmed by the Vice-President of the A.T.A. at the meeting on May 16, 1966, the A.T.A. began holding meetings of the Teacher Qualifications Board in June. The first meeting was held on June 6, 1966. The four A.T.A. representatives were present and the Registrar of the Department of Education, who was sent by the Minister of Education as an observer, because he "wanted to know what was going on over there."<sup>3</sup> The universities of Alberta did not send anyone to the first meeting. The University of Calgary sent the Dean of Education and the University of Alberta sent an Associate Dean of Education as observers to the second and third meetings of the Board held on June 23 and July 20, respectively. In giving a reason for sending observers, the Dean of Education, University of Alberta said, "I felt awkward not knowing what was going to happen and also since the A.T.A. seemed determined to proceed, I thought it best that they have access to the experience of University people."<sup>4</sup>

The first meetings of the Board were devoted to drawing up policy guidelines and procedures for evaluating teachers' qualifications for salary purposes. The observers were not entitled to vote on policy but took part in discussions. According to the President of the A.T.A. (1966-67) the observers supported the A.T.A. on the need for a broader base on which to evaluate teacher education for salary purposes than that used by the University of Alberta's Evaluation Committee, which tended to tie evaluation for salary to evaluation for admission to



advanced standing on University programs. "In some instances the policies the Board was developing for evaluating immigrant teachers were more lenient than the policy of the University's Evaluation Committee," the A.T.A. President said. "I am sure that if the A.S.T.A. had sent observers to the Board meetings their fears about our intentions would have vanished."<sup>5</sup>

### The A.T.A. Qualifications Office

By August 1, 1966, the A.T.A. Qualifications Secretary had been employed and the necessary application forms for teachers prepared. On August 1, the Qualifications Secretary issued the first Statement of Qualifications. The September issue of The ATA Magazine carried the following announcement:

A Teacher Qualifications Office operated by the Association opened August 1, 1966. It will evaluate teachers' credentials for years of teacher education for salary purposes. Teachers desiring a statement of qualifications which can be used, subject to terms of collective agreements, for determining placement on salary schedules or for other purposes should use the application form on page 38 in this magazine. . . .

Statements will be issued on receipt of a completed application together with necessary documents and fees. One of the necessary documents is a teaching certificate or letter of authority issued by the Minister of Education. Statements will be issued in accordance with policy and procedures established by the Teacher Qualifications Board.<sup>6</sup>

The fee for a Statement of Qualification was set at two dollars and fifty cents; an additional fee of five dollars was charged for evaluation of documents from outside Alberta but in Canada and ten dollars for evaluation of documents from institutions outside Canada.<sup>7</sup> Teachers were invited to request free conversion statements, that is,



a statement from the A.T.A. Qualifications Office based solely on a previous statement issued by the University of Alberta's Evaluation Committee.

#### A.T.A. Concessions

Following the meeting of May 16, 1966, with the Minister of Education and representatives of the A.S.T.A. and the universities, the A.T.A. Executive Council reviewed its position and proposed changes which might meet some of the objections raised by the President of the A.S.T.A. to the structure and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board. These proposals, presented to the Minister of Education, at a meeting in June, were recorded in a letter to the President of the University of Alberta from the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on September 6, 1966. The letter stated:

. . . In view of the concern expressed by some during the meeting held in the office of the Minister of Education in May, the Executive Council authorized the president and the executive secretary to propose to the Minister at a meeting in June that the membership of the Teacher Qualifications Board be increased by providing for two representatives from each of the trustees and the Department of Education. The Executive Council also offered to propose that the bylaws establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board be so drafted as to make clear that the Board will establish principles which are to govern the evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes. This would mean that any resolutions dealing with such principles which might be passed by the Annual Representative Assembly of the Association would serve only as instructions to its representatives on the Board and that such resolutions could not have any effect unless other members of the Board could be persuaded to support their intent. Finally, the Executive Council offered to make it explicit that the qualifications secretary issue statements of qualifications on the basis of the principles established by the Board.<sup>8</sup>







A Second Invitation to Appoint Representatives to the Teacher  
Qualifications Board

The reason the letter quoted above had been written by the Assistant Executive Secretary to the President of the University of Alberta was because "the Executive Council of the Association has asked that the University of Alberta be again invited to appoint a representative to the Teacher Qualifications Board and a representative to the Teacher Qualifications Committee."<sup>9</sup> Similar invitations were extended, at the same time, to the University of Calgary and the Department of Education. The A.S.T.A. was again invited to appoint a representative to the Teacher Qualifications Board.

To influence the decisions of the Presidents of the universities and the Minister of Education with respect to the appointment of representatives, the Assistant Executive Secretary advanced the following information:

It is evident, judging from the progress made in the three meetings of the Teacher Qualifications Board which have been held to date, that the Board can function as an appropriate policy-setting body for purposes of evaluating years of teacher education for salary purposes. It is also evident that the Association cannot control decisions of the Board inasmuch as there are more members representing the universities, the trustees and the Department of Education than there are voting members of The Alberta Teachers' Association. In this connection, it should be clear that the president of the Association, in his capacity as chairman, does not have the right to vote except in a tie-vote situation. The teacher education and certification officer of the Association, as secretary of the Board, does not, of course, have the right to vote.<sup>10</sup>



Appointment of Representatives to the Teacher Qualifications Board

In the fall of 1966, the Presidents of the universities and the Minister of Education decided to appoint representatives to the Teacher Qualifications Board and Teacher Qualifications Committee.<sup>11</sup> On October 27, 1966, the Minister of Education appointed the Chief Superintendent of Schools to the Teacher Qualifications Board and the Registrar of the Department of Education to the Teacher Qualifications Committee.<sup>12</sup> The President of the University of Calgary appointed the Dean of Education of that university to the Teacher Qualifications Board and an Associate Dean of Education to the Teacher Qualifications Committee. The President of the University of Alberta appointed an Associate Dean of Education to the Teacher Qualifications Board and the Assistant Registrar of the University of Alberta to the Teacher Qualifications Committee.

In his letter to the A.T.A. naming the University of Alberta representatives, the President of the University of Alberta spelled out his perception of the purpose of the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board as well as the purposes of other evaluating bodies. The President said:

There will inevitably be three different bodies assessing teachers' qualifications for three different purposes. The University of Alberta and the University of Calgary will be responsible for assessing these qualifications for eligibility for candidacy for study for advanced degrees. We hope, by continued consultation, to keep these standards closely similar on the two campuses. There will also be the role of the Department of Education in assessing these qualifications for certification purposes. The chief function of the Teacher Qualifications Board, which your association is setting up, will be for the purpose of evaluating years of teacher education for salary purposes. I hope that the three organizations involved will be able to carry out their various roles without conflict. Perhaps this is too much to





expect but at least we can hope that the conflict will be kept to a minimum and will also be capable of clear explanation and justification.<sup>13</sup>

Referring to the timing of the hand-over from the University Evaluation Committee to the A.T.A. Qualifications Board, the President said:

. . . Our Committee will not accept any further applications after October 31, 1966. This would leave two months for the committee to clean up all applications that had been received up to that date and phase out operations by the end of the calendar year, December 31, 1966. In the meantime we would expect that the new organization would begin to accept applications in November and to consider them from that date. I would hope that this change-over would take place smoothly and that this timetable would work out satisfactorily.

. . . Under the form in which you have proposed to establish the new organization I feel sure that the difficulties should be kept at a minimum and I do hope that this new system works out well. I shall do all in my power to see that it does.<sup>14</sup>

On October 3, 1966, the Dean of Education, University of Alberta wrote to the Minister of Education and informed him officially that the University Teacher Evaluation Committee would cease operating on December 31, 1966 and that the cut-off date for receiving new applications would be October 31, 1966. The Dean then indicated that he considered the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board and Committee as replacements for the University Evaluation Committee.

The Teacher Evaluation Board and the Teacher Evaluation Committee being set up by The Alberta Teachers' Association are already in existence and will begin to accept applications for evaluation as the University phases out. Indeed, I am assured that the Teachers' Evaluation Committee will be accepting applications well in advance of October 31st. For reasons indicated above there can be no hiatus. We anticipate that the transition from the work of the University Evaluation Committee to the ATA Evaluation Committee will be made without any serious problem.<sup>15</sup>





The above statements and actions demonstrate quite clearly that the officers of the University of Alberta and the Minister of Education did not perceive the threat to control of public education by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board as was perceived by the A.S.T.A. It also indicates that the universities and the Minister of Education recognized the right of the A.T.A. to operate an evaluation service, even though they did not necessarily concur with the way in which the A.T.A. had established it.

Refusal of the A.S.T.A. to recognize the A.T.A. evaluation service.

Notwithstanding the decision by the universities and the Minister of Education to accord recognition to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board by appointing representatives to it, the A.S.T.A. remained steadfast in its refusal to recognize it. The A.S.T.A. Executive Council declined to accept the second invitation of the A.T.A. to name representatives to the Board "in view of our corporate policies and directives."<sup>16</sup> The President of the A.S.T.A. urged all school boards "not to recognize any Alberta Teachers' Association evaluations and to avoid any wording in salary agreements which might in any way be interpreted as accepting Alberta Teachers' Association evaluations."<sup>17</sup> School boards were further directed to "negotiate specifically for another approach at the present time, either the University of Alberta Edmonton, or such agency as may be named by the Minister of Education."<sup>18</sup>



## II. A.S.T.A. OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

The A.S.T.A. set two main objectives as a consequence of the appraisal of the A.T.A.'s unilateral action in setting up an evaluation service, and the perception of the A.T.A.'s "real" purpose as being eventual control of certification. These objectives were: (1) to block the A.T.A. from operating its evaluation service, and (2) to induce the Minister of Education to establish a neutral and impartial agency for the evaluation of teachers' credentials for salary purposes and certification. The A.S.T.A.'s strategy developed in the spring and summer of 1966 related to these objectives and involved three successive tactical manoeuvres. These were: (1) to draw to the attention of the Minister of Education and other cabinet ministers the perceived dangers to public education in the A.T.A.'s scheme, (2) to try to persuade the Minister of Education to intervene in the dispute by setting up an evaluation service, and (3) to try to force the Minister of Education, through political pressure, to take action when it was perceived that the Minister of Education was doing nothing about the evaluation dispute.

### Meetings with the Minister of Education and Other Cabinet Ministers

On May 19, 1966, the President of the A.S.T.A. met with the Minister of Education to discuss with him the fears of the A.S.T.A. with regard to the A.T.A. unilateral approach to evaluations.<sup>19</sup> The President urged the Minister to establish a neutral agency for evaluations and if that arrangement was not possible, suggested the Minister adopt the A.S.T.A. proposal which would link certification to salary evaluation



(supra, p. 144). The A.S.T.A. President presented a statement to the Minister at this time which summarized A.S.T.A. "reaction to the power-seeking approach of the A.T.A."<sup>20</sup> The statement said:

We assert, without reservation, that the welfare of the school population of Alberta is at stake--not merely who administers a program of teacher evaluation. We do not hesitate to identify the present dilemma as a true crisis in the history of Alberta Education and one which, if allowed to develop along certain unilateral lines, could seriously affect supply of teachers in this province, particularly in rural areas. To be more specific, A.T.A. administrative control over teacher evaluations, even within approved policies, could limit the number of immigrant teachers with drastic accumulative effects on teacher supply. Such a possibility should not be permitted.

However, our concern over the A.T.A. approach goes far deeper than this serious possibility. We are convinced (and a public T.V. statement by the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. confirms our position) that the teacher organization is bent on control of teacher certification and is being encouraged and watched by other teacher bodies as an avant garde institution in this respect. The implications of such a development, should it be realized, are frightening. Other professions approach this state of affairs but they are not public, they do not have a captive clientele, and they do not have in their ranks a majority of inadequately prepared professionals who cast votes on matters of education and certification. . . .<sup>21</sup>

The Minister of Education assured the A.S.T.A. President that he would not recognize, for grant purposes, any evaluations done by the A.T.A. The Minister was "non-committal," however, with respect to the A.S.T.A. request for the Department of Education to set up an evaluation service, for salary purposes.

Discussions with other cabinet ministers. The President of the A.S.T.A. spoke to other cabinet ministers during the months of May and June about the evaluation issue. "I did not get a commitment from any of them," the President said, "but some of the cabinet ministers I spoke







to indicated opposition to the A.T.A. taking over the evaluation function."<sup>22</sup>

### A.S.T.A. Pressure Tactics

The ineffectiveness of the A.S.T.A.'s tactics of working directly on the Minister of Education to induce him to take action consistent with the A.S.T.A.'s objectives apparently produced frustration and anxiety. This frustration and anxiety was no doubt intensified by the knowledge that the A.T.A. had set up its Teacher Qualifications Board and was holding policy meetings. Consequently, at an Executive Council meeting held in Calgary, in late June, the A.S.T.A. decided to adopt a "harder" strategy. It was decided that an attempt should be made to muster public opinion (a) against the A.T.A. action, and (b) for the purpose of forcing the Minister of Education into acceding to the A.S.T.A.'s proposal for a neutral agency or run the risk of political reprisal at the polls for failing to comply with public demands. Two actions were planned: (1) the publication of a brochure entitled "Crisis in Alberta Education," and (2) the distribution to school boards of a document entitled "Action Proposals." According to The Edmonton Journal this tactic indicated "an abrupt change in A.S.T.A. policy, turning a year-old cold war into direct confrontation."<sup>23</sup>

"Crisis in Alberta Education." This document was distributed to school boards, members of the Legislative Assembly and the press. In the pamphlet it was charged that the vital functions of certifying teachers for Alberta's schools and of evaluating teachers' credentials



for salary purposes were in danger of being wrested from the Department of Education. The pamphlet charged further that "contrary to the wishes of the Alberta School Trustees' Association, The Alberta Teachers' Association is attempting to usurp this vital public right from the Alberta voters and taxpayers."<sup>24</sup>

The document also claimed that:

Control of education, such as the A.T.A. wishes to secure through its unilateral decision to evaluate credentials for salary purposes and to determine eligibility to join the teaching profession, is contrary to good public policy. It would lead to abnormal and unhealthy control of a necessary public service by one relatively small pressure group. It threatens the welfare of Alberta youth. By controlling the number of teachers allowed to teach, the teachers' organization could hold taxpayers to ransom.<sup>25</sup>

The document spelled out the background of the "crisis" and outlined the responsibility of the Minister of Education for teacher training and certification. It claimed that the failure of the Minister of Education to advance a proposal acceptable to both the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. as a permanent solution to the problem created by the imminent withdrawal of the University of Alberta Evaluation Service had "spawned the present crisis." The brochure outlined the proposals made by the A.S.T.A., and detailed the A.T.A. position and the A.S.T.A.'s appraisal of it. The pamphlet also revealed that the A.S.T.A. had earlier presented a statement to the Minister of Education condemning the A.T.A.'s action.

"Action Proposals." A letter dated July 13, 1966 and addressed to "All Trustees," signed by the Executive Assistant for Economic Services, accompanied the brochure, "Crisis in Alberta Education." The letter contained suggestions for action which should be taken by



each school board "to preserve public control of education."<sup>26</sup> These actions were necessary, it was claimed, because "the Minister had failed to provide assurance that the Department of Education will retain control of evaluations."<sup>27</sup> The following actions were recommended:

1. A resolution which,
  - a) resolves that control of education which is a public prerogative and responsibility, be retained.
  - b) requests the Department of Education to retain responsibility for certification and evaluation of teacher credentials.
  - c) opposes A.T.A. controlled evaluation.
2. Send a copy of this resolution, with an appropriate expression of concern to the Minister of Education and to member(s) of the cabinet from your region. . . .
3. Contact your local M.L.A. to same effect. Such contact should be both by delegation and by letter.
4. Supply the resolution with appropriate background and supportive comment by the chairman of the school jurisdiction to the local press. Sample for press is attached. Also supply the press a copy of "Crisis in Alberta Education."
5. Contact local municipal governments, by school board delegation asking municipalities to take steps 1, 2, 3, 4. . . .<sup>28</sup>

Effects of the Distribution of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" Brochure on Trustees

The distribution of the brochure "Crisis in Alberta Education" had the effect of rallying many of the trustees, especially from rural areas, behind the A.S.T.A. cause. It had been charged in the "Crisis" that the action of the A.T.A. presented the greatest danger to rural boards. It charged that the attempt to seize control of evaluations would allow the A.T.A. to control the supply of immigrant teachers and







since rural systems benefit most from immigrant teachers, rural areas would be hurt most.

Many of the persons interviewed in connection with the research for this study expressed the opinion that the charges made in the "Crisis in Alberta Education" aggravated the traditional and deep-rooted suspicion that many rural trustees have of the goals of The Alberta Teachers' Association. The view expressed was that rural trustees, in the province, generally hold a "hired-hand philosophy" in regard to the teacher-school board relationship. Rural trustees are generally less willing to recognize the professional role of teachers and tend to view the professional aspiration of the teachers' association as a threat to the status quo and a danger to the public prerogative and control of education.

Action of trustees. "The Crisis in Alberta Education" pamphlet induced a "great deal of action"<sup>29</sup> by trustees. Personal visits and telephone calls were made to the Minister of Education and other cabinet ministers. These supported the A.S.T.A.'s position that the Department of Education should assume responsibility for evaluations. The Minister reported that most but not all of the letters received were from rural trustees.<sup>30</sup> Typical of the letters written to the Minister of Education was the following letter from the Grande Prairie School District No. 2357:

The Board of Trustees of the Grande Prairie School District #2357 wishes to thank you for your interest in the matter of teacher evaluation for salary and grant purposes.

This Board fully supports the efforts of the A.S.T.A. in



urging you to arrange for the evaluation of teachers' credentials by a "neutral" agency. This agency would guarantee that the responsibility of education would remain with the Provincial Government. It would guarantee that the representation of the people would not be altered and the rights of the people would be safeguarded from control by an organization which does not represent the masses.

The Trustees are sure that your good judgment and leadership will set out a course of action that will strengthen the educational system of Alberta and will insure to the benefit of the student, the teacher and the individual person through the elected representative, the Trustee.<sup>31</sup>

Other effects of the "Crisis" on trustees. Not all trustees supported the position of the A.S.T.A in wanting the Department of Education to administer evaluations. In the opinion of the President of the A.S.T.A. (1965-66) some of the trustees from larger urban boards opposed control of evaluations by the Department of Education. These trustees were just as suspicious of the central government's interference in local autonomy as the teachers were of the central government's ability to lower standards under pressure.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, some of the urban trustees were prepared to give professional recognition to teachers and did not perceive any threat to loss of public control of education in the A.T.A.'s evaluation service. One trustee of the Calgary Public School Board suggested that the A.S.T.A. should let the A.T.A. do evaluations "to allow the teaching profession to grow up a bit."<sup>33</sup> "The Crisis in Alberta Education" brochure appeared to polarize the two points of view held by trustees with regard to A.T.A. control of evaluations. Evidence collected by interview revealed that the "Crisis in Alberta Education" was distributed without the knowledge of all the



members of the Executive Council of the A.S.T.A. The retiring Executive Director was on vacation, when the "Crisis" was distributed. The Vice-President, subsequently elected President, who, by virtue of his office, became one of the key negotiators in the resolution of the issue, was also on vacation and claimed no knowledge of the intention of the A.S.T.A. to distribute the pamphlet.

Effects of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" on the A.T.A.

The immediate effect of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" on the A.T.A. Executive was first anger and later derisiveness and ridicule. "Our boys were awfully mad when it first came out," said the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. "Later, when it proved ineffective, they laughed at it."<sup>34</sup>

The A.T.A. first attacked the "Crisis" in the public press. Later, in an issue of The ATA News, a point-by-point refutation of the specific charges made by the A.S.T.A. was made. In a prepared statement distributed to the major newspapers in the province on July 25, 1966, the President of the A.T.A. termed the A.S.T.A. charges "ridiculous."<sup>35</sup> He claimed that the pamphlet "Crisis in Alberta Education" was "an unwarranted and unprincipled attack on the integrity and motives of the A.T.A." He described the A.S.T.A. charges as "being close to scare tactics" and claimed that the "intemperate attack" by the A.S.T.A. Executive on the A.T.A. had done "incalculable damage." The President pointed out that the charges made by the A.S.T.A. were false and had spawned unease and uncertainty and by implication had wrongfully maligned the Minister of Education and the Department of Education.







"Far from attempting to wrest control of certification from the Minister," the President said, "the Association acknowledges the statutory right of the Minister to certify teachers, and the Teachers' Qualification Board has already ruled that no teacher will be issued with a statement of qualification until he has been granted an Alberta teaching certificate."

In the September issue of The ATA News the charges made by the A.S.T.A. that the Membership Eligibility Service could control teacher supply were answered by the following comment:

The Minister of Education has the right to certificate teachers. Inasmuch as in the short run supply is controlled by certification, this is in the hands of the Minister. Through its membership eligibility service, The Alberta Teachers' Association would be able to investigate cases where the competence of individual teachers is in question. The service would enable the A.T.A. on the advice of the Membership Eligibility Board to protest the granting of certificates to persons not meeting the established minimum requirements, if such cases should occur.<sup>36</sup>

Point-by-point refutation of A.S.T.A. charges. Other specific A.S.T.A. objections were cited in The ATA News and refuted in the following way:

1. The Teacher Qualifications Board would be dominated by teachers.

A.T.A. Comment: The A.T.A. would have only three voting members since the chairman does not vote. The A.S.T.A. and the Department of Education would have two each and could outvote the A.T.A.

2. The A.T.A. President would be chairman.

A.T.A. Comment: This is a non-voting post except when a casting vote is recorded.

3. Administrative staff including secretary would be A.T.A. employees.



A.T.A. Comment: When the University of Alberta operated the service the staff were employees of the University.

4. The Annual Representative Assembly could change principles set forth by the Board.

A.T.A. Comment: Proposed Bylaw 4 states that the Board shall prepare and publish principles. There is no provision for a veto or ratification of principles by any or all of the organizations represented. The Alberta Teachers' Association is in the same position as the other organizations represented; it may influence the decisions of the Board only through its representatives on the Board. A.R.A. resolutions on evaluation principles and related matters are directives to A.T.A. representatives on the Board.

5. The A.T.A. would refuse to recognize certain university courses.

A.T.A. Comment: The Alberta Teachers' Association could be outvoted on the Board and recognition given to a course over A.T.A. opposition. However, we believe that the A.S.T.A. as well as the A.T.A. would oppose the recognition of courses that would lower the standards of the qualifications of Alberta teachers.

6. The existing teacher shortage could be aggravated. According to the Alberta School Trustees' Association, immigrant teachers would be kept out by downgrading of their qualifications by the A.T.A. evaluation.

A.T.A. Comment: In 1965, The Alberta Teachers' Association adopted a resolution stating that teachers who have taken their teacher education in other jurisdictions will have their qualifications assessed on a basis no less but no more favourable than that applied to teachers prepared in Alberta. This was reaffirmed by the 1966 resolution and is the first principle adopted by the Teacher Qualifications Board.<sup>37</sup>

### Effects of the "Crisis" on the Department of Education

One spokesman for the Department of Education said, "We just laughed at the document around here. The charges made in it were ridiculous." Evidently, however, the distribution of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" and the charges made in it generated annoyance as well as humour among officers of the Department of Education. It did, in fact,





destroy at least temporarily the informal patterns of communication between the Department of Education and the A.S.T.A. and wrecked attempts being made by the Deputy Minister of Education to mediate the dispute. After the May meeting, the Deputy Minister attempted to find a solution to the issue through mediation. He explained it this way:

The tension and conflict that was present at the May meeting led me to believe that it would be better to try to settle the problem through discussion with each group independently. First, I found out from the A.S.T.A. exactly what they objected to in the A.T.A. plan. I contacted the A.T.A. conveying the A.S.T.A. terms. The Assistant Executive Secretary wrote back to me expressing a willingness on the part of the A.T.A. to yield on some points. The A.T.A. had begun to move toward the A.S.T.A. position, but the "Crisis in Alberta Education" came out the day before I got the A.T.A.'s letter<sup>38</sup> and I never did get the information to the A.S.T.A.<sup>39</sup>

#### Effects of the "Crisis" on the Minister of Education

In an interview with this writer, the Minister of Education discussed his reaction to the "Crisis in Alberta Education" pamphlet. The Minister said:

I wasn't very upset by the "Crisis in Alberta Education." I never did see the issue as a very big one. To me it was a "tempest-in-a-teapot." The caucus became a little alarmed but I was able to allay their fears by pointing out that the A.T.A. board presented no threat to certification. I made it clear to them that certification was a legislative responsibility and only an act of the legislature could change it.<sup>40</sup>

The Minister also tried to allay the fears of the trustees with regard to certification. He spoke to their convention in Calgary in December 1966. The Deputy Minister described the meeting this way:

The Minister informed the trustees that the issue had nothing to do with certification. However, it was evident he didn't make much progress there. There was too much emotion present. The "Crisis in Alberta Education" had clouded the issue by bringing in the matter of certification.<sup>41</sup>





## III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S EVALUATION SERVICE

Despite the willingness of the Minister of Education to accept personally the A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program purposes and although control of certification was in no danger of being forfeited by the Department of Education, the political reality of the situation created by pressures from trustees required the Government of Alberta to take some action. The action finally decided upon by the government was the establishment of an Evaluation Service to be used for effective administration of the Foundation Program.<sup>42</sup> However, conflicting statements made by cabinet ministers and Department of Education officials, in the summer of 1966, regarding the proposed Evaluation Service indicated some lack of agreement as to the purpose of the government's Evaluation Service.

Confusion over "Purpose" of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service

On August 8, 1966, the Deputy Minister of Education informally met with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. and the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. in an attempt to find a solution to the impasse. No solution appeared possible at this time and the Deputy Minister informed the two executive officers of the intention of the Department of Education to establish an Evaluation Service for Foundation Program purposes.<sup>43</sup> The next day, the Provincial Treasurer, acting as Minister of Education in the absence of the Minister who was attending a conference in Victoria, British Columbia, announced that the government was going to "establish a board to evaluate teacher qualifications."<sup>44</sup>



The announcement indicated that the "new board would be composed of A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. members, and representatives from the department of education and faculties of education at the Alberta universities."<sup>45</sup> No indication was given in the announcement that the government's planned Evaluation Service would be limited to the administration of the Foundation Program. The Edmonton Journal concluded that the government's action was "exactly what the A.S.T.A. asked for."<sup>46</sup>

Reaction of the A.T.A. The Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. expressed "surprise" at the government's announcement especially since the A.T.A. had not heard that the government had contemplated "this kind of action."<sup>47</sup> Referring to the meeting with the Deputy Minister on August 8, the Assistant Executive Secretary said, "We were told the Minister of Education would make an announcement within the next ten days or so."<sup>48</sup> The Assistant Executive Secretary also indicated that it was his understanding that the government's interest in teacher evaluation involved the matter of grants under the Foundation Program only. He said, "The Government's board sounds very similar in composition to the A.T.A.'s board and probably didn't offer a better answer to the problem."<sup>49</sup> He also indicated that the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Board would continue to operate.

On August 11, 1966, the Provincial Treasurer amended statements attributed to him on the 9th of August.<sup>50</sup> He said that he was misunderstood if he gave the impression that the government had decided to set up a board. He stated that the government was only exploring the possibility of a board but that other proposals were being studied and



no decision had been made.

Statements by the Minister of Education. The Minister of Education was contacted in Victoria, British Columbia by a newspaper reporter. The reporter was told that the Government's Teacher Evaluation Board would not go into operation until January 1, 1967. Commenting on the structure and function of the proposed board, the Minister of Education is reported to have said:

Some people are making a lot of fuss and getting all excited about it. They keep calling it a new board when all it will be is the old board in a new home. . . .If the University faculties insist on pulling out, there will be new board members. . . .They could come from the teachers' association and from the trustees' association. . . .Basically, however, the board will remain the same with the same policies and standards.<sup>51</sup>

On his return to Edmonton, the Minister of Education said that the only major change would be "the moving of the physical operation from the university to the department of education. I doubt, if we'd even call it a board, it will simply be a committee."<sup>52</sup>

No further information was made public by the Government of Alberta regarding plans for an evaluation service until October 5, 1966 when the Deputy Minister of Education sent to the Secretary-Treasurers of School Districts, School Divisions and Counties, an announcement of the establishment of a Teacher Evaluation Service by the Department of Education.<sup>53</sup>

#### The Function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service

The announcement sent out by the Deputy Minister of Education indicated that the Department of Education would commence to evaluate







teacher qualifications to establish years of teacher education, on November 1, 1966. The primary purpose of the government's service was to evaluate staff qualifications for the effective administration of the Foundation Program although it was suggested that use could be made of it "in salary agreements as had been done with the university service."<sup>54</sup> The announcement pointed out that it had become necessary to establish this service because the University of Alberta's Evaluation Service, previously used for determining payments under the Foundation Program would be discontinued on October 31, 1966.

The evaluation office was to be under the direction of the Registrar of the Department of Education. A committee consisting of senior officials was to be named to establish evaluation policy. This committee would consult with the appropriate officials of such organizations as The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association, from time to time.

#### Reasons for the Establishment of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service

Both administrative and political considerations seem to have prompted the Minister of Education to set up an evaluation service.

Political reasons. There is no doubt that the pressure exerted on the Minister of Education as a consequence of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" brochure motivated the Minister of Education to set up an evaluation service within the Department of Education. The form of the service decided upon was an outcome of the desire of the Department



of Education to maintain its traditional position of neutrality between The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association. The Deputy Minister explained the dilemma faced by the Department of Education and the reason for the action taken:

We were driven by the trustees on one side and opposed by the teachers on the other. The University of Alberta refused to continue to provide its service. There appeared to be only one way out. We decided to set up a board to evaluate for Foundation Program purposes because the Department had the right to set up such a body. The A.T.A. could not object and there was the possibility that this might satisfy the trustees. The Minister of Education had hoped that this would be a solution to the problem, but as it turned out neither side was pleased with it.<sup>55</sup>

The Registrar of the Department of Education said:

The decision to set up the Evaluation Service was no bluff. We hired staff and had to get cabinet approval for over-expenditure of the budget. There was no indication in the fall of 1966 that a compromise was possible. We honestly thought that two evaluations services would be necessary, the A.T.A.'s service and ours.<sup>56</sup>

Administrative reasons. The Minister of Education explained the administrative needs of the Department of Education for its own service:

When the University informed us that it would discontinue its evaluation service on October 31, 1966 and the trustees informed us that they would not recognize evaluations done by the A.T.A., it became apparent that an acceptable service of some kind was needed. Superintendents in the field needed a service for determining teachers' salary entitlement for contract purposes. The central office needed a service to be able to make equitable payments to all school boards under the Foundation Program.<sup>57</sup>

The Deputy Minister clarified the administrative purpose, but created some confusion regarding other uses of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service in a letter to the President of the A.T.A. on February 13, 1967. The Deputy Minister wrote:



The question of the purpose of the departmental service has been raised. The Department has indicated from the beginning that the major purpose of establishing this service is to make decisions having to do with the administration of the Foundation Program.

The Department is not interested in providing a service similar to that which the university formerly provided or which The Alberta Teachers' Association is now preparing to provide. What the Department proposes to do, and as a matter of fact has been doing, is to evaluate the years of education of teachers in round numbers as a basis for the payments from the Foundation Program. It is the hope of the Department eventually to have this information for all teachers in a data bank and at some time during the year, possibly in early September, provide a print-out to boards on which the qualifications of their staff would be provided for support purposes.<sup>58</sup>

Although the Deputy Minister's letter indicated that administration of the Foundation Program was the major purpose of the Department's Evaluation Service it was clearly not the only purpose for which the service could be used. The letter stated further that:

. . .any service that the Department renders to boards will be in terms of total staff. The Department is not interested in establishing a service to deal with individual teachers; nonetheless, if an individual teacher requests information with respect to evaluation, we will make this information available. Furthermore, if a board makes a request with respect to an individual teacher we will respond in the same manner.<sup>59</sup>

Different meanings could be assigned to the Deputy Minister's words "request information with respect to evaluation" but the meaning probably intended was that individual teachers or school boards could request a statement of evaluation. This is in fact what many did. Between November 1, 1966 and December 19, 1966, the Registrar of the Department of Education issued two hundred fifty statements of evaluation to teachers and had seventy-five applications on hand.<sup>60</sup> Although the Department's statement of evaluation was issued in terms of total







years as indicated in the Deputy Minister's letter quoted above, the calculation which appeared on the statement showed partial years so that it could be used in determining teacher placement in jurisdictions where salary schedules included pro rata provisions.

#### Reaction of the A.S.T.A. to the Department's Evaluation Service

The first reaction of the A.S.T.A. Executive to the Department's Evaluation Service was that "on the surface the department's solution will be satisfactory." Later, when it became apparent that the Department's intervention had not contributed a great deal toward the solution of the problem, the A.S.T.A. developed a negative attitude toward the Department's Evaluation Service. The Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. said, "We knew the Department's Evaluation Service hadn't solved the issue because the A.T.A.'s board was still operating."<sup>62</sup> In a brief to the Provincial Cabinet and the Department of Education on December 20, 1966, the A.S.T.A. criticized both the Department of Education's Evaluation Service and the Minister's recognition of the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board. The brief stated:

. . .the establishment of an evaluation service of teacher credentials for payments under the Foundation Program Fund seems to lack significance and authority as long as the decisions made by it are not binding on anyone. Unless we read the present regulations pursuant to the School Foundation Program Fund incorrectly, the Boards are not required to submit evidence of teachers' years of training to claim payment. This permissive regulation makes it possible for boards to do their own evaluations and submit a claim for payment to the Foundation Program Fund based on these evaluations. We submit that this could result in some inequitable treatment of certain boards.<sup>63</sup>

The brief expressed concern about the possible implications of official recognition of The Alberta Teachers' Association's Teacher



Qualifications Board by the government:

At the present time it would appear that the government of this Province is about to let the Teacher Qualifications Board of The Alberta Teachers' Association determine the principles by which the teacher's years of training should be determined. If it is about to delegate the administration of such evaluations to The Alberta Teachers' Association, it seems to us implied that it is also willing to accept The Alberta Teachers' evaluation for Foundation Program payments. This seems to be true since discrepancies in evaluation between those of the Department and those of The Alberta Teachers' Association would be untenable from any practical points of view. But more significantly, it is almost a fait accompli with an official Department member as a party to the principles of evaluation established by the Teacher Qualifications Board.<sup>64</sup>

#### Reaction of Local School Boards

Local school boards became concerned about the legality of salary agreements with teachers. Previously most salary agreements named the Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta as the body authorized to determine the number of years of teacher education for salary purposes. After November 1, 1966, when the University's Evaluation Committee ceased to exist, the question arose as to what body would have the right to do evaluations for salary purposes--the Department of Education's Evaluation Service or the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Board? Trustees were afraid that contrasting positions adopted by The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association would place teachers and trustees on "a collision course"<sup>65</sup> in salary negotiations. Some trustees predicted a "complete breakdown in teacher salary talks."<sup>66</sup>



### Reaction of the A.T.A. to the Department's Evaluation Service

From the beginning, the A.T.A. opposed the setting up of an evaluation service by the Department of Education. In August 1966, when the first indication was given that the Department of Education would probably establish an evaluation service, the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. said, "I don't think the A.T.A. Teacher Qualification service will be halted, regardless of what any other agency decides to do."<sup>67</sup> The Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. called the Department of Education's action "a retrograde step to get back into this area."<sup>68</sup> After October 5, 1966, the date the Department of Education formally announced the creation of its service, the A.T.A. adopted a hard policy in opposition to it and developed a strategy to "knock it off."<sup>69</sup>

#### IV. A.T.A. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS TO LIMIT THE FUNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S EVALUATION SERVICE

The presence of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service clearly weakened the position of the A.T.A. As long as the Department's service was available to teachers and school boards, there was little chance of the A.T.A. winning the exclusive right for professionals to evaluate years of teacher education. From the A.T.A.'s point of view the Department of Education's Evaluation Service had to be either destroyed or its function limited to evaluation for Foundation Program purposes only.







### A.T.A.'s Strategies

The principal objective of the A.T.A in the fall and winter of 1966 was to seek from the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. terms of agreement favourable to itself with regard to the evaluation of teacher education. To do this the A.T.A. employed the following strategies: (1) It attempted to modify the minimum disposition of the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. to agree to the A.T.A.'s terms by altering the criteria by which they judged the A.T.A.'s own minimum disposition with regard to acceptance of the Department's Evaluation Service. This involved on the part of the A.T.A. a firm commitment regarding its own evaluation service and the terms by which it would accept the Department of Education's Evaluation Service. (2) The A.T.A. conveyed to each group, to the public and to its own membership its firm resolution to remain committed to its own position. Committing itself in public had the effect of increasing the costs to the A.T.A. of breaking its own commitment and thereby affected the expectations of the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. regarding the A.T.A.'s future conduct. (3) The A.T.A. attempted to modify the minimum dispositions of the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. by employing tactics designed to increase the "costs" to both the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms in relation to the cost of agreeing to its terms.

### The A.T.A.'s Commitment Regarding the Department of Education's Evaluation Service and the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board

Original terms. At first the A.T.A. wanted the Department of



Education's Evaluation Service abolished altogether and its own service used for evaluation for Foundation Program purposes. On October 6, 1966 the President of the A.T.A. argued, "The Department was able to administer the grants by using someone else's evaluations before. . .I can't understand why they could not accept ours."<sup>70</sup>

Later terms. The Minister's commitment to the A.S.T.A. and to the public would have made it impossible for him to abolish the Department's service and accept the A.T.A.'s service immediately after having established it. To seek complete abolishment of the Department's service was unrealistic.<sup>71</sup> Consequently, in the fall of 1966, the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. were asked implicitly, if not explicitly, to agree to the following terms.

1. The A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board to determine evaluations policy.
2. The A.T.A. Qualifications Committee to evaluate exclusively for salary purposes.
3. The Department of Education's Evaluation Service to be restricted to evaluation for Foundation Program purposes.

The A.T.A. planned to limit the function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service to Foundation Program purposes by making this one of the terms by which the A.T.A. was willing to conclude an agreement.

A.S.T.A.'s terms. The following terms were implied in the A.S.T.A.'s proposals:

1. A neutral board to determine evaluations policy to be established under the Minister of Education.



2. Evaluation for certification and salary determination and Foundation Program payments to be administered by the Registrar of the Department of Education.

Minister of Education's terms. The Minister of Education refrained from stating terms explicitly but the following terms were implied in the Minister's announcement regarding the establishment of an evaluation service in the Department of Education.

1. The Department of Education's Evaluation Service to be used primarily for evaluation for Foundation Program payments.
2. The Minister of Education would recognize the right of the A.T.A. to operate an evaluation service for salary purposes.
3. Teachers and school boards could use the Department's Evaluation Service, for salary determination, if they wished.

Communication of the A.T.A.'s Commitment to the Other Parties, to the Public and to the Teachers

Neither the political activity of the A.S.T.A. in the summer of 1966, nor the criticism of the A.T.A.'s action by newspapers,<sup>72</sup> nor the establishment of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service seems to have weakened the determination of the A.T.A. to continue to offer its evaluation service to teachers. The firm commitment of the A.T.A. to continue its service was communicated privately and publicly, formally and informally, to the A.S.T.A. Executive, to the Minister of Education, to teachers, to the public and to local trustees. A spokesman for the Department of Education claims that they "made a lot of noise in doing so."





Communication of the commitment to the public. On October 8, 1966, the President of the A.T.A. informed a reporter for The Calgary Albertan that "The Alberta Teachers' Association will continue to offer a teacher evaluation service despite the decision of the Minister of Education to establish a similar service within the department."<sup>73</sup>

Communication of commitment to local trustees. On November 2, 1966, a letter was sent by the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. to the Secretary-Treasurers of School Districts, School Divisions and Counties informing them of The Alberta Teachers' Association's Qualifications Service. The letter stated:

On October 5, the Department of Education announced the establishment of a Teacher Evaluation Service for the administration of the Foundation Program. This letter is to tell you that The Alberta Teachers' Association is already operating a Teacher Qualifications Service to provide evaluations of years of teacher education for use by teachers and school boards in determining placement on salary schedules. This service has been in operation for some time now and we wish to explain it to school boards.<sup>74</sup>

Two statements accompanied the letter; one explained the Teacher Qualifications Service; the other listed the principles of evaluation which had been adopted by the Teacher Qualifications Board. The Executive Secretary asked that these statements be brought to the attention of the school boards.

Communication of commitment to teachers. A special letter from the President of the A.T.A. to "All Members" informed teachers of the Executive's plan with regard to the Teacher Qualifications Board. In part the letter stated:



There has recently been a great deal of confusion on this matter in the minds of the public and even of teachers because of misleading reporting and editorializing. Up to now our Association has remained silent in the face of this criticism from the Alberta School Trustees' Association and the press about our new service. But with recent blatant and unrealistic criticism we can no longer keep silent. I am therefore writing to each member of our Association in order that there is no doubt about our resolve in this essential professional task. . . .

. . . We must make the TQB the watchdog and conscience of professional preparation. We dare not abdicate, under any pressure, our responsibility to see that only the best prepared teachers are permitted to join our ranks. . . .

The TQB does not and cannot issue certificates nor is it designed to interfere with the Department's function of establishing minimum standards for certification. . . .

To achieve our professional goal all members of the Association must present a united and solid front. This can be achieved if every teacher applies to the TQB for an evaluation statement. . . .

It is. . . imperative that we negotiate with school boards to have evaluations done by the ATA service. A clause calling for evaluation of teacher education as done by the TQB should be in every collective agreement. . . .

The Alberta Teachers' Association will continue to do evaluations of teacher education.<sup>75</sup>

Communication of commitment to the A.S.T.A. executive. After the publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" pamphlet all formal communication regarding the evaluation issue between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. Executives was discontinued until December 17, 1966. However, the A.S.T.A. Executive was fully apprised of the A.T.A.'s commitment from public statements, and from informal contacts with A.T.A. officers.

#### Increasing the "Costs" of Disagreeing and Decreasing the "Costs" of Agreeing to the A.T.A.'s Terms

In Chapter IX the bargaining power of the A.T.A., the A.S.T.A. and



the Minister of Education will be analysed in terms of Chamberlain's model of bargaining power. The discussion at this stage will be limited to a description of the tactics used by the A.T.A. to increase the costs<sup>76</sup> to the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms and the tactics used by the A.T.A. to decrease the costs of agreeing on the A.T.A.'s terms.

Tactics used to increase the Minister's costs of disagreeing.

Tactics employed by the A.T.A. to increase the Minister's perception of the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms were: (1) warning, (2) threat, (3) arousing public opinion against the Minister, and (4) persuasion through argument.

Warning. At a meeting with the Minister of Education at Barnett House on November 4, 1966, representatives of the A.T.A. warned the Minister of Education that unless he restricted the function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service to evaluation for Foundation Program purposes a long struggle between the A.T.A. and the Department of Education would ensue. The A.T.A. officers pointed out to the Minister that superintendents had been informing teachers that A.T.A. evaluations were not acceptable for salary purposes and were advising teachers to secure evaluations from the Department of Education. The A.T.A. representatives argued that this was improper behaviour for school superintendents since decisions regarding evaluation cannot be made unilaterally but are negotiable. The Minister was warned that bargaining units would begin to negotiate for a clause in collective





agreements calling for evaluation of teacher education done by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board to replace evaluation done by the University of Alberta. This could lead to serious disputes with the possibility of teacher strikes. A.T.A. representatives also pointed out that teachers appeared determined to fight for a nonpolitical evaluations board. The A.T.A. Executive had no choice but to carry out the mandate given to it by the 1965 and 1966 Annual Representative Assemblies to establish an impartial board, considered essential to maintain standards of teacher education.

Threat. At the meeting on November 4, 1966, the A.T.A. representatives informed the Minister of Education that if serious disputes developed between teachers and school boards over evaluations that the boards involved would probably be listed as "in dispute" on this point. The A.T.A. Executive would have to draw these disputes to the attention of all Alberta teachers. If the disputes became widespread, it would be necessary to advise teacher organizations in all English-speaking countries as well as other provinces of Canada of the situation in Alberta. Since the matter of evaluation of years of teacher education is a determining factor in the decision of a teacher from another jurisdiction to immigrate to Alberta, this could seriously affect the number of badly needed immigrant teachers to Alberta.

Arousing public opinion. The Edmonton Journal had already criticized the Minister of Education for his handling of the evaluation dispute. Commenting on a statement by the Minister of



Education reputed to have been, "I don't know what all the fuss is about," The Edmonton Journal opined that the fact that the Minister "does not seem to know what all the 'fuss' is about is exactly what most of the 'fuss' is about."<sup>77</sup> The A.T.A. added its criticism of the Minister. In a "letter of dissent" to The Edmonton Journal, the Information Officer of the A.T.A. explained why the A.T.A. was mixed up in the "fuss." In the letter the Information Officer defended the action of the A.T.A. in establishing its Teacher Qualification Board and also used the opportunity for criticizing the Minister of Education for his handling of the evaluations dispute. When the University of Alberta announced, in 1965, that it could no longer carry on the administration of the evaluation service, "the Department of Education wobbled badly and at length all over the education scene,"<sup>78</sup> the Information Officer said.

Referring to the Department of Education's decision to set up an evaluation service, the Information Officer commented:

If one wants to attack the Minister's plan for evaluation, he is faced with much the same dilemma as that of a mosquito in a nudist camp. One does not know where to begin. . .one important facet of the weaknesses of the Minister's proposal is the failure of his plan to provide adequate consultation with the trustees, the teachers and the universities. . .his plan will subject teacher education standards to political pressure. . .it will lead to the Government's further centralization of control over an area which properly belongs to others. . .certification and evaluation must be kept separate one from the other. . . .<sup>79</sup>

The A.T.A. also attacked the Department of Education's Evaluation Service and by implication the Minister of Education in an editorial in The ATA Magazine. In part the editorial stated:



The Department's service, if it ever becomes operational, is not likely to improve education in this province. It is quite clear that the announcement was made to appease the Alberta School Trustees' Association. Yet effective administration of the Foundation Program has been carried out in the past by using evaluations made by an external agency. It is also quite clear that very little care or attention to detail was given by the Department in the establishment of such a service. . . .It is well to note here, that the Department, as of the time of its announcement, had not the personnel nor the necessary machinery to perform this service and furthermore, the groups most vitally concerned were not to be represented on the evaluation committee.<sup>80</sup>

The editorial concluded by commenting on the hesitancy of the Department of Education to take action in the evaluation dispute.

. . .We can't help wondering why the Department has waited so long to announce that it plans to provide such service. Perhaps it is as Winston Churchill once said of Stanley Baldwin:

Decided to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerfull to be impotent.<sup>81</sup>

Persuasion through argument. The A.T.A. attempted to persuade the Minister through argument, both publicly and privately, that it would be in the best interest of education to agree to the A.T.A.'s exclusive right to evaluate teacher education for salary purposes. The main arguments have been summarized in the editorial referred to above.

In recent years informed public opinion across Canada has recognized the reasonableness of teachers' organizations having greater control over admission to their ranks. One of the main reasons for this opinion is that enlightened citizens, with no special political interests, recognize that the improvement in teachers' qualifications in the last few decades have been due to the efforts of organized teachers and not to the departments of education or local school boards.<sup>82</sup>

The example of the evaluation service provided by the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation was cited to support this point of view. The editorial pointed out that as a result of the Ontario







system there has

. . .been a greater influx of mature and better qualified people into the profession, a greater number of specialists in their subject fields, and a greater stream of teachers back to university to improve their qualifications.<sup>83</sup>

### Tactics Used to Increase the A.S.T.A.'s "Costs" of Disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s Terms

In attempting to increase the A.S.T.A.'s perception of the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms, the A.T.A. used the following major tactics: (1) activities to aggravate the ideological division in the A.S.T.A., (2) statements which threatened a complete breakdown in the relationship between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A., (3) activities designed to establish the credibility of salary negotiation breakdown, and (4) public statements to arouse public opinion against the A.S.T.A. position.

Aggravation of the ideological division in the A.S.T.A. It had been apparent to the A.T.A. from the beginning that there was internal conflict in the A.S.T.A. with regard to the evaluation issue. This conflict existed in the Executive Council as well as among the general membership of the Association. Generally speaking, the trustees from the rural areas and small towns opposed the A.T.A. plan. Most urban trustees, however, many of whom were professional people, did not perceive the threat to public control of education in the A.T.A. scheme, that was seen by their rural colleagues. Some of the urban trustees were prepared to recognize A.T.A. evaluations for salary purposes, and some were even willing to allow the A.T.A. a greater voice in



certification. The President of the A.S.T.A. in 1966 was a representative of the "rural feeling" in the A.S.T.A. It was he who had been largely responsible for the distribution of the "Crisis in Alberta Education." The Vice-President that year was a representative of the urban trustees' point of view, a professional person willing to give professional recognition to teachers. Although it has been customary for the Vice-President to move up to the office of President in the A.S.T.A., so intense was the feeling within the A.S.T.A. over the evaluation dispute that the incumbent ran for re-election to the Presidency in competition with the Vice-President at the annual election held during the Annual Convention. The Vice-President won the contest.

At first the A.T.A. was content to do nothing in the hope that the internal conflict would create pressures in the A.S.T.A. that would force the Executive to change its position.<sup>84</sup> Later the A.T.A. seems to have taken positive steps to aggravate the dissension within the A.S.T.A. with a view to hastening this process. One move was to appoint the Superintendent of the Calgary Public School Board to the Teacher Qualifications Board, as an A.T.A. representative.<sup>85</sup> Another approach was the use of rational arguments and other psychological devices to try to gain the support of those persons within the A.S.T.A. organization who were sympathetic to the A.T.A. cause and opposed to the Department of Education taking over the evaluation function. An editorial in The ATA Magazine accused the A.S.T.A. of substituting pressure for purpose in its approach to the evaluation issue. Referring to the debate on the evaluation dispute held at the 1966 convention, the



editorial stated:

. . .In general, the debate was highly emotional and obviously marked by a lack of sober and rational thinking in this important matter of teacher evaluations. In spite of the intervention of some younger more progressive urban trustees in the debate, the general tenor of the meeting seemed to reflect the horse and buggy age.

Teachers who are working toward high objectives set out in The Teaching Profession Act trust that the faint hope of reason raised at the convention will eventually prevail. If this happens, then purpose will again replace pressure within the Alberta School Trustees' Association.<sup>86</sup>

The above seems to have been an appeal to the urban trustees who supported the A.T.A. at the fall convention to disassociate themselves from the position of the "horse and buggy" or reactionary group within the A.S.T.A. and support the A.T.A. on the evaluation issue, for the purpose of "promoting and advancing the cause of education in Alberta."<sup>87</sup>

Although the divisive tactics were probably conceived by the A.T.A. as a means of increasing the costs to the A.S.T.A. of prolonging the settlement of the issue, there were risks inherent in them. The A.S.T.A., unlike the A.T.A., is a voluntary organization. Conflict and division could have led to a complete fractionation of the organization. This fear was uppermost in the minds of the Minister of Education and senior officers of the Department of Education<sup>88</sup> and the awareness of this possibility seems to have been one reason the Minister of Education held fast to the Department of Education's hastily contrived Evaluation Service, until agreement between the A.S.T.A. and the A.T.A. was reached.

Relationship between the A.S.T.A. and the A.T.A.<sup>89</sup> The publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" and other public statements







made by the A.S.T.A. representatives in opposition to the A.T.A.'s Evaluation Service strained the cooperative relationship that normally exists between the two organizations. The A.T.A. admonished the A.S.T.A. for creating this situation and threatened to reassess its whole relationship pattern with the A.S.T.A. On one occasion the A.T.A. reprimanded the A.S.T.A. publicly for not "acting as partners with the organized teaching profession to ensure that teaching standards continue to rise as they have in the past few years."<sup>90</sup> On another occasion the President of the A.T.A. predicted that "the A.T.A. will find considerable difficulty in working with the A.S.T.A. on the real problems and crises which beset education."<sup>91</sup> The President intimated that the Executive Council of the A.T.A. "will be driven. . .to reappraise the time and effort expended on joint councils with the representatives of the A.S.T.A. executive."<sup>92</sup>

Establishing credibility of negotiations breakdown. The A.T.A. made it clear to the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. officers that if the issue could not be settled to the A.T.A.'s satisfaction at the provincial level, the "battle ground" would be shifted to the local level where the issue would be fought out in local negotiations. Much of the A.T.A.'s extranegotiatory activity in the fall of 1966 and early winter of 1967 involved preparing teachers for possible showdowns with school boards and in public acts intended to establish the credibility of threats and warnings regarding salary negotiation breakdowns. In February, 1967, The Edmonton Journal predicted an "Education Crisis" and claimed that The Alberta Teachers' Association had drawn a battle line



for a do-or-die province-wide fight over evaluation of teacher training for salary purposes.<sup>93</sup> The article stated that the "possibility of teacher strikes has been mentioned officially for the first time as a measure of how far teachers are willing to go."<sup>94</sup> A member of the Legislative Assembly asked in the Legislature if the government planned anti-strike legislation in the "threatened battle over evaluation of teachers' training for salary purposes."<sup>95</sup>

A further attempt was made to establish the credibility of a strike threat by sending \$18,000 to support striking teachers in the Province of Quebec and offering the use of Barnett House "as a clearing house for Quebec teachers seeking to leave their province to teach in Alberta."<sup>96</sup>

An editorial which appeared in The Calgary Herald indicated that the A.T.A.'s activities were not going unnoticed by that newspaper, at least. The editorial stated, in part:

. . .It is high time the provincial government showed more spine in dealing with this militant, trade-unionist talk. After all, it has already been warned by the Alberta School Trustees' Association that the ATA is attempting to take away part of the control of schooling from the provincial minister of education. These most recent ATA posturings of grandeur further underline the truth of the ASTA warning.<sup>97</sup>

Arousing public opinion. The A.T.A. attempted to arouse public opinion, especially in the educational community, against the A.S.T.A probably in the hope that loss of public favour would add to the A.S.T.A.'s discomfiture and thereby induce it to come to terms more hastily. This was done primarily through the medium of the A.T.A.'s own publishing facilities as the A.T.A. perceived the public press to be



generally hostile to it.<sup>98</sup> One of the more vitriolic attacks made on the A.S.T.A.'s actions was made in an editorial in The ATA Magazine, November, 1966. The editorial charged that trustees had substituted "pressure for purpose" in their approach to the evaluation of teacher education. To quote from the editorial:

It is evident from the statements of some trustee officers and from action taken by the Alberta School Trustees' Association that political pressure has been substituted for purpose. Surely the main purpose of the ASTA should be the same as that of the ATA, namely to advance and promote the cause of education in Alberta.<sup>99</sup>

The editorial charged further that the A.S.T.A. should be cooperating with the A.T.A. to carry out the responsibilities given to it by the Government of Alberta, namely, "providing the best possible educational opportunities for the youth of their communities."<sup>100</sup>

#### Decreasing the A.S.T.A.'s "Costs" of Agreeing to the A.T.A.'s Terms

The main fears of the A.S.T.A. which made trustees unwilling to accept the terms offered by the A.T.A. for establishing a Teacher Qualifications Service were: (1) the Teacher Qualifications Service might influence teacher supply by discriminating against teachers from outside the Province; (2) the Teacher Qualifications Service might lead to control of certification; (3) the A.T.A. could change the terms of reference of the Teacher Qualifications Board by changing its bylaws. In order to decrease the perception of the costs associated with these fears, the A.T.A. attempted to convince the trustees that these fears were groundless.







Influencing teacher supply. One of the principles adopted by the Teacher Qualifications Board and stressed many times by the A.T.A. in communiqués to the trustees and to the public was "that teachers from outside the province will be treated no more but no less favourably than teachers prepared in Alberta."

Control over certification. Another principle adopted by the Teacher Qualifications Board was that no evaluation would be made by the Teacher Qualifications Secretary unless the applicant holds a certificate to teach in the Province of Alberta, issued by the Registrar of the Department of Education. The A.T.A. received an assist from the Department of Education in allaying the fears of trustees in this matter. Attached to the announcement to trustees informing them of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service was a statement intended to relieve the "widespread concern on the part of serious-minded citizens with respect to the control of teacher certification."<sup>101</sup> Part of the statement said:

. . . Certification is the prerogative of the Minister of Education under the provisions of Section 7 of the Department of Education Act, and Section 331, of The School Act, R.S.A. 1955. Only an Act of the Provincial legislature can change this.<sup>102</sup>

As indicated earlier, the Minister of Education conveyed the same message to trustees at the 1966 Annual Convention at Calgary. The Minister went even further than attempting to allay fears regarding certification and tried to convince the trustees that the Teacher Qualiifications Service was not a bad one for salary purposes. In an interview with this writer, the Minister said:



I spoke to a whole "batch" of them at their convention at Calgary. I pointed out to them that evaluation presented a problem with only about ten percent of our teachers--the immigrant teachers. There is no problem in evaluating the qualifications of the remaining ninety percent who receive their training in Alberta. Even the evaluation for most immigrant teachers presents little difficulty because they are usually trained in recognized colleges and universities in Canada. It is easy to relate their training to the Alberta program. What we were really fighting over was about two percent of our teachers. I tried to convince the trustees that if the teachers wanted to take the risk of criticism for evaluating the credentials of these teachers, they were doing us all a favour.<sup>103</sup>

Changing the terms of reference of the Teacher Qualifications Board. To allay the fear associated with this factor, the Executive Council, at its May meeting agreed that decisions made by the Annual Representative Assembly with respect to principles of evaluation would serve only as instructions to the A.T.A. representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board and that other representatives could not be bound by these instructions. Later, the A.T.A. agreed to have amendments to the bylaw establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board subject to the approval of the Cabinet in the same manner as amendments to A.T.A. discipline bylaws.



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, June 7, 1966.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from the President of the University of Alberta to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., dated September 30, 1966.

<sup>3</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education on December 12, 1967.

<sup>4</sup>Interview with the Dean of Education, University of Alberta on November 23, 1967.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.T.A. on November 28, 1967.

<sup>6</sup>The ATA Magazine, 47:33, September, 1966.      <sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. to the President of the University of Alberta, dated September 6, 1966.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.      <sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>These decisions were no doubt influenced in part by the arguments advanced by the Assistant Executive Secretary in his letter of invitation and also from the favourable reports of observers at the meetings. Moreover, the Minister of Education had already announced the formation of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service for Foundation Program purposes.

<sup>12</sup>The ATA News, 2:2, November, 1966.

<sup>13</sup>Letter from the President of the University of Alberta, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Letter from the Dean of Education, University of Alberta to the Minister of Education, dated October 3, 1966.

<sup>16</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, May 13, 1966.

<sup>17</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Salary Bulletin, May 20, 1966.

<sup>18</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.





<sup>20</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Crisis in Alberta Education, (The Alberta School Trustees' Association, July, 1966).

<sup>21</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Position on Teacher Evaluation, December 13, 1966. (Typewritten.)

<sup>22</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.

<sup>23</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, July 21, 1966.

<sup>24</sup>Crisis in Alberta Education, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Letter to "All Trustees" from the Executive Assistant for Economic Services of the A.S.T.A., dated July 13, 1966.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.      <sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Interview with the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. on December 20, 1967.

<sup>30</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education on December 12, 1967.

<sup>31</sup>Letter from the Secretary-Treasurer of the Grande Prairie School District No. 2357 to the Minister of Education, dated June 3, 1966.

<sup>32</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. on December 18, 1967.

<sup>33</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, November 10, 1966.

<sup>34</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 24, 1967.

<sup>35</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, July 25, 1966.

<sup>36</sup>"No Crisis," The ATA News, 7, September, 1966.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>The letter to which the Deputy Minister referred was from the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., dated July 21, 1966. In the letter the Assistant Executive Secretary advised the Deputy Minister of the decision made by the Executive Council to propose changes which have been spelled out in the letter to the President of the University of Alberta, quoted on page 154.



- <sup>39</sup>Interview with the Deputy Minister of Education on October 25, 1967.
- <sup>40</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education on December 12, 1967.
- <sup>41</sup>Interview with the Deputy Minister, op. cit.
- <sup>42</sup>Circular from the Deputy Minister of Education to the Secretary-Treasurers of School Districts, School Divisions and Counties, dated October 5, 1966.
- <sup>43</sup>Interview with the Deputy Minister of Education, October 5, 1967.
- <sup>44</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, August 9, 1966.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid.    <sup>46</sup>Ibid.    <sup>47</sup>Ibid.    <sup>48</sup>Ibid.    <sup>49</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, August 11, 1966.
- <sup>51</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, August 13, 1966.
- <sup>52</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, August 18, 1966.
- <sup>53</sup>Circular from the Deputy Minister of Education, op. cit.
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup>Interview with the Deputy Minister of Education, op. cit.
- <sup>56</sup>Interview with the Registrar of the Department of Education on October 31, 1967.
- <sup>57</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education, December 12, 1967.
- <sup>58</sup>Letter from the Deputy Minister of Education to the President of the A.T.A., dated February 13, 1967.
- <sup>59</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>60</sup>These figures were disclosed by the Registrar of the Department of Education at a meeting on December 19, 1966.
- <sup>61</sup>News item in The Calgary Herald, October 7, 1966.
- <sup>62</sup>Interview with the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A., December 20, 1967.
- <sup>63</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Brief to the Legislative Council and the Department of Education, December 20, 1966, p. 7.



<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>65</sup>News item in The Calgary Herald, November 10, 1966.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>News item in The Calgary Herald, August 10, 1966.

<sup>68</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, October 29, 1966.

<sup>69</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 24, 1967.

<sup>70</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, October 6, 1966.

<sup>71</sup>Later the A.T.A. demanded from the Minister of Education as a condition to the Memorandum of Agreement that the A.T.A. evaluations be accepted by the Department of Education for Foundation Program purposes.

<sup>72</sup>An editorial in the October 13 edition of The Edmonton Journal asserted that the A.T.A.'s bluff had been called by the action of the Minister of Education in setting up an evaluation service and suggested that teachers would be wise to reconsider the expense to themselves of their Association going on with its now pointless political gambit. A story in The Edmonton Journal on October 18, 1966 claimed that the government's decision to take over the evaluation of teachers' credentials for salary purposes represented a political defeat for the A.T.A. rather than a professional one. The story suggested further, that the A.S.T.A. "having had its first taste of blood in the public arena might press its efforts and succeed in politically discrediting the ATA even among the ATA's own members."

<sup>73</sup>News item in The Calgary Albertan, October 8, 1966.

<sup>74</sup>Letter from the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. to Secretary-Treasurers of School Districts, School Divisions, and Counties, dated November 2, 1966.

<sup>75</sup>Letter from the President of The Alberta Teachers' Association to "All Members," dated October 18, 1966.

<sup>76</sup>Costs of agreement and disagreement must be regarded as the subjective estimates of the parties or the expected probability of the consequences or agreeing or disagreeing. The balancing of costs does not require measurement in any arithmetic sense. The balancing of incommensurable items may be accomplished in the same way that oranges may be balanced against apples on a consumer's indifference map. See Chamberlain and Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 170-71, and Chamberlain, A General Theory of Economic Process for a complete discussion of the estimation of costs in a bargaining relationship.







<sup>77</sup> Editorial in The Edmonton Journal, October 1, 1966.

<sup>78</sup> Letter to The Edmonton Journal from the Information Officer of the A.T.A., printed on October 25, 1966.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> "Editorially Speaking," The ATA Magazine, 46:4, October, 1966.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 5.      <sup>82</sup> Ibid.      <sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Interview with the President of the A.T.A. on December 1, 1967.

<sup>85</sup> The Calgary Public School Board was one of those which accepted the A.T.A.'s evaluation service.

<sup>86</sup> "Editorially Speaking," The ATA Magazine, op. cit.      <sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Interview with a former Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. on November 21, 1967.

<sup>89</sup> See Walton and McKersie, op. cit., pp. 184-280 for a complete discussion on the process of attitudinal structuring in a bargaining relationship.

<sup>90</sup> The ATA Magazine, op. cit.

<sup>91</sup> News item in The Edmonton Journal, July 25, 1966.      <sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> News item in The Edmonton Journal, February 18, 1967.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> News item in The Edmonton Journal, February 19, 1967.

<sup>96</sup> News item in The Peace River Record, March 8, 1967.

<sup>97</sup> Editorial in The Calgary Herald, February 14, 1967.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 24, 1967.

<sup>99</sup> The ATA Magazine, op. cit.      <sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Circular from the Deputy Minister to Secretary-Treasurers, op. cit.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Interview with the Minister of Education, December 12, 1967.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT

In the previous two chapters it was shown how the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. became committed publicly to opposing positions with regard to the responsibility for evaluating teacher education. This chapter examines the second stage in the negotiations which resolved the issue-- the search for agreement. The chapter will attempt to reveal something of the delicate procedure by which the parties pulled back cautiously from original positions and made concessions to each other as they sought earnestly in the background for signs of tacit agreement. Generally, the negotiations during this stage were held in secret, each side making public utterances only when it was considered necessary to do so to give prominence to a probable outcome favourable to itself or to stimulate public opinion to force changes in the opponent's minimum disposition.

The process of seeking agreement usually begins when one party expresses an earnest desire to come to terms. In this case, it appears to have been the A.S.T.A. and the first indication of it came during the 1966 Annual Convention held in Calgary.



# I. THE A.S.T.A. ANNUAL CONVENTION AT CALGARY, 1966

## Debate of the Grande Prairie Resolution

The school board from Grande Prairie introduced an emergent resolution at the convention which precipitated a considerable amount of debate. The resolution called for "a neutral body to be established under the Minister of Education for the purpose of evaluating the university education of teachers for certification and salary determination." (supra, p. 143). The debate on this resolution revealed that some of the urban trustees were in favour of the A.S.T.A. dropping its central principle, that is, insistence that the Minister of Education control evaluations, so that a settlement with the A.T.A. would be possible.

Amendments to the motion. A trustee from the Edmonton Public School Board moved that the motion be amended to delete the words "under the Minister of Education" and add "that the Executive be given power to commit the Association with respect to the function and constitution of a neutral body to be set up for the said purpose."<sup>1</sup> In moving the amendment, the trustee suggested that if it was approved it would then be possible for the A.S.T.A to work out a compromise with the A.T.A. without the help of the Department of Education.<sup>2</sup> The Chairman of the Edmonton Public School Board and new President of the A.S.T.A. supported the amendment. He claimed that the A.S.T.A. had not been able to talk rationally since the evaluations dispute began and that the controversy had only "helped to sell newspapers."<sup>3</sup>

A point was raised in the debate that the amendment actually dealt





with two issues. The convention first dealt with the first part of the amendment which required the deletion of the words "under the Minister of Education."<sup>4</sup> A St. Albert Separate School trustee opposed the deletion of these words on the grounds that any evaluations body must be responsible to the people of the province "through the Minister." Any other step would be "granting authority without responsibility."<sup>5</sup> The first part of the amendment was defeated and the second part was not taken to a vote.

A trustee from the Leduc School Board moved an amendment which would delete the word "certification."<sup>6</sup> This amendment was also defeated. The original motion carried by a vote of two hundred thirty to one hundred fifty-five.<sup>7</sup>

#### Significance of the Debate

Despite the fact that the Alberta School Trustees' Association reaffirmed its stand on evaluations, a spokesman for the A.T.A. expressed optimism that there "may be room for negotiations in the teacher evaluation dispute."<sup>8</sup> He said his optimism was based on statements made by the new President of the A.S.T.A. The A.S.T.A. President had expressed the opinion that the resolution approved by the Annual Convention "indicated a compromise on the part of trustees to a less rigid stand on the question."<sup>9</sup> The A.T.A. spokesman suggested that the indication of flexibility on the part of the A.S.T.A. combined with flexibility on the part of the A.T.A. could lead to a "meaningful dialogue." He also indicated that the A.T.A. had proposals "that might satisfy" the demands of the A.S.T.A.



## II. THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 17, 1966

On December 17, 1966 at the invitation of the A.S.T.A. the full Executive Councils of the two Associations attended a dinner meeting at the MacDonald Hotel to discuss the evaluation issue. Although no agreement was reached at the meeting "an atmosphere of willingness to negotiate and solve a common problem prevailed."<sup>10</sup> The parties exchanged information regarding their respective positions and made specific proposals.<sup>11</sup>

### The A.S.T.A. Points of Concern

The officers of the A.S.T.A. spelled out their main points of concern about the A.T.A. Evaluation Service. These were:

1. The A.T.A. by changing its bylaws could change the composition and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board.
2. The A.S.T.A. had fewer members on the Board than the A.T.A.
3. The Chairman of the Board was specified as an A.T.A. member.
4. The trustees held the view that certification and evaluation are wedded and that by influencing one it would be possible to influence the other.
5. The A.S.T.A. feared that the Teacher Qualification Service could be used to restrict the supply of teachers.

### The A.S.T.A. Minimum Position as Perceived by the A.T.A.

During the course of the discussion the A.S.T.A. officers spelled out their minimum position regarding the composition of an evaluation board. In a brief presented to the A.T.A., the A.S.T.A. officers asserted that their guide to the solution of the issue was the resolution passed at the 1966 Annual Convention which called for a



"neutral body to be established under the Minister of Education." To satisfy this expression of the members' stand, the A.S.T.A. Executive proposed the establishment of a neutral policy-setting body to be established by Order-in-Council. To assure as much neutrality in the board as possible the A.S.T.A. demanded the following minimum terms:

1. Equal representation from the A.S.T.A. and the A.T.A. on the board to be established by Order-in-Council.
2. The Chairman of the board to be elected from among the members of the board.

A.S.T.A. concession. The A.S.T.A. officers indicated that if their minimum terms were met regarding the composition of the board, the A.S.T.A. would be willing to consider the possibility of a separate body to administer the evaluation policies set by the board to be established by Order-in-Council. The A.T.A. representatives took this to mean that the A.S.T.A. would accept in principle the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service as well as the Department of Education's Evaluation Service. Both would evaluate teachers' credentials using policies determined by the "neutral body" to be set up by the Order-in-Council.

#### The A.T.A. Position

The A.T.A. officers claimed that they had already made several major concessions to meet the A.S.T.A. objections raised in the May meeting. These were spelled out again because apparently these concessions which had been communicated to the Minister and the Deputy Minister had never been transmitted to the A.S.T.A. Executive Council.







The concessions were:

1. The A.T.A. bylaws would be amended to require the Teacher Qualifications Secretary to evaluate teacher credentials in accordance with principles established by the Teacher Qualifications Board.
2. The principles established by the Teacher Qualifications Board not to be subject to A.T.A. veto at the Annual Representative Assembly.
3. The representation on the Teacher Qualifications Board to be changed by providing two representatives each from the Alberta School Trustees' Association and the Department of Education.

New proposal. To further assuage the apprehensiveness of the A.S.T.A., the A.T.A. proposed to make the Teacher Qualifications Service bylaws subject to approval by the Provincial Cabinet in the same way as A.T.A. discipline bylaws as provided in The Teaching Profession Act. The A.S.T.A. rejected this proposal as unacceptable.

The A.T.A.'s Minimum Position as Perceived by the A.S.T.A.

The A.T.A. Executive rejected the A.S.T.A. proposal for the establishment of a board by Order-in-Council. The A.T.A. officers stated the position of the A.T.A. as that endorsed by the Annual Representative Assembly that evaluation of teacher education is a professional right and responsibility. The A.S.T.A. officers perceived the A.T.A. Executive as being committed to the establishment of a board by A.T.A. bylaws with provisions for specific guarantees that would satisfy A.S.T.A. objections.



### III. THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 19, 1966

The parties decided at the meeting on December 17 that the Minister of Education should be asked to reconvene the groups which had met unsuccessfully on May 15, 1966. The Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. telephoned the Minister and asked him to convene such a meeting. The Minister arranged a meeting for the afternoon of December 19.

Persons present. The meeting which was chaired by the Minister of Education was attended by the following persons: the Deputy Minister of Education, the Chief Superintendent of Schools and the Registrar from the Department of Education; the Deans of Education from the University of Alberta and the University of Calgary; the President, the Past-President and Executive Director of the A.S.T.A.; the President, Vice-President, Executive Secretary and two Executive Assistants from the A.T.A.

#### Positions of the University Representatives

The university representatives considered themselves to be neutral parties in the dispute and expressions voiced by them were largely of an advisory nature. The Dean of Education, University of Alberta expressed the view that with two systems of evaluation operating there would be trouble and pleaded for one evaluation board. The Dean said that he personally could not see why the A.T.A. service could not be acceptable to trustees especially since the A.T.A. Evaluation Service



had gone further than the University Evaluation Committee and had provided for A.S.T.A. representation. On the other hand, the Dean could not understand why the A.T.A. should object to a policy-making body established by the Government of Alberta.

#### The A.S.T.A. Position

The A.S.T.A. representatives spelled out their minimum position which was the same as that given two days before--a neutral body established by Order-in-Council with equal representation from the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A.

#### The A.T.A. Position

The A.T.A. representatives repeated the position which had been spelled out many times previously that evaluation of teacher education is a professional matter not a political one. The board should be set up by the professional organization and not by an act of government. The President reiterated the offer made to the A.S.T.A. at the meeting on December 17, that is, the A.T.A. would make the Evaluation bylaw changes subject to the approval of the Cabinet.

#### Discussion Regarding an Order-in-Council

Examination of the data available reveals that the efforts of the parties at this and subsequent meetings focused on finding an acceptable solution to a procedure for establishing a policy-setting body for evaluation. This seemed to be the major point of disagreement. Terms regarding representation and administration appear to have been secondary to and grouped around the anticipated solution or "probable





outcome" of the dispute as perceived by each party.

The A.S.T.A. representatives were asked why they favoured a board to be established by Order-in-Council rather than by A.T.A. bylaws. The answer given was that a board set up by Order-in-Council would not be subject to modification to the same degree as a board established by the A.T.A. The A.S.T.A. could not accept the guarantees offered by the A.T.A. regarding Cabinet approval of bylaw change because the board would still be established by A.T.A. bylaws and therefore not a neutral board as required by the A.S.T.A. policy resolution.

A.S.T.A. proposal. The President of the A.S.T.A. proposed that if the A.T.A. would agree to the establishment of a board by Order-in-Council with equal representation from the two parties, the Executive Council would explain to member school boards that the provincial body would agree to the local boards using either the A.T.A. service or the Department of Education's Evaluation Service.

Proposal of the Minister of Education. The Minister of Education advised the parties that if a board acceptable to the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. could be established, the Department of Education would accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments. This would leave only the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service administering evaluations for salary purposes.

Legality of an Order-in-Council. The Deputy Minister of Education raised the question of the legality of an Order-in-Council which might set up an evaluations board. An Order-in-Council is generally rooted in



some legislation and the Deputy wondered which government legislation would be appropriate. The Dean of Education, University of Alberta thought it might be possible to have an evaluations board set up under the University Co-ordinating Council. The Dean suggested this would be preferable to establishing a board by Order-in-Council under The Department of Education Act as such a board would be less accessible to pressure groups. The Minister of Education and the President of the A.S.T.A. agreed that this would be an acceptable arrangement if it could be accomplished. A suggestion was made to send the proposal to the Attorney General's Department for legal clarification.

The A.T.A. proposal. The Vice-President of the A.T.A. suggested that if a board had to be established by government action, it could be set up by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act. The Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. suggested that a committee of four persons meet later to explore the problem and examine the several other alternatives. A committee consisting of the Minister of Education, the Dean of Education, University of Alberta, the President of the A.T.A. and the President of the A.S.T.A. were named to the committee.

#### IV. THE A.T.A. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION ACT.

On the afternoon of December 19, following the meeting detailed above, the President of the A.T.A. wrote to the Minister of Education suggesting how an evaluation board might be established by amending The Teaching Profession Act. The President requested that this proposal



be "sent along with your suggestions to the Attorney General"<sup>12</sup> for legal interpretation. In the A.T.A. proposal it was suggested that Section 22 of The Teaching Profession Act become Section 24 and that new Sections 22 and 23 be added. The sections could be worded as follows:

#### Teacher Qualification

22. There shall be a Board to be known as the Teacher Qualifications Board which shall be composed of a chairman and other members appointed as follows:

- (1) The President of the A.T.A. shall be chairman.
- (2) Each university under contract with the Minister of Education to prepare teachers for Alberta schools shall be entitled to appoint one member to the Board.
- (3) Each of the following shall be entitled to appoint two members to the Board:
  - (a) the Minister of Education,
  - (b) the A.S.T.A.
- (4) The A.T.A. shall appoint three members to the Board.
- (5) Each member other than the chairman shall hold office for two years from the effective date of appointment.
- (6) Should a member of the Board be unwilling or unable to complete his term, the organization appointing him should be entitled to appoint an alternative member to serve the balance of his term.

23. It shall be the duty of the Board:

- (a) to meet not less than once each calendar year and at such other times as may be necessary to conduct its business;
- (b) to prepare principles for the evaluation of years of teacher education and publish such principles from time to time;
- (c) to formulate regulations and to make recommendations to the A.T.A. regarding administration, personnel and facilities required for the evaluation of years of teacher education;
- (d) to hear and act upon appeals.<sup>13</sup>

#### V. THE MEETING ON JANUARY 4, 1967

The four persons named to a committee to investigate the possibility of establishing an evaluation board by Order-in-Council or





some other form of government action met on January 4, 1967, in the office of the Minister of Education. The Deputy Minister of Education accompanied the Minister.

#### The Department of Education's Proposed Order-in-Council

The Deputy Minister presented the outline of an Order-in-Council that would establish an independent board to determine principles of evaluation. There would be equal representation from the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. as well as representation from the Department of Education, the University of Calgary and the University of Alberta. The chairman would be elected by a majority vote of the members (see Appendix A).

Legal basis. The Deputy Minister explained the legality of the proposed Order-in-Council. Since the meeting on December 19, 1966, the Deputy Minister had learned that a board could be established by Order-in-Council without rooting it in legislation provided that three conditions were met. These were:

1. The body to be created by the Order-in-Council does not spend Government money;
2. The body does not restrict any authority exercised by the Government;
3. The body created does not impose its authority on other bodies.

The Deputy Minister gave it as his opinion that a board for the purpose of evaluating teacher education for salary purposes met these conditions and therefore the Order-in-Council would be legal.

The Order-in-Council recognized the A.T.A. Evaluation Service as well as the Department of Education's Evaluation Service for Foundation



Program purposes. Hopefully, with one board setting policy, discrepancies in the evaluations done by the two services could be minimized.

#### Reaction of the Other Parties to the Order-in-Council

Reaction of the Dean of Education. The Dean was favourably disposed to the Order-in-Council. He favoured the idea of one policy-setting body. The Dean rejected his own previous suggestion for establishing a board under the University Co-ordinating Council. He thought the Board as established by Order-in-Council represented a fair solution to the problem because it could be free from government control, meeting the A.T.A. fear and free from A.T.A. control, meeting the fear of the A.S.T.A. The Dean noted that enough freedom was given to the Board to allow it to act as an appeal body.

Reaction of the President of the A.S.T.A. The President of the A.S.T.A. favoured the Order-in-Council suggested by the Deputy Minister. The President said that it would be acceptable to the A.S.T.A. because it met the stand of the membership for a neutral board and freed it from A.T.A. bylaws, which had been the major objection of the trustees. The President felt that he would not be able to "sell" the A.T.A. proposal for an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act to the A.S.T.A. Executive. He implored the A.T.A. President to accept the Order-in-Council on the grounds that it represented a fair solution to the dispute. The A.S.T.A. would get a neutral board and the A.T.A. would get the administration of the evaluation service. The President promised that if the A.T.A. would accept a board established by Order-in-Council with equal representation, the A.S.T.A. would appoint educators as representatives



to the board. He predicted that the teaching profession would eventually have control over all aspects of teacher evaluation and saw the present problem as a minor inconvenience. He anticipated that the evaluation issue which had come between the two groups would disappear, if the A.T.A. would accept a neutral body with equal representation.

The A.S.T.A. President was asked by the Deputy Minister about the A.T.A.'s insistence that the chairman be an A.T.A. member. The President said that he did not think the A.S.T.A. would accept the President of the A.T.A. as chairman automatically.

Reaction of the President of the A.T.A. The A.T.A. President showed coolness toward the proposed Order-in-Council but agreed that the A.T.A. Executive Council would consider it. The President reiterated the A.T.A. position and emphasized the fact that the Executive Council had already proposed three changes in the original position adopted by the Annual Representative Assembly in April, 1966. Further changes which the Executive Council would be empowered to make would depend on whether they were minor ones or changes in basic principle. He thought it unlikely that the A.T.A. Executive Council would be willing to accept changes in principle. The A.T.A. Executive would be interested in discussing the possibility of treating A.T.A. evaluation bylaws like the discipline bylaws or an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act to include provisions for the structure and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board. The President asked if the Minister had forwarded his proposal regarding an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act to the Attorney General's office for legal interpretation. The Minister of







Education informed him that he had not because the officials of the Department of Education felt that the new information about the Order-in-Council offered an acceptable solution to the problem.

On the other matter of equal representation, the President of the A.T.A. argued that there were two levels of operation; (a) the local level of salary negotiations where equal representation was already recognized, and (b) the Teacher Qualifications Service which was a professional service, at the provincial level, providing information about teacher qualifications. Equal representation on the policy body was still a matter of debate.

#### The Outcome of the Meeting of January 4th

The representatives of the Department of Education and the President of the A.S.T.A. left the meeting with the belief that the issue over evaluation was resolved. In an interview with a reporter for The Lethbridge Herald, the President of the A.S.T.A. said that an agreement had been reached by the "group set up for the purpose."<sup>14</sup> He said the group had decided in favour of an evaluation board set up as a "creature of Government" with administration to follow The Alberta Teachers' Association's recommendations. He said "for the first time the trustees, government, teachers could sit down together and come to an agreement," but added that there were two "very small points of disagreement" to be settled.

The President of the A.T.A. did not express the same point of view, when interviewed by the same reporter. He said, "I was a little perturbed about the outcome of the meeting. . .I certainly wasn't



jumping up and down."<sup>15</sup> The President explained that the reason the A.S.T.A. President was "so happy" was because only the A.S.T.A. proposal for an Order-in-Council had been discussed at the meeting although four new proposals had been submitted for the group to consider.

The A.T.A. President said that some school boards and teachers were currently negotiating for salaries using either the A.T.A. service or the government service, some boards and teachers had agreed to use the A.T.A. service. Most urban boards were waiting until the provincial bodies could reach an agreement on the establishment of a board. The President claimed that "that may not be very soon."

The President of the A.T.A. wrote to the Minister of Education on January 5, 1967 and expressed regret that the A.T.A. proposals had not been submitted to the Attorney General. He urged the Minister to refer these proposals to the Attorney General's office "so that all parties would have the advantage of being able to evaluate several suggestions instead of only one."<sup>16</sup>

The Minister of Education wrote to the President of the A.T.A. on January 9, 1967 and asked that the A.T.A. "give the Order-in-Council a trial at least."<sup>17</sup>

#### VI. MEETING OF A.T.A. REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION ON JANUARY 18, 1967

On the morning of January 18, following a meeting of the Executive Council of the A.T.A, the President, Executive Secretary and Assistant Executive Secretary met with the Minister and Deputy Minister of Education



to discuss the proposed Order-in-Council

#### A.T.A. Minimum Position

The position adopted by the Executive Council regarding the proposed Order-in-Council was presented. The minimum conditions for accepting the Order-in-Council were:

1. The chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board must be the A.T.A. President;
2. There must be more A.T.A. representatives than A.S.T.A. representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board;
3. The Department of Education must discontinue its Evaluation Service for teachers and school boards although the Department could offer a print-out to boards of full years of teacher education, in November;
4. The Department of Education must accept A.T.A. evaluation of years of teacher education for Foundation Program payments.

In addition, the A.T.A. representatives conveyed the preference of the Executive Council which was that if a Teacher Qualifications Board had to be set up under law, it preferred that it should be by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act.<sup>18</sup>

The A.T.A. representatives charged that the Department of Education had reacted to A.S.T.A. pressure in establishing its Evaluation Service and now it appeared to be reacting to A.S.T.A. pressure in putting forth a proposal for an Order-in-Council. The representatives again emphasized the fact that the Executive Council had made, through its President and other representatives, three modifications in its original position and had proposed other changes which had not received proper consideration. They advised the Minister and Deputy Minister that the Executive Council was firm in its position regarding the presidency





and number of representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board.

Points Expressed by the Minister and Deputy Minister

The Minister of Education informed the A.T.A. representatives that the Social Credit Caucus was generally suspicious of professions and that it was highly unlikely that either the Cabinet or the Caucus would favour the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board and Teacher Qualifications Service by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act.

The Minister pointed out that the trustees resented the unilateral action of the A.T.A. in setting up an Evaluation Service without consulting other groups to see if the A.T.A. proposal was acceptable. The Department officials did not see an analogy in the evaluation problem with the struggle of teachers for collective bargaining rights, which had been won over the objection of trustees. The Minister claimed that the Department had not given way to trustee pressures on the issue but insisted that the Department of Education needed to do evaluations for Foundation Program purposes.

The A.T.A. representatives informed the Minister that the A.T.A. Executive Council had reached a "sticking-point" on the issue and that A.S.T.A. pressure would be matched by A.T.A. pressure.

VII. MEETING OF A.T.A. REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE A.S.T.A.

On the afternoon of January 18, 1967, following the meeting with the Minister of Education, the A.T.A. Executive Secretary and Assistant



Executive Secretary met with the President of the A.S.T.A. The minimum terms acceptable to the A.T.A. outlined to the Minister, in the morning, were conveyed to the President of the A.S.T.A.

#### Reaction of the A.S.T.A. President

The A.S.T.A. President expressed disappointment at the stand taken by the A.T.A. Executive Council. He was pessimistic about reaching an agreement on the terms laid down by the A.T.A. and predicted that school boards and teachers would become embroiled in a "broken-bottle" fight over evaluations in contract negotiations.

The President expressed the opinion that the A.T.A. position was not as firm as the A.T.A. Executive Council would have the A.S.T.A. and others believe it to be. He observed also that many trustees, and other officials believed that the position being taken by the A.T.A. was really the position of the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. and not an expression of the will of teachers. The President also complained that the A.T.A. President did not seem to have authority to negotiate in meetings with the A.S.T.A. representatives.

#### Response of the A.T.A. Representatives

The A.T.A. representatives countered the views expressed by the A.S.T.A. President by assuring him that the Executive Council was indeed committed to a firm position, that the assumption that the A.T.A. position was that of the Executive Secretary was merely a "red-herring," to insult the intelligence and competence of members of the Executive Council and general membership of the A.T.A. As regards the authority



of the A.T.A. President to negotiate, it was argued that he had as much authority as the President of the A.S.T.A., who appeared to be bound by both the decisions of the A.S.T.A. Annual Convention of 1966 and decisions of the Executive Council of the A.S.T.A.

#### Debate over the Order-in-Council and The Teaching Profession Act

The A.S.T.A. President said that he did not believe that the A.S.T.A. Executive Council would accept the idea of a board set up by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act and asked if the A.T.A. would accept the Order-in-Council if the chairman of a board established by it was the A.T.A. President and the A.T.A. had three representatives on the board and the A.S.T.A. had two.

The A.T.A. representatives said they did not know for sure how the A.T.A. Executive Council would react to this offer but they did know that some members were rather firmly opposed to the idea of establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board by Order-in-Council. The A.S.T.A. President was non-committal when asked if the A.S.T.A. would recommend a discontinuance of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service, if an agreement could be reached on the procedures for setting up the Teacher Qualifications Board.

#### Aftermath of the Meeting

The A.S.T.A. Executive informed its membership that the A.T.A. had decided that changes were necessary in the proposed Order-in-Council to make it acceptable. The Executive indicated that it "is now considering further action in the matter."<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, the A.T.A.





continued to engage in extranegotiatory activities to back up its moves at the negotiating table.

#### VIII. A.T.A. EXTRANEGOTIATORY ACTIVITY

To influence the minimum dispositions of the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education to make each desirous of settling for less by making an agreement seem more urgent, the A.T.A. engaged in the following extranegotiatory activities:

1. Public statements by A.T.A. officers at teachers' conventions and meetings reiterating and supporting the A.T.A. position.
2. Discussion of the evaluation issue at regional conferences with special reference to recommendations to the bargaining units.
3. A special series of Area Briefing Schools to advise bargaining units on procedures for seeking inclusion of a clause in the collective agreements to provide for recognition of statements of qualifications issued by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board.
4. A press conference to make the A.T.A. views public.
5. A special issue of The ATA News in tabloid form devoted to the evaluation issue and distributed to all members of the Association and others.

#### Public Statements

The Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. spoke on January 28, 1967 to the Edmonton public school teachers who had met to ratify requests to be made to the Edmonton Public School Board in the forthcoming negotiations over the 1967-68 contract. The Assistant warned that a "head-on-clash" was likely unless some formula was found for settlement of the evaluation dispute with the A.S.T.A. He outlined



the development of the dispute, reaffirmed the Association's "right" to evaluate the years of education beyond the minimum requirements for certification. He outlined the modifications which the A.T.A. Executive Council had made to meet the A.S.T.A. objections and said that a "sticking-point" had been reached.<sup>20</sup>

### Regional Conferences

On January 28, 1967, nine regional conferences were held throughout the province. Teachers were informed of the situation with regard to evaluations. Typical of the reports given to local teachers was that at the North-East Regional Conference held at Smoky Lake. The District Representative reported that:

The Executive Council had gone as far as it could in seeking compromise with the trustees under terms of reference given it by the last Annual Representative Assembly of the Association. . . .Your elected Executive is very close to the point where we will have to await the Easter ARA before we can make another move. . . .<sup>21</sup>

The ATA News reported that the teachers of the North-East Region stood strongly behind the professional organization and that:

Reports coming in from representatives at the other eight regional conferences indicate that the Smoky Lake regional's determination to see the evaluation issue through is reflected throughout the province.<sup>22</sup>

### Special Area Briefing Schools

At the Executive Council meeting in February, 1967, the decision was made that each bargaining unit throughout the province should be advised about the importance of securing an amendment in each collective agreement to provide recognition of statements of qualifications issued



by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service.<sup>23</sup> To support this decision, the Executive Council authorized a special series of area briefing conferences to acquaint all negotiating committees with the position taken by the Executive Council and to advise on procedures. One bit of advice given to the negotiating committees was not to settle all issues except the evaluation issue so that it would not be taken to a conciliation board by itself.

### Press Conference

The President of the A.T.A. held a press conference on February 16, at which time he intimated that if the dispute could not be settled in negotiations at the provincial level, it would be made a major issue in local teacher-trustee contract negotiations. Drawing a parallel between the evaluation issue in Alberta and the current Quebec teachers strike,<sup>24</sup> the President said that the issue would be a major one because teachers were becoming "just as concerned or more concerned about professional aspects of contracts as money ones."<sup>25</sup> When asked if teachers would strike over evaluations the President said, "I think the question has been asked and I think the answer is 'yes'."<sup>26</sup>

The President expressed hope that the settlement could be reached at the provincial level "if the parties continue moving toward a compromise." He said that the A.T.A. had been doing most of the moving and is "now willing to go no further." Referring to the stand of the Department of Education regarding its Evaluation Service, the President commented, "The department of education is in this deeper than they realize. . . . Now it is their turn to make some concessions."<sup>27</sup>





### The Special Issue of The ATA News

In February 1966, an experimental issue of The ATA News was published in tabloid form. This issue was distributed to all members of the A.T.A. and copies were sent to all other persons connected with the dispute. The issue dealt largely with the evaluation dispute. Reports from the January regional conferences, addresses by A.T.A. staff officers and decisions made at the January Executive Council meeting were recorded.

Commenting on the stand taken by the A.T.A. Executive at the January meeting an article in the paper made the point that:

It would appear from the tenor of the meeting that agreement can now only be reached with the ASTA if teachers are prepared to abandon the principle that evaluation of years of teacher education is the right and the responsibility of the profession.

The recent Regional Conferences have conclusively shown that the teachers are not willing to abandon this position but are willing to back up the Executive Council in its stand on evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes.<sup>28</sup>

"Closing the credibility gap." An editorial in the February issue was devoted to the elimination of the "credibility gap." The editorial claimed that the Association was determined to convince the trustees that teachers had resolved to exercise their professional responsibility in the evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes. The editorial charged that the A.S.T.A. document, "Crisis in Alberta Education" had converted the credibility gap into a chasm by trying to convince the public that the A.T.A. was attempting to control public education. It claimed that the trustees were still trying to confuse the public by equating evaluations with certification and were still attempting to keep alive "the myth" that the Teacher



Qualifications Service would slow down the entry of teachers from outside the province.

Finally, the editorial stated quite clearly the A.T.A.'s firm commitment on the evaluation issue and the consequences which could be expected to flow from that commitment.

The Executive Council of the ATA has finally taken a firm stand. Concessions and compromises on the part of the Executive Council has continued since last May. But the Executive Council cannot honorably retreat any further and must indeed seek approval of the Annual Representative Assembly for modifications already proposed. The mood of the overwhelming majority of teachers in this province as seen at the regional conferences is to take the issue to the bargaining table if necessary.

It is clear that the trustees and others who have opposed the Association's position on evaluation of years of teacher education have badly misread teacher temperature. It is equally clear that the ASTA pressure on the government and the university has driven teachers to the alternative of taking the issue to the bargaining table.<sup>29</sup>



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Unofficial Transcript of the A.S.T.A. Annual Convention Proceedings, 1966. (Typewritten.)

<sup>2</sup>News items in The Edmonton Journal, November 10, 1966.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Unofficial Transcript, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup>The Edmonton Journal, op. cit.

<sup>6</sup>Unofficial Transcript, op. cit.

<sup>7</sup>The Edmonton Journal, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, November 11, 1966.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, 2, January 25, 1967.

<sup>11</sup>This meeting and subsequent meetings have been reconstructed from information provided in interviews by the participants and from personal records kept by persons present at the meetings.

<sup>12</sup>Letter from the President of the A.T.A. to the Minister of Education, dated December 19, 1966.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>News item in The Lethbridge Herald, January 6, 1967.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Letter from the President of the A.T.A. to the Minister of Education, dated January 5, 1967.

<sup>17</sup>Letter from the Minister of Education to the President of the A.T.A., dated January 9, 1967.

<sup>18</sup>This position was communicated to the members of the A.T.A. in The ATA News, 1, February, 1967.

<sup>19</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, 2, January 25, 1967.





<sup>20</sup>The ATA News, op. cit.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>The Alberta Teachers' Association, Special Report to the 1967 Annual Representative Assembly (Edmonton: The Alberta Teachers' Association). (Mimeographed.)

<sup>24</sup>The teachers in the Greater Montreal Area in the Province of Quebec had been on strike for several weeks. One of the major issues in that strike was the greater participation of teachers in decision-making at all levels in the school system.

<sup>25</sup>News item in The Edmonton Journal, February 17, 1967.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>This statement was made just two days after the receipt of the letter from the Deputy Minister of Education, dated February 13, 1967, informing the President of the concessions which the A.S.T.A. was willing to make and the position of the Department of Education regarding its Evaluation Service. See page 175.

<sup>28</sup>The ATA News, op. cit.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CONVERGENCE ON POINTS OF AGREEMENT

In this chapter, the process by which the parties brought their positions into final agreement is examined. The parties adapted their proposals into a single agreed set of terms, in the open, at the bargaining table, but it should be recognized that this merely represented the surface manifestation of reaching agreement. The major portion of the process of reaching agreement took place within the minds of the negotiators and within the inner councils of the respective executives. That aspect of the process lay beyond the scope of this study. It can be assumed, however, that as the final stage of negotiations approached, each party revised its expectations about the position of the other, each shifted its evaluation for measuring gains and losses in making concessions and each weighed the choice of accepting the available terms against the possibility of further bargaining in the hope of reaching better terms.

The record shows that the A.S.T.A. made the first major concessions with the hope of breaking the impasse.

#### I. A.S.T.A. CONCESSIONS

At an Executive Council meeting on February 6, 1967, the A.S.T.A. decided to make certain concessions from its position to make the Order-in-Council more acceptable to the A.T.A. A delegation from the A.S.T.A.



visited the Minister of Education on February 7th and outlined the proposed concessions. These were sent on to the A.T.A. by the Deputy Minister of Education in a letter to the President. The concessions as understood<sup>1</sup> by the Deputy Minister were:

1. The A.S.T.A. is prepared for a reduction of its membership to two and expresses the view that the place thus released should be allocated to the University of Lethbridge, at a time, I presume, when Lethbridge becomes concerned with teacher education.
2. The trustees indicated their readiness to accept the president of The Alberta Teachers' Association as chairman of the Qualifications Board. They indicated their willingness to nominate this person at the first meeting; however, I expect they would also agree that there should be written into the Order-in-Council a statement to the effect that the chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board must be the president of The Alberta Teachers' Association.
3. The representatives from the executive indicated that they would, at the same time, once this Qualifications Board has been established by Order-in-Council, inform the members of their Association of the new arrangements and advise their membership to make application to the Evaluation Committee of the A.T.A. for evaluations of year of education for individual teachers who had made application to the committee.<sup>2</sup>

## II. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Shortly after the receipt of the letter from the Deputy Minister of Education, the Assistant Executive Secretary said to the Executive Secretary, "I think the time has come for a Memorandum of Agreement."<sup>3</sup> The idea was presented to the Executive Council at the February meeting and after considerable debate it was agreed that the A.T.A. representatives should propose that a Memorandum of Agreement be developed among the Department of Education, the Alberta School Trustees' Association and The Alberta Teachers' Association for the purpose of establishing a





Teacher Qualifications Board.<sup>4</sup>

### Background of the Memorandum of Agreement

That the idea for a Memorandum of Agreement as a mechanism for solving the impasse should occur first to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. is not surprising. This person, who had many years of experience in collective negotiations had been largely responsible for planning the strategy and tactics used by the A.T.A. in conducting its negotiations with the A.S.T.A. and Department of Education. In thinking back to the time when the Salary Appendix Committee had been able to develop principles used by the Evaluation Committee of the University of Alberta for evaluating teacher credentials, it occurred to him that if a body similar to the Salary Appendix Committee which had been established by agreement could be set up, it might provide a way out of the impasse. The question was how could such a body be set up by action other than through an Order-in-Council?

It crossed my mind that a Memorandum of Agreement among the three parties spelling out the things that would be acceptable to each and every party might be the answer. I did some scribbling weeks before but kept the idea to myself. I discussed it with the Executive Secretary first and then the President before we discussed it with the others.<sup>5</sup>

Conscious of the political nature of the two Associations, the Executive officers of the A.T.A. waited for the propitious moment before advancing the idea of a Memorandum of Agreement. That moment came when they were convinced that both sides were truly anxious to find a way out of the impasse and all other roads appeared blocked. "The reaction of our Executive Council was far more favourable to the Memorandum of



Agreement when it was presented than it would have been a few months before,"<sup>6</sup> the Assistant Executive Secretary said. The A.T.A. Executive officers were in a position to readily assess the tenor of their own organization but it was more difficult to ascertain the mood and expectations of the A.S.T.A. The letter from the Deputy Minister announcing major concessions on the part of the A.S.T.A. heralded the "propitious moment" by convincing the A.T.A. negotiators that the A.S.T.A. was honestly searching for a way out of the impasse as well. The Memorandum of Agreement represented the final major concession of the A.T.A. and it had to be timed so as not to prejudice the A.T.A.'s chances of winning concessions from the A.S.T.A.

### III. A MEETING OF A.T.A. REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION ON MARCH 2, 1967

Following the discussion of the Executive Council of the A.T.A. at its February meeting, the President, Executive Secretary and Assistant Executive Secretary met with the Minister of Education and Deputy Minister to discuss the precise meaning of the concessions made by the A.S.T.A. as outlined in the Deputy Minister's letter of February 13, 1967. At the meeting, the A.T.A. representatives suggested that instead of attempting to set up the Teacher Qualifications Board by Order-in-Council as requested by the A.S.T.A. or by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act as proposed by the A.T.A., it might be preferable to explore the possibility of preparing a Memorandum of Agreement, signed by representatives of the three parties and incorporating



certain undertakings by each of the parties to the agreement. The Minister of Education expressed interest in this suggestion and asked that the A.T.A. representatives discuss it with the A.S.T.A. officers to obtain their reaction.

The Minister and Deputy Minister were asked if they were prepared to abandon the Department of Education's Evaluation Service or restrict its function to providing evaluations for Foundation Program purposes, if the Memorandum of Agreement could be effected. The Minister and Deputy Minister did not commit themselves on this point.

The Minister and Deputy were amenable to a suggestion by the A.T.A. representatives for a procedure which would require a prospective immigrant teacher to send his documents first to the Registrar of the Department of Education for evaluation in terms of deciding whether or not the teacher was entitled to an Alberta teaching certificate and then to apply for a Statement of Qualifications for salary determination from the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Secretary.

#### IV. MEETING BETWEEN A.T.A. AND A.S.T.A. OFFICERS ON MARCH 3, 1967

After the meeting with the Minister and Deputy Minister, the President of the A.T.A. telephoned the President of the A.S.T.A. and arranged for a meeting between A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. officers to exchange views on recent developments. The meeting took place at the A.S.T.A. offices on the evening of Friday, March 3, just before a meeting of the A.S.T.A. table officers gathered to prepare for an Executive Council meeting the next day.







The A.T.A. officers expressed gratitude with the conciliatory tone shown in the recent A.S.T.A. proposal and noted that the Minister seemed anxious for an immediate solution to the problem. The A.T.A. officers then outlined the proposal for establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board by Memorandum of Agreement among the Department of Education, the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. rather than by Order-in-Council or an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act. The A.T.A. officers also outlined the A.T.A. condition with regard to the Department of Education's Evaluation Service, that is, that the Department's Evaluation Service be confined to evaluation activities related to the Foundation Program Fund.

The A.S.T.A. officers expressed interest in the proposal and asked a number of questions about the intended relationship between the Teacher Qualifications Board and the Qualifications Committee. The A.S.T.A. officers advised that they would need time to examine the proposal and to take it before the full Executive Council the next day.

#### A.S.T.A. Executive Council Reaction to the Memorandum of Agreement

The A.S.T.A. Executive Council discussed the A.T.A. proposal thoroughly at the meeting on March 4, 1967. Three decisions were made at the meeting relevant to the evaluation issue. These were: (1) A committee consisting of the President, Vice-President and Executive Director was appointed to investigate the possibilities for solving the issue. (2) Three possible devices which the A.S.T.A. would accept as a means for establishing an Evaluations Board were listed in order of priority. These were a Memorandum of Agreement, an Order-in-Council, an



Act of the Legislature. (3) The structure of the board, regardless of how it might be established, should be the same as that in the Order-in-Council proposed by the Minister of Education and already agreed to by the A.S.T.A.

A few days later, the committee of three visited the Minister of Education to discuss the proposals. The Minister advised that the Order-in-Council was unacceptable to the A.T.A. and that legislation would be difficult to achieve. The Minister suggested that the Memorandum of Agreement seemed to be the best alternative. The A.S.T.A. officers agreed to participate in meetings with the Minister and representatives of the A.T.A. to further investigate the possibility of executing a Memorandum of Agreement.

#### V. MEETING OF THE MINISTER WITH A.T.A. AND A.S.T.A.

REPRESENTATIVES ON MARCH 14, 1967

After the meeting with the A.S.T.A. officers at which it was agreed that the possibility of a Memorandum of Agreement should be explored further, the Minister of Education telephoned the President of the A.T.A. and requested that an elected representative and staff officer of the A.T.A. meet with him and an elected representative and staff officer of the A.S.T.A. in the Minister's office at 8:00 a.m. on March 14, 1967. The Minister asked that the A.T.A. be prepared to exchange lists of items that might be included in a Memorandum of Agreement and be prepared to try to reach consensus concerning what items might be included in the Memorandum of Agreement. The Minister also suggested



that, contingent upon the outcome of the meeting on March 14, another meeting between the table officers of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. be held in his office on March 21, to finalize the Memorandum of Agreement.

The A.T.A. President appointed the Vice-President and Assistant Executive Secretary to represent the A.T.A. The President and Executive Director represented the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education and Registrar represented the Department of Education. Each group took a list of points to be considered for inclusion in the Memorandum of Agreement (see Appendices B, C, and D).

#### Points of Agreement

After reading each other's lists of recommendations, agreement was reached by the representatives on the following points:

1. The representatives agreed that it would be proper and feasible for the parties to execute a Memorandum of Agreement setting out the general and specific intentions of the parties.

2. The representatives agreed to accept items ten, eleven and twelve on the list submitted by the A.T.A. These items represented significant concessions on the part of the A.S.T.A. because they obliged the A.S.T.A. to appoint representatives to the Board, to advise all member school boards that an agreement recognizing the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service had been signed, and to request all member school boards to inform prospective immigrant teachers to apply for Statements of Qualification from the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service.





3. The Minister of Education agreed to accept items thirteen to seventeen on the A.T.A. list. Reference to Appendix B will show that the acceptance of these represented significant concessions on the part of the Minister of Education. The items state clearly that the Department of Education will restrict its service of evaluation to Foundation Program purposes, that prospective teachers will be referred by the Department of Education after determining entitlement for an Alberta teaching certificate, to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service for a Statement of Qualifications, that the Department of Education will accept for Foundation Program purposes Statements of Qualifications issued by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service, if the collective agreement between a school board and its teachers recognize such statements for salary purposes.

#### Points of Disagreement

The following points were not agreed upon by the representatives:

1. The Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. representatives would not agree to the A.T.A. preference (Item 6, Appendix B) that the Memorandum of Agreement provide that the A.T.A. establish a Teacher Qualifications Board composed of representatives of the A.S.T.A., the Department of Education and each university which is under contract to the Department of Education to prepare teachers. The Department of Education representatives and the A.S.T.A. representatives preferred that the composition of the Teacher Qualifications Board be spelled out precisely in the Memorandum of Agreement as recommended in the A.S.T.A. list of items (Appendix C, Item V).



2. The representatives did not agree on the position of the Chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board, and therefore the number of A.T.A. representatives on the Board. The A.T.A. representatives stressed the concept of a chairman accepted by The Alberta Teachers' Association. That is, a chairman is a non-voting member except in cases of a tie-vote and is precluded from expressing opinions and taking part in discussions. The A.T.A. therefore anticipated having three voting representatives on the Board as well as the President of the A.T.A. who would act as chairman. The A.S.T.A. representatives rejected the A.T.A. concept of chairman and stressed the trustee understanding that a chairman is a full member of a board with all the rights of any other member. He is a highly influential member of a board because with the prestige attached to his office he can influence the views and actions of other members. The A.S.T.A. representatives, therefore, wanted the A.T.A. President to be one of the three A.T.A. representatives. The Minister of Education supported the views held by the A.S.T.A. representatives.

#### Outcome of the Meeting

The A.T.A. representatives stated that they could not indicate whether the Executive Council and Annual Representative Assembly would approve changes necessary to meet the objections of the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education or not. However, the A.T.A. representatives presented these changes to the Executive Council at a meeting on March 17 and 18, 1967. The Executive Council approved the following changes in the A.T.A.'s position:



1. The Memorandum of Agreement should specify the establishment of the Teacher Qualifications Board, including the parties to be represented and the number of representatives from each party rather than by a decision of the A.T.A.

2. Provision be made on the Teacher Qualifications Board for three A.T.A. representatives including the President of the A.T.A. as chairman rather than three A.T.A. representatives in addition to the A.T.A. President as chairman.

3. Provision be made for a clear understanding, in the Memorandum of Agreement, that the A.T.A. President, as chairman, would be a full member of the Teacher Qualifications Board with all the rights of any other member including the right to express views, make motions and vote on any question brought before the Board.

#### VI. MEETING OF THE A.T.A. REPRESENTATIVE AND THE A.S.T.A.

##### REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE REGISTRAR OF THE

##### DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ON

MARCH 20, 1967

On March 20, the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. and the Registrar of the Department of Education met to prepare an outline of a Memorandum of Agreement for the consideration of a combined meeting of the table officers of both Associations and the Minister of Education scheduled for March 21. The A.T.A. representative took into the meeting a draft of a Memorandum of Agreement which he had prepared in advance. Neither the A.S.T.A.





representative nor the Registrar had prepared a document. The basic structure and most of the content in the draft Memorandum of Agreement (Appendix E) reflected the document which the A.T.A. representative had prepared since this document served as a basis from which the representatives prepared the finished draft.

Disagreement over naming of Chairman. Reference to Appendix E, Item 1.1 will show that the representatives could not agree to the wording for the appointment of the Chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board. The A.T.A. representative wanted it spelled out in the Memorandum of Agreement that the Chairman would be the A.T.A. President. It was his impression that the A.S.T.A. representatives had agreed at the meeting on March 14 that if the A.T.A. reduced its representation on the Teacher Qualifications Board to three members, the A.S.T.A. would not object to having the A.T.A. President as Chairman. The A.S.T.A. representative wanted the Memorandum to provide that the Chairman of the Board be elected from among the members of the Board and the A.S.T.A. representatives on the Board would nominate the A.T.A. President as Chairman as a matter of "gentlemen's agreement." The A.T.A. representative would not accept this. Since the representatives could not agree, they decided to leave the question for the decision of the combined groups the next day.

#### VII. COMBINED MEETING ON MARCH 21, 1967

On March 21, the Minister of Education convened a combined meeting of representatives of the A.T.A., the A.S.T.A. and the Department



of Education. The representatives considered each clause of the Memorandum of Agreement and finally agreed on a revised version (see Appendix F). Three major changes in the draft prepared by the representatives on March 20th were agreed upon. These involved (1) the name of the Board, (2) the Chairmanship, (3) undertakings of the A.T.A.

Name of the Board. The Vice-President of the A.S.T.A. wanted the name of the Board changed to "Board for Evaluation of Years of Teacher Education." The A.T.A. objected to the word "evaluation" in the name because of the wider connotation of the word.<sup>7</sup> In turn the A.T.A. suggested insertion of the word "salary." This was acceptable to the A.S.T.A. representatives because it would delimit the function of the Board to evaluation for salary purposes and prevent any possibility of its use for certification purposes. Thus the board was named the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board.

Chairman of the Board. The issue of the Chairmanship was one of the more difficult issues to resolve because it had been a major point of contention from the beginning. The A.T.A. had publicly committed itself to having the A.T.A. President as Chairman of the Board. This had been one of its "sticking-points." The A.S.T.A., on the other hand, was committed to a "neutral" body and may have had difficulty convincing its membership that it had won a neutral board if it had signed a document agreeing that the President of the A.T.A. should be Chairman of the Board. A "face-saving" device was required for both sides. The following alternatives were suggested: (1) that the Chairman be the



President of the A.T.A., (2) that the Chairman be one of the representatives of The Alberta Teachers' Association, (3) that the Chairman be elected by the Board, (4) that the Chairman be elected by the Board from among the A.T.A. members. The wording finally agreed upon was: "The Chairman of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board shall be one of the representatives of The Alberta Teachers' Association." In return for this formula which allowed the A.T.A. to appoint its President or not, the A.T.A. agreed that at the first meeting of the Board it would support an A.S.T.A. nomination for the Evaluation Officer of the Department of Education<sup>8</sup> as Secretary of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board, rather than an employee of the A.T.A.

A.T.A. undertaking. The A.S.T.A. representatives objected to clause 3.2 of the draft Memorandum of Agreement which required the A.T.A. to "accept regulations and recommendations made by the Board to The Alberta Teachers' Association regarding the administration, personnel, and facilities required for the proper operation of the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board." In its place was substituted the clause,

The Alberta Teachers' Association undertakes to operate its Teacher Qualifications Service within the policies and principles established by the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board.

A comparison of Appendices E and F will show that a few other minor changes were agreed to in the wording of the clauses in the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement.





## VIII. THE FINAL MEETING MARCH 23, 1967

The table officers of the A.S.T.A. were obliged to get approval of the Memorandum of Agreement from the Executive Council which met on Thursday March 23, before signatures could be affixed to the document. The A.T.A. representatives had received prior approval from the A.T.A. Executive Council for all terms agreed to at the meeting on March 21. The A.S.T.A. Executive Council endorsed the Memorandum of Agreement. In the evening of Thursday March 23, 1967, the Executive Councils and staff officers of The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees Association met in a joint session with the Minister of Education to witness the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement by the Minister of Education, the President of the A.T.A. and the President of the A.S.T.A. A photograph of the occasion records broad smiles on the faces of each of the signatories.<sup>9</sup>

## IX. EPILOGUE

The A.T.A. Annual Representative Assembly which met during the week of March 28, 1967, approved the following resolution introduced by the Executive Council:

BE IT RESOLVED, that this Annual Representative Assembly endorse the Memorandum of Agreement whereby the Department of Education, the Alberta School Trustees' Association and The Alberta Teachers' Association agree to cooperate in the establishment of a Teacher Salary Qualifications Board for the development of policies and principles which shall be the basis on which evaluations of teacher qualifications for salary purposes shall be made.<sup>10</sup>

The A.S.T.A. Executive Council did not seek approval from its membership at its Annual Convention held in Edmonton in November, 1967,



because the Executive considered the establishment of a neutral board through the Memorandum of Agreement as having carried out the intent of the 1966 resolution. No one raised a question about the Memorandum of Agreement from the floor of the Convention. This was taken as a sign that the membership of the A.S.T.A. was satisfied with the solution of the dispute.<sup>11</sup>



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

<sup>1</sup>The officers of the A.S.T.A. did not agree that they had stated their position exactly as the Deputy Minister had conveyed it to the A.T.A. Although the A.S.T.A. officers admitted to agreeing to reducing the number of A.S.T.A. representatives on the proposed board from two to three, they did not agree to having it written into the Order-in-Council that the Chairman must be the President of the A.T.A. They did agree to nominate the A.T.A. President as Chairman the first year as a quid pro quo, if the A.T.A. would agree to the Order-in-Council. The position of the A.S.T.A. with regard to the Chairmanship of the Board was that there was no logical reason for a person who happened to be president of an association to automatically become chairman of another organization to which his association happened to belong. The A.S.T.A. officers stated further that they did not agree previously to advising the members of the A.S.T.A. to make application to the A.T.A. Qualifications Committee. They claim to have told the Deputy Minister that if the A.T.A. would accept the Order-in-Council, the A.S.T.A. was prepared to advise member boards that the A.S.T.A. was a party to the Order-in-Council and if the boards wished to use the A.T.A. Evaluation Service they could; or, they could use the Department of Education's Evaluation Service.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from the Deputy Minister of Education to the President of the A.T.A., dated February 13, 1967.

<sup>3</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 24, 1967.

<sup>4</sup>The Alberta Teachers' Association, Special Report, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on November 29, 1967.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Some teachers had already been asking if evaluation by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board meant "merit rating." The A.T.A. Executive wanted it made clear that the A.T.A.'s Evaluation Service was only for the purpose of assessing a teacher's university background for salary purposes and had no authority to judge classroom performance.

<sup>8</sup>This person had been hired on January 1, 1967 to administer the Department of Education's Evaluation Service.

<sup>9</sup>The ATA News, 2, April, 1967.

<sup>10</sup>The Alberta Teachers' Association, Manual of ATA Policy for 1967 (Edmonton: The Alberta Teachers' Association, 1967), p. 38.

<sup>11</sup>Interview with the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A., December 20, 1967.





## CHAPTER IX

### CASE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

The parties clearly entered into negotiations in the case described in the last three chapters for the purpose of distributing the right and responsibility for evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes. Negotiation was defined previously as the process by which parties put forth explicit proposals for the purpose of reaching agreement on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present. Parties frequently make other moves to strengthen their own positions or weaken the positions of opponents, in addition to the moves made in direct confrontation at the bargaining table. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the case by attempting to interpret the negotiating moves and extranegotiatory activity of each party and, if possible, to relate these moves to the outcome of the issue. The case will be analysed in terms of the following criteria:

1. Major and sub-issues,
2. Initial bargaining positions of each party,
3. Final bargaining positions of each party,
4. Commitment strategy and tactics,
5. Bargaining power of each party at given times,
6. Methods of reaching terms of agreement, on the sub-issues,
7. Shifting evaluations of each party,
8. Roles played by "third parties."



## I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

### Ordering of Preferences


Ikle's model of Political Negotiations had been modified to incorporate the assumption that preferences for control of evaluation of teacher education in Alberta, from the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. points of view, can be ordered on a continuum as depicted in Figure 8. The range of preferences extends from a preference for complete control by The Alberta Teachers' Association at one extreme through control by the University of Alberta, to control by some body considered neutral by both parties, to control by the Department of Education and finally complete control by the Alberta School Trustees' Association. The A.T.A.'s order of preferences for control of evaluations is assumed to have extended toward the left, whereas, the ordering of preferences of the A.S.T.A. was in the opposite direction. The constant ordering of preferences does not imply constant utility on the part of each negotiator or that there was necessarily unanimity of preference in each party.

### Rationale for the Ordering of Preferences

Equidistant between the two extremes exists an area in which the preferences of the two parties are the same. This would require that evaluation responsibility be assigned to some agency neutral to both parties. Distribution of the responsibility for evaluation to an organization positioned on either side of this neutral area would have represented a perceived "loss" or "gain" to one or other of the parties, depending upon which direction the responsibility for evaluation was



← A.T.A.'s Ordering  
of Preferences



A.S.T.A.'s Ordering  
of Preferences →

FIGURE 8

DISTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EVALUATION  
OF TEACHER EDUCATION FOR SALARY PURPOSES





distributed. Preference for control by the University of Alberta is placed to the left of the neutral area because to the A.S.T.A. the University represented something less than a neutral body. The A.S.T.A. had generally been content to have the University of Alberta administer evaluations, although some trustees felt that because evaluation for salary purposes had been so closely related to evaluation for advanced standing on university programs at times evaluations were harsher than was necessary. The A.T.A. preferred control by the University of Alberta above control by any other group and if not the University then the A.T.A. The Department of Education is placed to the right of "neutral" because the A.T.A. considered the Department of Education too easily influenced by pressure from school trustees and other groups to satisfy its definition of neutrality. Complete control of evaluations in the hands of the Department of Education would definitely have been considered a "loss" to the A.T.A.

At no time did the A.S.T.A. claim for itself the right to evaluate teacher education as an institutional responsibility, nor did any other group suggest that this task should be assigned to the A.S.T.A. In actual fact, therefore, the range of preferences extended from preference for control by the A.T.A. to a preference for control by the Department of Education. Moreover, since the University of Alberta eventually made good its promise to withdraw its evaluation service, preference for control by the University has been removed from the range of preferences in Figures 9 to 15. Partial A.T.A. control implies that although a body may be established by A.T.A. bylaw or be responsible to



the A.T.A. Executive it may contain members who represent the views of other organizations and who could influence the decisions of the body and therefore the body would not be completely controlled by the A.T.A.

### Preferences of the Other Groups

The Minister of Education preferred a continuation of the evaluation service given by the University of Alberta. It was his personal view that "the people who train teachers should evaluate them." This particular value held by the Minister seems to have prevented him from taking immediate action in the dispute between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. and resulted in his having been accused of "having wobbled all over the education scene."

The Deputy Minister of Education (formerly the Chief Superintendent of Schools) held the view that evaluation for salary purposes was a matter that should be worked out locally between teachers and school boards and was not the proper function of any provincial group. However, if evaluations had to be done at the provincial level, the Deputy Minister personally preferred transfer of responsibility for the administration of evaluations to the A.T.A. The Deputy Minister did not wish the Department of Education to become involved in the performance of the evaluation task unless absolutely necessary. Moreover, the Deputy Minister considered that the A.T.A. was the only body other than the Department of Education with the necessary resources and competent personnel to perform the task efficiently, if the University of Alberta would not continue.

The Dean of Education, University of Alberta did not seem to have



a preference for administration of evaluations as between the Department of Education or the A.T.A. Either was acceptable to him, personally. He believed that the major consideration for assigning responsibility for evaluations, to whatever body, was that both the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. agree to the arrangement, because teachers and trustees were the groups most directly affected by evaluation.

## II. THE ISSUES

### The Major Issue

The major issue can be considered in terms of the analytical framework. The issue involved a conflict in the objectives of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. for distribution of the right and responsibility for control of evaluation of teacher education. Redistribution of this right and responsibility became necessary after the University of Alberta decided to relinquish exclusive responsibility for performing the evaluation function previously assigned to it through the tacit agreement of all those concerned with evaluation. The A.T.A. subscribed to the value that evaluation of teacher education is a "professional right and responsibility" and preferred an arrangement which would transfer control of evaluation to the teachers' professional organization. The officers of the A.S.T.A. held the view that evaluation of teacher education cannot be separated from teacher training and certification and therefore is a legal function of the Minister of Education. The A.S.T.A. preferred that control of evaluations be transferred to the Department of Education and administered by the Registrar or some other person responsible to the Minister of Education.





Simply stated the major issue was a question of whether the A.T.A. or the Department of Education had the right and should assume the responsibility for evaluating teacher education for salary purposes.

Conflicting interest. As in most instances of negotiation for redistribution, the conflicting interest became the principal one. In this case it stemmed from the move by the A.T.A. to take over the evaluation function, unilaterally. The A.S.T.A. seems to have perceived in this move a threat to the status quo which existed between teachers and trustees, especially at the local bargaining tables. The move was vigorously opposed by the A.S.T.A. which accused the A.T.A. of employing a "power-seeking approach" to usurp control of public education from the elected representatives of the people.

Common interest. The common interest which lay in the mutual desire to avoid a showdown over the issue remained tacit at the beginning of the dispute. In the final stages of negotiation, the common interest assumed greater prominence as the parties sought earnestly for a solution to the issue while there was still time to prevent a breakdown in salary negotiations at the local level.

### Sub-Issues

Examination of the data reveals that at least six sub-issues made up the major issue in dispute. These were:

1. By what method should a Teacher Qualifications Board be established?
2. How should the Teacher Qualifications Board be constituted?



3. How should the Chairmanship of the Board be determined?
4. What should the function of the Teacher Qualifications Board be?
5. Who should have responsibility for administration of evaluations?
6. What should the function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service be?

For each of these single issues, each party sought a settlement consistent with its order of preferences. The negotiating process will be analysed by examining how the parties came to terms on each of these sub-issues. It is necessary to realize, however, that the final agreement arrived at involved the connecting of these related sub-issues into a complex overall set of agreed terms.

### III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INITIAL BARGAINING POSITIONS

#### Explanation of Models

Figures 9 and 10 show the bargaining positions taken by the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. on the range of preferences over a period of about one and one-half years--from October 21, 1964, when the A.T.A. submitted its first proposal to May 1966 at which time each party had become firmly committed to a "final" position. The positions adopted by each party on each of the sub-issues are shown on the same models to indicate the relationship among them, although a different model might have been used for each one. The positions indicated represent minimum dispositions of each party and therefore the bargaining ranges marked by






FIGURE 9  
INITIAL BARGAINING POSITIONS OF THE A.T.A. AND A.S.T.A. DECEMBER 1, 1965 SHOWING ACTUAL BARGAINING RANGES

A.T.A. INFORMATION


1. Indication given by the University of Alberta of its intention to discontinue its evaluation service, probably April 1, 1966.
2. The A.T.A.'s plan for administration of evaluations not endorsed by the A.S.T.A.,
3. The A.T.A.'s plan for administration of evaluations endorsed by the President of the University of Alberta.
4. A resolution approved by the A.S.T.A.'s Annual Convention requesting the Minister of Education to establish a board for evaluation and certification.
5. A principle approved by the B.T.E.C. calling for salary evaluation and certification to be hinged together and handled by the same board.

A.S.T.A. INFORMATION

1. A policy resolution approved by the A.T.A. calling for the A.T.A. to administer evaluations under terms of reference determined by the B.T.E.C..
2. Indication given by the University of Alberta of its intention to discontinue its service, probably April 1, 1966.
3. A principle approved by the B.T.E.C. calling for salary evaluation and certification to be hinged together and handled by the same body.







A.T.A. INFORMATION

1. Evaluation service of the University to be continued for another year.
2. Request made by the A.S.T.A. to the Minister of Education to establish a board for evaluation and certification.
3. The A.T.A.'s plan for administration of evaluations rejected by the A.S.T.A.
4. The view expressed by the President of the University of Alberta that the Registrar of the Department of Education should do evaluations along with certification.
5. A plan being considered by the Department of Education to set up an independent board by Order-in-Council.
6. The view expressed by the Minister of Education that trustees must agree to any plan established by the A.T.A.
7. Evaluation considered a local matter by officials of the Department of Education but if no system exists or if a conflict develops between the A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. the Minister may have to use his residual power to settle it.
8. Draft Evaluation Bylaw giving Executive Council authority to take action on evaluations approved by the Annual Representative Assembly.

A.S.T.A. INFORMATION

1. Evaluation service of the University to be continued by another year.
2. Draft Evaluation Bylaw and Draft Membership Eligibility Bylaw approved by A.T.A. Annual Representative Assembly.
3. Public statement made by A.T.A. officers that A.T.A. Evaluation service will begin June 1, 1966.
4. Resolution approved by A.T.A. Annual Representative Assembly to amend policy resolutions in which reference is made to evaluation of years of teacher education by the University of Alberta by adding words "or by the Teacher Qualifications Board".
5. The view expressed by the President of the University of Alberta that the Registrar of the Department of Education should do evaluations along with certification.
6. Assurance given by the Minister of Education that he will not accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments.
7. No action taken by the Minister of Education on previous A.S.T.A. proposals.

FIGURE 10  
BARGAINING POSITIONS AND ACTUAL BARGAINING RANGES OF THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. ON May 15, 1966



horizontal lines are actual bargaining ranges rather than estimated ones. (There was no indication that the parties attempted to estimate the minimum disposition of each other or to estimate a bargaining range for each issue.) No attempt has been made to quantify the data. The models serve illustrative purposes only. The information known to have been possessed by each party, on which decisions may have been made is recorded on the left side of each model.

#### Bargaining Positions and Bargaining Ranges to December 1, 1965

Bargaining positions of the A.T.A. In Figure 9, the positions given for the A.T.A. are those contained in the proposal submitted to the Board of Teacher Education and Certification on October 21, 1964. These remained the A.T.A.'s preferences until after the move by the A.S.T.A. on December 1, 1965. During this period, the A.T.A. seems to have been primarily interested in gaining control of the administrative aspects of evaluation only. It wanted an A.T.A. staff officer to be responsible for evaluating teachers' credentials and issuing statements of evaluation. To assist the administrative officer in dealing with difficult cases and to develop detailed guidelines for evaluation, the A.T.A. proposed a small committee composed of representatives from the A.T.A., the universities and the Department of Education, but with no representative from the A.S.T.A. This committee was to be responsible to the A.T.A. Executive Council. This item is therefore placed on the model in the area labelled "Partial A.T.A. Control." The A.T.A.'s proposal called for a policy and appeals committee to be appointed by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. Because the Board of



Teacher Education and Certification has been established by Order-in-Council, it has been assumed that the A.T.A.'s preference for this particular item lay somewhere between "Neutral" and "Department" on the range of preferences until December 1, 1965.

Bargaining positions of the A.S.T.A. The positions given for the A.S.T.A. in Figure 9 are those contained in the resolution approved by the Annual Convention held the first week in December, 1965. The A.S.T.A.'s proposal clearly places its preference for the administrative aspect of evaluations in the zone which indicates control by the Department of Education. The A.S.T.A. wanted the Registrar of the Department of Education to issue statements of evaluation and the evaluations committee representative of all parties to be appointed by the Minister of Education. The A.S.T.A. proposed the establishment of a policy-setting and appeals committee as a sub-committee of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. The principal difference between the A.T.A.'s proposal and the A.S.T.A.'s proposal regarding this item was that the A.S.T.A. preferred that the committee should be responsible for both certification and salary evaluation policies.

#### Bargaining Positions and Bargaining Ranges to May 15, 1966

Bargaining positions of the A.T.A. Reference to Figure 10 shows that by May 15, 1966, the A.T.A. had adopted a more extreme position with regard to the establishment of a Qualifications Board for the purpose of determining evaluation policies. The A.T.A. proposed that the Qualifications Board be established unilaterally, thus substantially







removing evaluation from direct public control. The specific nature of the A.T.A. proposal which came in the form of a Draft Bylaw introduced the sub-issues related to the number of representatives from each group and the Chairmanship of the Board. At first, some confusion surrounded the intended purpose of the Teacher Qualifications Board as proposed by the A.T.A. bylaw. Later, this confusion was eliminated when the A.T.A. specified that the Board was intended for the purpose of developing policies for evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes only. The A.T.A.'s position with regard to administration of evaluations remained substantially the same as in the first proposal. The only change in this area was in the procedure for establishing the administrative machinery.

Bargaining positions of the A.S.T.A. The minimum dispositions of the A.S.T.A. for each item given in Figure 10, page 254, are those which were stated by the Executive Officers of the A.S.T.A. at the meeting on May 15, 1966. A comparison with Figure 9, page 253, shows very little fundamental change in the A.S.T.A.'s disposition to prefer an agreement on the A.T.A.'s terms in May from December, 1965. The A.S.T.A. countered the A.T.A. proposal regarding the number of representatives on the Board with a demand for equal representation. The A.S.T.A. officers demanded that a Qualifications Board be established by some form of "legislation." Although the data available do not make clear what type of legislation was intended, the Executive was probably thinking in terms of an Order-in-Council.

The data show clearly that the A.S.T.A., in contrast to the A.T.A.,



did not have a singleness of purpose and therefore did not know precisely where its own minimum disposition lay, in May, 1966. In a Newsletter, dated May 13, 1966, the statement was made that the "A.S.T.A. will push for the task of evaluations to be assumed by the Department of Education, but may be forced to agree to some other 'non-A.T.A.' alternative."<sup>1</sup> The difficulty in forming an internal consensus was probably due to the fact that school trustees who represent a variety of socio-economic and occupational interests held different values and attitudes regarding the granting to teachers of the type of professional autonomy which was being sought by the A.T.A. The difference in attitude of trustees was clearly demonstrated by the decision of some school boards to accept A.T.A. evaluations from the outset while others stubbornly refused. The debate over the policy resolution passed at the Annual Convention in Calgary, 1966, revealed the severity of the division among school trustees. This public display of division probably served to weaken the A.S.T.A.'s bargaining power when direct negotiations began with the A.T.A. a few weeks later. Teachers, on the other hand, formed a more homogeneous group, socially and economically, and seem to have conveyed the impression that they held pretty much the same aspirations with regard to evaluations.

Bargaining ranges. The significant change in bargaining ranges between December 1, 1965 and May 15, 1966 was in the respective preferences for the method of establishing a Qualifications Board. Whereas the preferences were nearly congruent in December, 1965, a wide gap between the preferences for this item had developed by May, 1966. The



record shows that the issues related to administration of evaluations were the first ones settled but that the issue over the establishment of the Qualifications Board was more difficult to resolve and took much more time. Perhaps the reason for this was because this item touched on the basic fears and suspicions each party had of the other's motives. Also, the issue was more readily identified with the commitment to principle made by each party and since commitment to principle is very difficult to break without suffering severe "loss-of-face" it seems to have been difficult for each side to find an acceptable means of retreat necessary to break the impasse which had developed.

Possibly, the issue might have been settled more expeditiously before December 1st, 1965, when the preferences of the two parties were nearly congruent. Unfortunately, the parties were not encouraged to negotiate directly at this time but were allowed, instead, to debate the issue at the meetings of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification where it became enveloped with matters related to teacher education programs and certification. Direct negotiations earlier may also have prevented or at least delayed the firm commitments made by each party through the general membership at the annual conventions.

#### Status Quo Versus Prominent Demand

The A.S.T.A clearly committed itself to the status quo by insisting on a neutral evaluation agency under the Minister of Education. This commitment to a status quo seems to have placed the A.S.T.A. at a disadvantage as it entered into negotiations with the A.T.A. When faced with a "prominent demand" by the A.T.A. to take over the evaluation







function, the A.S.T.A. was forced to negotiate defensively. Because its initial bargaining position was identical with its minimum disposition, it allowed itself little or no room in which to make concessions. After the 1966 Annual Convention when the A.S.T.A. seems to have become concerned about reaching an agreement quickly, it could only do so by eroding its own minimum disposition. With the passage of time, the A.S.T.A.'s minimum disposition was viewed by the A.T.A. (and perhaps by third parties) as its initial bargaining position (which, of course, it was). According to the negotiating norm which requires that a concession by an opponent be answered by a counter concession, the initial position is expected to give way to a revised bargaining position. The A.T.A. frequently reminded the A.S.T.A. and others that it had made concessions and expected the A.S.T.A. to reciprocate. Truly, the A.T.A. had made concessions, for example, allotting more A.S.T.A. representatives to the Teacher Qualifications Board and offering to make amendments to the bylaw related to the evaluation service, subject to cabinet approval, but by taking up a prominent position far removed from its absolute minimum (neutral evaluation agency), the A.T.A. provided itself plenty of room in which to manoeuvre. The prominent demand of the A.T.A. and the initial position of the A.S.T.A. (status quo) became the actual bargaining range, that is, the range of preferences within which both sides preferred agreement to no-agreement. Gradually the parties began to estimate that the probable outcome of the dispute lay somewhere between these two extremes. At the meeting of January 4, 1967, the President of the A.S.T.A. argued that the proposed Order-in-Council



represented a fair solution to the dispute because "the A.S.T.A. would get a neutral body and the A.T.A. would get administration of the evaluations." At this point the A.S.T.A. had gone a long way from its initial position which was that evaluations should be administered by the Department of Education (Figure 9, page 253).

Third parties also thought of a probable outcome in terms of a "fair" division of the bargaining range related to the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board. The Dean of Education, University of Alberta, supported the Order-in-Council as a means of setting up a Qualifications Board because he considered that a board so established would meet the A.T.A. fears by freeing it from government control and meet the A.S.T.A. fears by freeing the board from A.T.A. control.

Had the A.S.T.A. moved to take over the evaluation function unilaterally as the A.T.A. had done, the outcome of the dispute would probably have been much different. In this hypothetical situation, the A.S.T.A. would have allowed itself more manoeuvring space between its initial position and its minimum disposition. With third parties estimating a probable outcome somewhere between the two extremes (A.T.A. control or A.S.T.A. control) with a "fair" outcome about in the middle, the A.S.T.A. may have had a better chance of attaining its objective of a completely neutral body to control evaluation policy with administration carried out by the Department of Education or "some other non-A.T.A. alternative." As it turned out the A.S.T.A. was obliged to settle for administration of evaluations by the A.T.A. and a policy board which could only be considered to be technically neutral.<sup>2</sup>



## IV. COMMITMENT

Commitment as Power

The rationale behind a commitment tactic lies in the voluntary and irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice.<sup>3</sup> Paradoxically, the power to constrain an opponent may come from the power to bind oneself. If one can convince an opponent that a position adopted represents a true minimum position and one for which he would sooner accept a stalemate than capitulate, he may constrain his opponent's choice by affecting his expectations, providing, of course, the opponent wants to avoid a stalemate, as well. The question becomes one of how to achieve this sacrifice of choice. Because reliance on words is not enough, a party needs some device for binding himself to a pledged course of action, or to maintain a present course in such a way that he leaves himself no apparent discretion in actually continuing the present course of action or carrying out the intended one when the time comes to do so. Essentially the problem becomes one of establishing credibility. Several devices may be employed to achieve it.

Pledge of reputation. One potent way of achieving the credibility of a commitment is to pledge one's personal prestige and bargaining reputation to a course of action. This pledge is usually more implicit than explicit. Parties do this by committing themselves visibly to opponents, to third parties and to their followers and to the public. Commitment to an opponent is particularly effective when the parties are engaged in continuous negotiations or are likely to be involved in negotiations in the future. The logic of this situation lies in the







fact that one of the parties cannot afford to recede from a stated position to which he has become committed because if he conceded to his opponent the opponent might revise his estimate of him in future negotiations. To protect his future bargaining strength, he must stand firm.

Commitment to principle. Another way of establishing credibility is to commit oneself to a principle of fundamental importance. To recede from a commitment that has been nailed to a principle may put the principle itself in jeopardy. Having so pledged himself, a party may convince his opponent that he would sooner accept stalemate than capitulate and discredit the principle.

Reducing one's own authority. A party can bind itself by taking steps to reduce the scope of its own authority.<sup>4</sup> If an executive is freed by its government to negotiate the best arrangement possible, it may be unable to make a position stick and end up by conceding controversial items because the opponent knows, or believes, that the other party, be it a country or merely an interest group, would rather concede than terminate negotiations. If, however, the executive can negotiate under legislative authority with its position constrained by domestic law and if it is evident that the governing body will not or cannot be convened to change the authority within the necessary time limit, then the executive is given a firm position, visible to the opponent, from which to negotiate.

#### Commitment Tactics of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A.

The activities by which the parties became committed to firm



positions were described in Chapters V and VI. The following observations have been made from a detailed analysis of these activities.

1. For each party, the process of commitment was a progressive one, the commitment acquiring its firmness through a succession of acts.

2. Each party limited its own authority through the legislative action of the respective governing bodies.

3. Each party committed itself to a principle.

4. Each party's commitment was motivated as much by fear of what it thought the other party might do as it was by its own aspiration.

5. Each party committed itself to a position without adequately assessing the minimum disposition of the other party or without attempting to anticipate the extranegotiatory moves of the other party.

### Progressive Commitment

The Executive Councils of both Associations clearly initiated the proposals with respect to the positions adopted by each Association. The data show that each Executive committed its Association to firm positions, publicly, through a sequence of actions. The first move toward commitment was made by the A.T.A. when it presented a proposal to the Board of Teacher Education and Certification in October, 1964. Next, the A.T.A. introduced a policy resolution at the 1965 Annual Representative Assembly. The wording of this resolution was such that it expressed a desire rather than a firm commitment to action but it did become Association policy and provided the Executive with the authority to take the next step toward firmness in commitment. The first move on the part of the A.S.T.A. came in the form of an Executive Council



resolution adopted by the Annual Convention of 1965. This resolution was more positively stated than the A.T.A. resolution and spelled out in greater detail what sort of evaluation service the A.S.T.A. was prepared to settle for. This action was followed by a firm public commitment on the part of the A.T.A. to set up its own evaluation service by A.T.A. bylaw. The A.T.A. Vice-President dispelled any belief that this might be "bluff" by stating quite definitely at the May meeting that the A.T.A. intended to proceed with its plan whether other groups agreed or not. The A.S.T.A. finally firmed up its commitment through the publication of "Crisis in Alberta Education" and other published statements of principle.

#### Commitment Through Association Policy

Each party used the technique of committing its Association through the adoption of policy resolutions introduced by the Executive Council. This tactic served to increase the bargaining power of the negotiators by limiting their own authority to accept proposals offered by the other party and also prevented them from making concessions to opponents in the face of convincing arguments put forth at negotiating sessions. Much evidence of the significance of this tactic, used by both parties is revealed in the data. A few examples will serve as illustrations.

The A.S.T.A.'s brief presented to the A.T.A. on December 17, 1966 stated: "This resolution [1966 policy resolution] is our guide because it is the expression of the members' stand on this issue" (supra, p. 204).





An editorial in The ATA News, February, 1967 pointed to the powerlessness of the A.T.A. negotiators to make further concessions:

The Executive Council of the A.T.A. has finally taken a firm stand. Concessions and compromises on the part of the Executive Council has continued since last May. But the Executive Council cannot honourably retreat any further and must indeed seek approval of the Annual Representative Assembly for the modifications already proposed.

This limitation of authority through the legislative action of the governing bodies became a point of sharp exchange between the A.S.T.A. President and the A.T.A. representatives at the meeting on January 18, 1967, when the A.S.T.A. President complained that the A.T.A. President did not seem to have the authority to negotiate at meetings with the A.S.T.A.

The disadvantage of this tactic came when the negotiators wanted to make concessions that would end the dispute but had difficulty in finding a way to undo their commitments in a way that would be minimally acceptable to their respective Executive Councils and ultimately the general membership of the Associations and without costing the negotiators the penalty of "loss-of-face" and possibly loss of institutional security, especially for the administrative officers.

#### Commitment to Principle

Both parties nailed their commitments to basic principles. The A.T.A. became committed to the principle of "professional right and responsibility." The A.S.T.A. was committed to the principle of "public control" of education through the Minister of Education. The A.T.A. pointed out the seriousness of breaking a commitment to principle. An



article in The ATA News, February, 1967, warned that:

. . . agreement can now only be reached with the ASTA if the teachers are prepared to abandon the principle that evaluation of years of teacher education is the right and responsibility of the profession (*supra*, p. 224).

#### Motivation to Make Commitments

The record of events shows quite clearly that each party became committed to its position partly through fear of the consequences of the action being taken by the other.

A.T.A.'s motivation. There is no doubt that The Alberta Teachers' Association aspired to take over the administration of evaluations many months before it committed itself to a definite course of action at the 1966 Annual Representative Assembly. It is equally clear, however, that the events which had taken place in the autumn of 1965, enumerated on page 104, induced the A.T.A. to take irrevocable action quickly, presumably before the evaluation function was assigned to the Department of Education. In advising the membership that the Executive Council would introduce bylaws at the 1966 Annual Representative Assembly which would establish an Evaluation Service, the Executive advised that this action was "triggered by events" (*supra*, p. 103). Again in March, 1966, the Executive claimed that the events which took place in the winter "lends an even greater sense of urgency and importance for the Association to develop viable plans for performing this service" (*supra*, p. 129). The A.T.A.'s principal concern was that evaluations would revert to the Department of Education, where, it was thought, standards of teacher education could easily be lowered through political pressures.



A.S.T.A. motivation. The A.S.T.A. Executive presumably felt impelled to commit its Association to a position calling for the evaluation function to be taken over by the Department of Education because it feared the A.T.A. would administer evaluation policies in such a way as to limit the flow of immigrant teachers to the province, raise standards for certification and eventually gain a greater degree of control over public education in the Province of Alberta.

### Timing of Commitment

Normally a party makes a firm commitment to a position which lies somewhere between its target (what it hopes to get) and its minimum disposition. Walton and McKersie<sup>5</sup> have suggested that the determination of this point is a function of the party's subjective utility (what satisfactions it hopes to receive) and its subjective estimate of the probability of attaining its objective. One of the major factors in determining probability of success is knowledge about an opponent's minimum disposition and the estimation, in the light of all information available, of the probability of what an opponent might do in attempting to attain its objective. Normally, a firm commitment is not made until after a party has had an opportunity to obtain and assess this kind of information. Commitment is then usually made to a position on a party's order of preference somewhat short of its initial bargaining position.

The initial stage of negotiation, therefore, involves the process by which parties attempt to discover and reveal through information exchange the minimum dispositions of each other. Schelling<sup>6</sup> points out that this process of discovery and revelation becomes quickly merged with







the process of creating and discovering commitments. If, as a consequence of incomplete information or the misinterpretation of information obtained, a party establishes an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, it provokes the likelihood of a stalemate or complete breakdown in negotiations. Both the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. seem to have made tactical errors in the timing and positioning of their commitments. Both appear to have made firm commitments to initial positions without adequately assessing the minimum disposition or firmness of the other party's commitment.

#### Bases of A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. Commitments

The record clearly indicates that the subjective probability of attaining the objective to which it became firmly committed was, for each party, a function of its perception of third party utilities rather than an accurate assessment of the utilities of the other party. Except for a joint-committee meeting of the Executive Councils, on December 9, 1965, at which evaluations represented only one of twenty-three items discussed, there was no direct discussion between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. on the evaluation problem until May 15, 1966 by which time the A.T.A. had become firmly committed to a course of action. Evidence of the developing commitments travelled by newspaper and hearsay or were demonstrated by actions taken at annual conventions. Therefore, neither side had any meaningful way of finding out what the minimum disposition of the other might be. In the absence of an accurate picture of the other party's utility, commitments were made to positions which proved to be incompatible. The A.T.A. would not accept evaluations administered



by the Department of Education, the position to which the A.S.T.A. had become committed. The A.S.T.A. would not accept a policy-setting board that was established by and under the control of The Alberta Teachers' Association, the course of action to which the A.T.A. had become committed. Since the resolution of the conflict eventually required the undoing of these commitments by both parties, the perceived costs associated with personal reputations, job security and abandonment of principle produced a very high level of tension and animosity.

Both the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. seem to have based their hope of achieving their objectives on their perception of what the Minister of Education might or might not do. The A.T.A. officials seem to have believed that they could commit The Alberta Teachers' Association to a specific course of action on the basis of the following:

1. The officials of the Department of Education were not personally opposed to administration of evaluation by the A.T.A.
2. The A.T.A. hoped the Minister of Education would "take no action" on the matter of evaluation, and indeed, the Minister gave no indication that he would take action until after the publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" in July, 1966. In the meantime, the A.T.A. had drafted and published its bylaws and had received the approval of the Annual Representative Assembly for them.
3. The A.T.A. expected the A.S.T.A. to object to its action but believed and hoped the Minister believed that this did not matter because the A.S.T.A. had frequently opposed A.T.A. policies in the past and had, in fact, strongly opposed collective bargaining when it had been



introduced.

The A.T.A. did not seem to be concerned about the intense feeling generated in the A.S.T.A. Executive as a consequence of the A.T.A.'s stated preference for control of evaluations by the professional organization. The unanticipated consequence of this was the publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" and the political pressure exerted on the Minister of Education which led eventually to the establishment of an evaluation service by the Department of Education. The establishment of this service clearly affected the outcome of the issue.

The A.S.T.A. appears to have based its strategy and commitment on decisions made by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification and on its own interpretation of the responsibilities and duties of the Minister of Education. The A.S.T.A.'s proposals paralleled the principle adopted by the Board of Teacher Education and Certification at the meeting on October 25, 1965. This principle called for evaluations for salary determination and certification to be linked together and handled by a body outside the universities of Alberta. The fact that representatives of the Department of Education and the universities sitting on the Board of Teacher Education and Certification had approved this principle may well have assured the A.S.T.A. that it was reasonably justified in asking the general membership of the A.S.T.A. to approve a similar principle despite the knowledge that the A.T.A. had a different objective in mind. Statements made to the press by the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. at the time the A.T.A. announced publicly its intention of establishing an evaluation service by Association bylaws, gave the







impression that he did not think the A.T.A. was really serious. He claimed that the A.T.A. was presumptuous in saying that it was going to take over the evaluation function because there was no "authority for them to do so." He also said, "I don't think the Minister of Education will agree to it." The A.S.T.A. officers were therefore genuinely surprised and apparently shocked to learn at the meeting of May 15, 1966 that the A.T.A. was indeed serious and fully committed to proceed with the establishment of its service.

#### V. A.S.T.A. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

A conclusion drawn from this analysis is that because the A.S.T.A. had not accurately assessed earlier the determination of the A.T.A. to set up an evaluation service, unilaterally, and because the A.S.T.A. had based its own policy on the expectations of what the Department of Education "ought" to do, it found itself in a weak bargaining position relative to the A.T.A. The A.S.T.A. had allowed itself to become committed to a position which required that action be taken by a body over which it had no direct control, that is, the Department of Education.

Not only did the A.S.T.A. enter into negotiations with the A.T.A. from a defensive position but in May, 1966 it seemed to have had few weapons with which to defend its position. In June, 1966, it appeared to the officers of the A.S.T.A. that the Minister of Education did not intend to set up an evaluation service, nor did it seem likely that he would attempt to prevent the A.T.A. from setting up its service. "It was



a frustrating experience," said the Past-President of the A.S.T.A. in an interview, "to see the A.T.A. proceeding with its plans and the Minister of Education giving no indication of his position and apparently not committed to any point of view."<sup>7</sup>

At that time the A.S.T.A. Executive was convinced that the A.T.A. was attempting to take over control of education and in desperation (because the Minister of Education was doing nothing) conceived and carried out the idea of publishing the "Crisis in Alberta Education." Action proposals were distributed at the same time "to counter certain actions taken by the A.T.A."<sup>8</sup>

#### Interpretation of the Results of the "Crisis in Alberta Education"

Clearly the "Crisis in Alberta Education" pamphlet and the action which it precipitated had the immediate effect of crystallizing opinion on evaluation both within the A.S.T.A. and in other groups. It served as a catalyst, if not an agent, in bringing about the decision at the political level to set up an evaluation service in the Department of Education. The Department of Education's Evaluation Service eventually provided the quid pro quo by which the A.S.T.A. was able to come to terms with the A.T.A. on the method of establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board. For this reason the tactic may be considered to have been effective from the A.S.T.A. point of view. However, it should be remembered that at the time the "Crisis in Alberta Education" was published, the A.S.T.A.'s objective was to have evaluations administered by the Department of Education and not the A.T.A. The manoeuvre which



brought about the "Crisis in Alberta Education" was not successful in blocking A.T.A. control of the administration of evaluation.

Perhaps the "Crisis in Alberta Education" was only partially successful because of the timing of its publication. It was published in the summer when many officers in all groups concerned were on vacation. The public is perhaps in a less querulous mood in the summer months and did not appear to have become as aroused by the accusations made in the statement as its authors would have wished. Furthermore, the Minister of Education and senior officers of the Department of Education had already given tacit approval of the A.T.A.'s Qualifications Service and having done so could not readily disagree to it without some loss of prestige in the eyes of the A.T.A. Consequently, when the Department did set up an evaluation service it was for "administration of the Foundation Program."

The A.S.T.A. may have made a tactical error in the use of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" as well. The sudden and unexpected publication of it certainly caused some concern but it did not seem to have made the impact on the public that was intended.<sup>9</sup> The officers of both the Department of Education and the A.T.A. claim to have "laughed at it" but it is possible that the laughter was as much a symptom of relief at the ineffectiveness of the pamphlet as it was derision at its content. Had the A.S.T.A. used the publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" as a threat instead of a fait accompli, the anticipation of the public reaction which it might have produced may have provided the A.S.T.A. with a more powerful bargaining weapon. However,







having packed all its "powder" into the one shot, the A.S.T.A. seems to have had little left with which to fight after the publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education." From then on its officers appear to have sought a way to retreat gracefully from the A.S.T.A.'s commitment that the Department of Education should administer evaluations for salary purposes.

One defensive measure used effectively by the A.S.T.A. to prevent the A.T.A. from gaining control of the policy-setting body was the refusal to appoint a representative to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board. Although it was suggested that the A.S.T.A. might send an observer to the meetings, the A.S.T.A. steadfastly refused to recognize the board and eventually the A.T.A. was obliged to negotiate for some other way of establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board that would be recognized by the A.S.T.A.

## VI. BARGAINING POWER OF EACH PARTY AT GIVEN TIMES

### Stalemate

The firm public commitments to principle made by the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. and the action taken by the Minister of Education in setting up an evaluation service in the Department of Education brought about a temporary stalemate. To break the stalemate a power struggle between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. ensued. The Minister of Education found himself trapped in the middle of the struggle with much of the A.T.A.'s offensive strategy and tactics directed toward him.

The situation which existed in the fall of 1966 consisted of the



following relationships. The A.T.A. wanted to control evaluations and had already set up machinery for evaluating teachers' credentials for salary determination. The A.S.T.A. opposed control of this function by the A.T.A., wanting the Minister of Education to take it over instead. The Minister of Education did not want to be responsible for evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes, considering this a matter to be negotiated between school boards and teachers, locally. However, the Minister of Education had been obliged to set up an evaluation service for the administration of the Foundation Program because the University of Alberta had discontinued its service and the A.S.T.A. was not likely to recognize grant payments based on A.T.A. evaluations. Furthermore, the legality of grants based on the evaluations of an external evaluation agency was questioned. The possibility of incurring criticism from a dependency on such an external agency as the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service made it highly unlikely that the Minister could accept it (see Appendix D). The Department of Education made its Evaluation Service available to teachers and school boards for statements of evaluation for salary determination apparently in an effort to mollify the A.S.T.A. after the publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education." As long as the Department of Education's Evaluation Service was available for this purpose, the A.T.A.'s service could be bypassed thus minimizing the possibility of evaluations becoming the exclusive right and responsibility of the teaching profession. This situation would have served to embarrass the Executive Officers of the A.T.A., who had gambled much prestige and reputation on the successful outcome of their commitment



strategy. The power struggle therefore involved efforts on the part of the A.T.A. to force the Minister of Education to abandon the Department of Education's Evaluation Service or to limit its operation strictly to Foundation Program administration. The A.S.T.A.'s efforts were directed toward getting the Minister to maintain the Department of Education's Evaluation Service, at least until a satisfactory agreement could be concluded with the A.T.A. The Minister of Education seems to have been content to stand firm until after the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. had come to terms.

### Bargaining Power

The bargaining power between the Minister of Education and the A.T.A. and between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. can be analysed in terms of Chamberlain's model of bargaining power described in Chapter II. According to Chamberlain's model a party's bargaining power depends upon the inducement of an opponent to agree to the party's terms. The inducement to agree is a function of the "costs" of disagreeing to the "costs" of agreeing to the other party's terms. As a condition for agreement, the ratio of inducement must be "one" or greater than one.<sup>10</sup> That is to say, if a numerical value could be assigned to each "cost," the sum of the values representing the costs of disagreeing would have to be greater than the sum of the values assigned to the costs of agreeing. Negotiation partly involves the use of tactics designed to increase for an opponent his costs of disagreeing to one's stated terms and reducing the perceived costs of agreeing to those terms. The purpose of this is to create a ratio of inducement to agree of one or greater than one so that the opponent will make concessions.<sup>11</sup> Bargaining







power depends upon the influence which one possesses over the other to force concessions thus moving the opponent's minimum disposition along the range of preferences in a direction favourable to oneself. (The tactics employed by the A.T.A. to increase its bargaining power over the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. were described in Chapter VI and need not be repeated here.)

Power Relationship Between the Minister of Education and the A.T.A.  
in October, 1966

Tables II and III describe the bargaining relationship between the A.T.A. and the Minister of Education over terms of agreement at two points of time--October, 1966 and December, 1966. The possible costs or subjective estimates of the consequences for each of agreeing and disagreeing to the other's terms are listed. No attempt has been made to weigh these costs arithmetically but from the events which transpired and from data gathered by interview, it is possible to make inferences about the ratios of inducement to agree for each party at the different points in time.

The Minister's "costs" of agreeing and disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms. Table II shows the perceived costs to the Minister of Education and the A.T.A. of agreeing and disagreeing to each other's terms on and immediately after October 5, 1966, the date the Department of Education announced the establishment of its Evaluation Service. From Table II it may be deduced that the costs to the Minister of agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms (abandonment of the Department's Evaluation Service)



TABLE II

POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND  
THE A.T.A. OCTOBER, 1966

Costs to Minister of Disagreeing to A.T.A. Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Disagreeing to Minister's Terms
Costs to Minister of Agreeing to A.T.A. Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Agreeing to Minister's Terms
1 Public ill-will	1 Public ill-will
2 Loss of support at the polls	2 Ill-will of officers of the Department of Education
1 Broken public commitment--"loss-of-face"	1 A.T.A. position weakened as long as teachers have access to Department's Evaluation Service
2 Broken commitment to A.S.T.A.	2 Broken commitment to membership--"loss-of-face"
3 Possible criticism for depending on an external evaluation agency for Foundation Program payments	3 Loss of teacher support
4 Adverse effect on morale of officers of the Department of Education	
5 Possible destruction of the A.S.T.A. with resultant loss of countervailing power to counteract power of the A.T.A.	
6 Public ill-will and possible loss of support at the polls	



were greater than the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s demands (maintaining the Department's service). In weighing the costs of disagreeing with the A.T.A., the Minister had to consider the possibility of the development of poor relationship with the A.T.A., the possibility of the generation of public ill-will and some future loss of support at the polls, especially from those who supported the A.T.A. demands. These particular costs seemed remote and considerably less important, at that time, than the perceived costs to the Minister of agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms. For the Minister to have discontinued the Department of Education's Evaluation Service immediately after having established it could have been interpreted as a broken commitment to both the trustees and the public, with the resultant "loss-of-face" and damage to personal prestige associated with it. The Minister was concerned with the possible criticism which may have come from depending upon an external evaluation service for Foundation Program payments, particularly since the legality of government expenditures made on such a basis was not clear. Even if the legality of such a course had not been in question, to have abandoned a service may well have affected the morale of the senior Departmental officers on whose advice and recommendation the service had been established. Moreover, the Minister was aware of the intense feeling and political division in the Alberta School Trustees' Association. For him to discontinue the Department's Evaluation Service and accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program may have appeared to some trustees that the Minister was "taking sides" on an issue within the A.S.T.A. itself. This could possibly have widened





the urban-rural division in the A.S.T.A. to a point where the complete bifurcation of the Association would have become inevitable. The Minister needs a strong trustees' association in Alberta as a countervailing force to offset the emergent power of The Alberta Teachers' Association. This force would have been greatly weakened if the A.S.T.A. had split into two groups. The net result of these consequences would have been to produce an even greater degree of public ill-will with perhaps considerable future loss of support at the polls both for the Government of the Province and the Minister of Education personally.

The A.T.A.'s "costs" of agreeing and disagreeing to the Minister's terms. The A.T.A.'s ratio of inducement to agree to the Minister's terms was also less than "one." (See page 179 for an explanation of these terms.) The costs of disagreeing to the Minister's terms were minimal in October, 1966. A quarrel with the Department of Education would undoubtedly have produced some unwished for ill-will from officials of the Department of Education and a certain amount of public displeasure would probably be generated by the continued attacks on the A.T.A.'s position by newspapers. However, these seem to have been less significant to the A.T.A. Executive Officers at that time than the perceived disadvantages of agreeing to the continuation of the Department's Evaluation Service. The presence of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service and its availability to teachers and school boards for statements of evaluation for salary purposes clearly undermined the A.T.A.'s own service. For the A.T.A. Executive Council to concede even



partial defeat after having committed The Alberta Teachers' Association to the proposition that evaluation is an exclusive professional prerogative would have placed both the elected officers and the appointed officers in a precarious position within their own organization.

The ratio of inducement to agree for both the Minister of Education and the A.T.A. may be considered to have been less than "one" and the likelihood of either giving ground was very small. The A.T.A. therefore launched an offensive, the purpose of which was to increase for the Minister of Education the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms. This offensive strategy involved the use of tactics such as the warning, threat, arousing public opinion against the Minister's position, and persuasion through argument. The way the A.T.A. applied these tactics was described on pages 184-187.

#### Power Relationship Between the Minister of Education and the A.T.A.

##### After the Use of A.T.A. Tactics

Table III shows how the tactics employed by the A.T.A. increased substantially the potential costs to the Minister of Education of continuing to disagree to the A.T.A.'s terms. Table III reveals that the A.T.A.'s tactics, especially the threats and warning, also represented potential costs to the A.T.A. of disagreeing to the Minister's terms. As time for salary negotiations neared, a period of uncertainty would inevitably develop during which the A.T.A. Executive Council could not be absolutely certain that teachers would support it in a showdown with school boards in sufficient numbers to protect its power. Efforts were



TABLE III

POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND THE A.T.A. AFTER  
EMPLOYMENT OF A.T.A. TACTICS--OCTOBER, 1966 TO DECEMBER, 1966

Costs to Minister of Disagreeing to A.T.A. Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Disagreeing to Minister's Terms
Costs to Minister of Agreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Agreeing to Minister's Terms
1 Possibility of teacher salary negotiation breakdown	1 Public ill-will
2 Possibility of immigrant teachers avoiding Alberta	2 Ill-will of officers of the Department of Education
3 Public ill-will	3 Possibility of teacher salary negotiation breakdown
4 Loss of support at the polls	4 Possibility of loss of teacher support
5 Possible loss of support in Cabinet and Caucus	
1 Broken public commitment--"loss-of-face"	1 A.T.A. position weakened as long as teachers have access to Department's Evaluation Service
2 Broken commitment to A.S.T.A.	
3 Possible criticism for depending on an external evaluation agency for Foundation Program payments	2 Broken commitment to membership
4 Adverse effect on morale of officers of the Department of Education	3 Loss of teacher support
5 Possible destruction of the A.S.T.A. with resultant loss of countervailing power to counteract power of the A.T.A.	
6 Public ill-will and possible loss of support at the polls	







made by the A.T.A. Executive to muster the support of teachers but only forcing the issue at the local level would reveal how strong that support actually was. The A.T.A. Executive had received some indication from the Registrar, in December, that teacher support for the A.T.A.'s position was not as strong as could be hoped for. The Registrar of the Department of Education had issued two hundred fifty statements of evaluation and had seventy-five applications on hand on December 19, 1966. The A.T.A. Qualifications Secretary had issued three hundred eleven new evaluations in the same period.

A showdown in a power struggle between the A.T.A. and the Minister of Education would have been futile from the A.T.A. point of view. In the end, the Minister of Education could have used his "residual power" to take over all evaluations and through Executive or Legislative action could have settled any prolonged teacher strike.

Attempts to increase the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms, in itself, merely served to sharpen the horns of the dilemma on which the Minister of Education found himself. To disagree to the A.T.A.'s terms involved the possibility of disputes with breakdowns in salary negotiations at the local level; to yield to the A.T.A. meant suffering the costs associated with that alternative.

Decreasing the Minister's "costs" of agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms. The A.T.A.'s best hope of increasing its bargaining power over the Minister of Education lay in effecting a decrease in the costs to the Minister of agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms and thereby increasing the Minister's ratio of inducement to agree. The Minister of Education



had previously stated that he could only agree to accepting A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments if the A.S.T.A. agreed to the A.T.A. plan for evaluation. The Minister had made a commitment to the A.S.T.A. on this point and for this reason had established the Department's Evaluation Service. Therefore, if the A.T.A. was to modify the Minister of Education's minimum disposition to accept the A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program purposes, the A.T.A. had to provide a way for the Minister to break his commitment to the A.S.T.A. This meant the A.T.A. had to make peace with the A.S.T.A. and was forced to reverse its previous claim that it was not necessary for the A.S.T.A. to agree to any plan for evaluating years of teacher education. The A.T.A. was obliged to negotiate directly with the A.S.T.A. to find an agreement that would be acceptable to all three parties. A spokesman for the Department of Education observed that "the Department's Evaluation Service made the A.T.A. people stop their shouting and noise-making and brought them to the bargaining table with humility." This probably explains why the A.T.A. willingly accepted the A.S.T.A. Executive Council's invitation to a dinner meeting on December 17, 1966, to begin direct negotiations.

This section may be concluded by pointing out that when it became apparent that the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. had agreed on a procedure for establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board by Memorandum of Agreement, the Minister agreed to the items on the A.T.A.'s list (Appendix B) which called for the Minister to recognize evaluations done by the A.T.A.'s Qualifications Service for Foundation Program purposes.



Despite the questionable legality of such an agreement and despite the fact that the Department of Education's Evaluation Service was all but emasculated the Minister could apparently see greater disadvantages in not accepting the A.T.A.'s terms than accepting them. With an election scheduled in two months time the Minister was no doubt anxious to have the issue settled and peace restored to the educational scene.

Power Relationship Between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. at the Commencement of Direct Negotiations

Table IV depicts the power relationship between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. at the time direct negotiations between the two parties commenced. As in Tables II and III, the possible costs or subjective estimates of the consequences for each side of agreeing and disagreeing to the other party's terms are listed. (See page 181 for a summary of the terms.) Documentary evidence and data collected in interviews indicate that at the time direct negotiations commenced each side perceived the costs of agreeing to the other's terms much greater than the costs of disagreeing. Therefore, it may be assumed that for each side the ratio of inducement to agree was less than "one" and the possibility of either side making concessions small. That is to say, the bargaining power of each side was about equal.

In order to change the power equation so that one party's inducement to agree would be greater than the other's, the parties had to employ tactics designed to increase each other's costs of disagreeing and/or decrease each other's costs of agreeing to respective terms. The party which possessed the greater negotiating skill would presumably







TABLE IV

POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. AT THE  
BEGINNING OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS--DECEMBER, 1966

Costs to A.S.T.A. of Disagreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Disagreeing to A.S.T.A.'s Terms
Costs to A.S.T.A. of Agreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Agreeing to A.S.T.A.'s Terms
1 Division in A.S.T.A. intensified. Some boards favour A.T.A., some disagree that Department's Service meets requirements of an "Independent Board"	1 Possible breakdown in salary negotiations
2 Aggravation of the poor relations between A.T.A. and A.S.T.A.	2 Possible loss of teacher support
3 Possible breakdown in salary negotiations	3 Possible public disapproval
4 Possible poor public image	4 Possible government intervention
	5 Weakening of relationship with A.S.T.A.
	6 Possible loss of influence with the Department of Education
=	
1 Broken commitment to membership "loss-of-face"	1 Broken commitment to membership "loss-of-face"
2 Rural-urban division widened with possible bifurcation of A.S.T.A.	2 Weakening of bargaining reputation in future negotiations with A.S.T.A.
3 Possible weakening of bargaining reputation for future negotiations with the A.T.A.	3 Possible division in A.T.A. Many teachers adamantly opposed to control of evaluations by the Department of Education
4 Possible loss of public control of certification	4 Possibility of lower standards of teacher training from political pressures on the Department of Education
5 Possible higher salaries through teacher shortage caused by harsh evaluation of immigrant teachers	
6 Job security of appointed officers and loss of political support for elected officers	5 Job security of appointed officers and political support for elected officers



increase its bargaining power over the other and thus force concessions. The data indicate that the party which won the first major concessions was the A.T.A.

The extranegotiatory activity engaged in by the A.T.A. and the direct proposals made to increase its bargaining power over the A.S.T.A. have been described on pages 188-195. No evidence was found to indicate that the A.S.T.A. engaged extensively in any extranegotiatory activity to try to increase the A.T.A.'s costs of disagreeing to the A.S.T.A.'s terms. At the meeting with the President of the A.S.T.A. on January 18, 1967, the A.T.A. officers learned that the A.S.T.A. was not convinced that the A.T.A.'s commitment was as strong and its minimum disposition as fixed as the A.T.A. claimed it to be. The record shows that as a result of this information, the A.T.A. increased the intensity of its extranegotiatory activity to establish the credibility of its position and to back up the proposals made at the negotiating table. This activity has been described on pages 221-224.

#### Shift in Bargaining Power in Favour of the A.T.A.

At an Executive Council meeting on February 6, 1967, the A.S.T.A. decided to make concessions that would make a proposed Order-in-Council appear more acceptable to the A.T.A. (supra, p. 228). It must be assumed that because the A.S.T.A. was prepared to make these concessions, its inducement to agree to the A.T.A.'s terms must have been greater, at that time, than the A.T.A.'s inducement to agree to the A.S.T.A.'s terms and therefore the A.T.A.'s bargaining power at that particular moment in time was greater. A comparison of Tables IV and V gives some indication



TABLE V

POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. FEBRUARY, 1967

Costs to A.S.T.A. of Disagreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Disagreeing to A.S.T.A.'s Terms
Costs to A.S.T.A. of Agreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms	Costs to A.T.A. of Agreeing to A.S.T.A.'s Terms
1 Possible breakdown in salary negotiations	1 Possible breakdown in salary negotiations
2 Division in A.S.T.A. intensified the longer the issue is prolonged	2 Possible loss of teacher support in a showdown
3 Deterioration in relationships between A.T.A. and A.S.T.A. the longer the issue is prolonged	3 Possible public disapproval
4 Possible poor public image	4 Possible government intervention
	5 Weakening of relationship with A.S.T.A.
	6 Possible loss of influence with the Department of Education
1 Broken commitment to membership "loss-of-face"	1 Possibility of political pressure on Department of Education to lower standards
2 Rural-urban division in A.S.T.A. widened with possible destruction of A.S.T.A.	2 Broken commitment to membership, "loss-of-face"
3 Possible weakening of bargaining reputation for future negotiations with A.T.A.	3 Job security of administration officers and reputation of elected officials
4 Job security of administrative officers and reputations of elected officials	4 Possible division in A.T.A.--many teachers adamantly opposed to control of evaluations by Department of Education
	5 Weakening of bargaining reputations and bargaining power in future negotiations with A.S.T.A.







of the shift in bargaining power in favour of the A.T.A. between December, 1966 and February, 1967.

Respective "costs" of agreeing and disagreeing in December, 1966.

In December, 1966, the A.S.T.A. Executive was concerned about possible salary negotiation breakdown at the local level as a consequence of continued opposition to the A.T.A.'s demands. This fear was expressed by many trustees, including the President-elect, at the A.S.T.A. Annual Convention held in Calgary in December, 1966. However, these costs do not seem to have been considered as great at that time, perhaps because they were not as imminent; as the costs of agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms. The costs associated with agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms seem to have been of two types, (1) perceived effects on teacher supply and certification from A.T.A. control of evaluations, and (2) personal costs such as loss of prestige and damage to bargaining reputation suffered by the Executive Officers from breaking a commitment to the membership and to the A.T.A. Officers as well as to the public. These perceived costs were apparently strong enough to produce an inducement to agree ratio of less than "one" and constrained the A.S.T.A. from making concessions to the A.T.A. The A.T.A. perceived the costs of agreeing to the A.S.T.A.'s terms considerably greater than the costs of disagreeing. The A.T.A.'s perceived costs of agreeing fell into two major categories, (1) the perceived possibility of lowered standards through political pressure if evaluations reverted to the Department of Education and (2) personal costs to the Executive Officers of loss of prestige and reputation from breaking a commitment.



Respective "costs" of agreeing and disagreeing in February, 1967.

The negotiating tactics employed by the A.T.A. and other mitigating circumstances seem to have gradually changed the power equation to favour the A.T.A. The fact that the Minister of Education and the universities had appointed responsible people to the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Board did much to allay the distrust which the A.S.T.A. had of the intentions of the Board. Policies adopted by the Teacher Qualifications Board for evaluating years of teacher education showed there was little chance that the A.T.A.'s evaluation service would be any harsher on immigrant teachers than on locally-trained teachers. Moreover, statements made by the Minister of Education must inevitably have assured the A.S.T.A. officers that there was no danger of loss of public control of certification of teachers from evaluations administered by the A.T.A. The new President of the A.S.T.A. seemed willing to grant professional recognition to teachers in the matter of evaluation for salary determination. The sum total of these factors served to reduce the perceived costs to the A.S.T.A. of agreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms. Simultaneously, the extranegotiatory activities employed by the A.T.A. and public statements made by the A.T.A. officers had seemed to render the A.T.A. commitment to carry the issue to the local bargaining tables so firm that there was no obvious way to undo the commitment and avoid a clash short of A.S.T.A. retreat. The certainty of a battle in the local bargaining units increased substantially the A.S.T.A.'s perception of the costs of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s terms to a point where apparently the costs of disagreeing became greater than the costs of





agreeing. The parties were playing a game of "chicken" with a head-on clash inevitable unless one of the parties stood aside. The A.T.A.'s bargaining power apparently increased to the point where the A.S.T.A. sought to avoid a clash by offering to make the concessions referred to above.

#### Shift in Bargaining Power in Favour of the A.S.T.A.

The commitment to seek a neutral Teacher Qualifications Board allowed the A.S.T.A. Executive to go only so far in making concessions. The A.S.T.A. Executive proposed an Order-in-Council because the establishment of a board in that manner had seemed to be the only way to satisfy the membership's demand for a neutral body. However, the attainment of the Order-in-Council seems to have been possible only by allowing the A.T.A. to gain the items to which it had unreservedly committed itself, that is, that the Chairman of the Board must be the A.T.A. President, that the A.T.A. must have more representatives on the Board than the A.S.T.A. and that evaluations for salary determination must be done by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service only. The A.S.T.A. Executive had to weigh the disadvantages of yielding on these minor issues against the disadvantages of yielding on what it considered to be a major issue and decided to give way on the former. But having offered to make concessions on these items, the A.S.T.A. was constrained from going further. For the A.S.T.A. to accept establishment of the Teacher Qualifications Board either by A.T.A. bylaw or by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act would have represented a total breach of commitment to the membership and total defeat at the bargaining table for the





Executive.

Having made the concessions referred to above the power equation shifted in favour of the A.S.T.A. Table VI shows that the A.T.A.'s inducement to agree to the A.S.T.A.'s new terms became greater because the A.T.A.'s perception of the costs of disagreeing to the A.S.T.A.'s terms relative to the cost of agreeing to them increased. The significant costs previously associated with "loss-of-face" and a broken commitment were minimized. The A.T.A. would be able to claim victory on the achievement of details related to the composition of the Teacher Qualifications Board. The A.T.A. Executive Officers had gained a reputational balance if not an edge over the A.S.T.A. Executive for future negotiations. The possibility of political pressure on the Minister to lower standards could be minimized by setting up the Board by Memorandum of Agreement (a proposal which the A.T.A. officers had been holding in reserve). On the other hand, for the A.T.A. to continue to disagree to the A.S.T.A.'s terms and prolong the struggle would have proven very costly and perhaps even disastrous. Unless the issue could be resolved soon, salary negotiations would undoubtedly break down in some bargaining units, a consequence that neither party wanted and an eventuality for which neither party wanted to be held accountable. The negotiating norm which requires that a concession by one side be answered by a concession from the other side left the A.T.A. with little choice but to abandon its demand that the Teacher Qualifications Board be established by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act and propose the Memorandum of Agreement which seemed to satisfy the



TABLE VI

POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. AFTER A.S.T.A. MADE CONCESSIONS--  
MARCH, 1967

<u>Costs to A.S.T.A. of Disagreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms</u> / <u>Costs to A.T.A. of Disagreeing to A.S.T.A. Terms</u>	
<u>Costs to A.S.T.A. of Agreeing to A.T.A.'s Terms</u>	<u>Costs to A.T.A. of Agreeing to A.S.T.A.'s Terms</u>
1 Possible breakdown in salary negotiations	1 Possible breakdown in salary negotiations
2 Increased public disapproval	2 Increased public disapproval
3 Increased disapproval of officials of Department of Education and Universities for breaking negotiating norm	3 Increased disapproval of officials of Department of Education and Universities for breaking negotiating norm
4 Possible loss of teacher support in a showdown with school boards	4 Possible loss of teacher support in a showdown with school boards
5 Possible government intervention in a showdown	5 Possible government intervention in a showdown
6 Further deterioration of relationship with A.S.T.A.	6 Further deterioration of relationship with A.S.T.A.
<hr/>	
1 Broken commitment to membership "loss-of-face"	
2 Possible widening of rural-urban division in A.S.T.A.	
3 Further weakening of bargaining reputation in future negotiations with the A.T.A.	
4 Concern for job security of appointed officers and loss of political support for elected officers	(The previous costs substantially reduced)



A.S.T.A.'s commitment to a neutral board.

## VII. METHOD OF REACHING TERMS OF AGREEMENT ON THE SUB-ISSUES


Section III of this chapter discussed the establishment by each party of initial and final bargaining positions. Section IV analysed the commitment of each party and showed how these produced a stalemate resulting in a power struggle between the groups. Section VI described the power relationship between the parties and indicated how the tactics employed by the A.T.A. eventually broke the power deadlock and forced major concessions from the A.S.T.A. This in turn produced a major concession from the A.T.A., acceptable to the Minister of Education, for the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board, which led to a final settlement of the dispute. This section will attempt to describe the methods found by the parties to reach terms of agreement on each of the sub-issues which made up the major issue in dispute. The sub-issues and the method of reaching terms of agreement on each of them have been summarized in Table VII, page 309. The stages of convergence on points of agreement may be traced on Figures 11 to 15.

### Estimating Probable Outcomes

Iklé<sup>1</sup> claims that parties in political negotiations seldom estimate a bargaining range for each sub-issue, partly because negotiators are frequently not conscious of their own minimum dispositions, but more especially because the complexity of a situation may involve many bargaining ranges which must be combined into an over-all bargain.<sup>12</sup>








- A.T.A. INFORMATION
1. Representatives appointed by the Minister of Education and the Universities to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board.
  2. Minister of Education agreeable to accepting A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program purposes if the A.S.T.A. and A.T.A. can agree to the establishment and composition of a board.
  3. Deputy Minister of Education reluctant to abandon the Department of Education's Evaluation Service.
  4. Minister of Education, Deans of Education, A.S.T.A. President favour establishment of a board by Order-in-Council.
  5. A.S.T.A. willing to accept A.T.A. evaluations if A.T.A. will accept Order-in-Council with equal representation.
  6. A.S.T.A. not willing to accept establishment of a board by A.T.A. bylaws, even with guarantee.
  7. Internal conflict evident in A.S.T.A. over evaluations.
  8. The Registrar of the Department of Education has issued over three hundred evaluations.

- A.S.T.A. INFORMATION
1. Representatives appointed by the Minister of Education and the Universities to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board.
  2. Minister of Education and Deans of Education favour establishment of a board by Order-in-Council.
  3. A.T.A.'s Evaluation Service to be used for salary purposes only.
  4. Conflict in the A.S.T.A. over preferences for administration and control of evaluations.
  5. School Boards concerned about legality of collective agreements and breakdown in future negotiations.
  6. Annual Convention has passed resolution calling for "neutral body" to evaluate for salary and certification.
  7. The Minister of Education not interested in linking salary evaluation and certification together.

FIGURE II  
POINTS OF AGREEMENT, MINIMUM DISPOSITIONS AND ACTUAL BARGAINING RANGES OF THE A.T.A.  
AND THE A.S.T.A. ON JANUARY 4, 1967.





A.T.A. INFORMATION


- 1. A.S.T.A. willing to make major concessions if A.T.A. will accept Order-in-Council.
- 2. Department of Education's Evaluation Service to remain available to teachers and school boards for evaluation statements.
- 3. Teacher support for A.T.A. positions seems strong throughout the province.
- 4. Minister of Education not likely to abandon Evaluation Service as long as there is disagreement between trustees and teachers.
- 5. A.S.T.A. committed to a "neutral board".
- 6. Trustees concerned about the possibility of breakdown in salary negotiations.
- 7. Department of Education afraid internal pressures and conflict within the A.S.T.A. may weaken or destroy the Association.

A.S.T.A. INFORMATION

- 1. Teacher support for A.T.A. position appears strong.
- 2. A.T.A. position very firm.
- 3. A.T.A. publicly committed to take issue to a showdown at bargaining tables if necessary.
- 4. Department of Education's Evaluation Service available to teachers and school boards.

FIGURE 12  
POINTS OF AGREEMENT, MINIMUM DISPOSITIONS AND ACTUAL BARGAINING RANGES OF THE  
A.T.A. AND A.S.T.A. ON FEBRUARY 16, 1967





A.T.A. INFORMATION

A.S.T.A. INFORMATION

1. Cabinet and Social Credit Caucus will probably not support an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act.

2. A.T.A. Executive Council will not agree to an Order-in-Council.

3. A.S.T.A. committed to a "neutral board".

4. Strong support of teachers for A.T.A. position evident.

5. The Deadline for settling the issue rapidly approaching as many school boards and teachers involved in negotiations for next year's contract.

6. The A.S.T.A. have made major concessions re: number of representatives, Chairmanship of the Board, recognition of A.T.A. Evaluation Service.

7. The Department of Education anxious to solve the issue.

8. Possibility of an election in the spring.

9. The Minister of Education may accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program purposes if A.S.T.A. and A.T.A. can agree on the establishment of a board.

10. The Minister of Education has expressed interest in a Memorandum of Agreement.

11. The Minister of Education willing to advise teachers to apply to A.T.A. for Statement of Qualification after issuance of Certificate.
1. Teachers appear determined to fight the issue at the local level.


2. A.T.A. will not accept Order-in-Council.

3. Memorandum of Agreement proposed by A.T.A. satisfies condition of a "neutral board".

FIGURE 13  
POINTS OF AGREEMENT, MINIMUM DISPOSITIONS AND ACTUAL BARGAINING RANGES OF THE  
A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. ON MARCH 3, 1967







A.T.A. INFORMATION

1. A.S.T.A. has agreed to a Memorandum of Agreement as a method of establishing a Qualifications Board.
2. A.S.T.A. had agreed to advise school boards to apply to A.T.A. Qualifications Service for Statements of Qualifications.
3. A.S.T.A. has agreed to nominate A.T.A. President as Chairman.
4. Minister of Education has agreed to Memorandum of Agreement.
5. Minister of Education has agreed to accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program.
6. A.T.A. has lost absolute control of Qualifications Board but with University representatives profession holds a six-four ratio of voting strength.
7. A.T.A. still has three voting members and Chairman is A.T.A. President if A.S.T.A. proposal accepted.

A.S.T.A. INFORMATION

1. Minister of Education favours a Memorandum of Agreement.
2. If A.T.A. accepts proposal re number of representatives, Chairmanship is the only issue in the way of a complete settlement.
3. Minister of Education has agreed to accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program.

FIGURE 14  
POINTS OF AGREEMENT, MINIMUM DISPOSITIONS AND ACTUAL BARGAINING RANGES OF THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. ON MARCH 14, 1967






FIGURE 15  
FINAL TERMS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. ON MARCH 21, 1967



Usually parties estimate a probable outcome of the issue. That is to say, in a complex bargaining situation parties may form an image of the anticipated agreement whose terms represent the probable outcome on all disputed issues or sub-issues. In the negotiations which took place over the redistribution of the right and responsibility for evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes, it seems that each party formed an image of the anticipated agreement which would establish an evaluation service--the terms of this anticipated agreement or instrument representing the probable outcome of all the disputed sub-issues, for example, the number of representatives on the policy board, the Chairmanship of the Teacher Qualifications Board, administrative arrangements, and so on. The fact that the parties did not estimate a bargaining range for each sub-issue is not to suggest that an actual bargaining range as shown in the models did not exist. It seems, therefore, that the negotiators' efforts were directed toward modifying the opponent's estimate of the probable outcome of the dispute. As the parties were forced to change their conceptions of the anticipated outcome of the dispute, the minimum disposition for each sub-issue was adjusted as shown in Figures 11 to 14.

#### Examples of Anticipated Outcomes

The models represented in Figures 9 and 10 on pages 254 and 255, actually represent the image of the terms of a possible agreement or probable outcome of the dispute formed by each party at different points in time. The A.T.A.'s estimate of the probable outcome was some form of evaluation service established by the A.T.A. with guarantees





provided that would make the service acceptable to the trustees. The A.S.T.A. seems to have anticipated as an outcome a body free from A.T.A. control set up by legislation or some other government action that would insure the board's neutrality. Both parties maintained their "images" of the outcome almost to the end of the negotiations. The A.T.A.'s was amended from time to time with minor concessions to the A.S.T.A. on the number of representatives on the Board and devices for guaranteeing the board's freedom from A.T.A. control, that is, subjecting evaluation bylaws to the Provincial Cabinet for approval.

The A.T.A.'s proposal for an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act indicated a revision of its estimate of the probable outcome of the dispute. Although the details of the composition and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board included in this proposal remained substantially the same as in the bylaw, the proposed method of establishing the board through legislation was an important change intended to satisfy the A.S.T.A.'s objections while continuing to satisfy the A.T.A.'s preference (and commitment) for the establishment of an evaluation board.

The detailed Order-in-Council put forth by the Deputy Minister of Education (Appendix A) represented the Department of Education's conception of an acceptable outcome of the dispute. Each of the "lists of items" to be included in the Memorandum of Agreement (Appendices B, C, and D) are further examples of the estimated probable outcome as conceived by each party late in the negotiations.

### The Function of Proposals in Reaching Terms of Agreement

Proposals play a key role in the process through which parties



come to terms of agreement. Much of the negotiating process involves the confrontation, revision and final acceptance (or rejection) of proposals at the bargaining table.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the principal difference between tacit bargaining and negotiation is the use of explicit proposals, for in order that there be an explicit agreement there must be at least one explicit proposal.<sup>14</sup>

Ostensibly a proposal represents an offer to an opponent; that is, it gives a description of the terms that are allegedly being made available to an opponent, but, in reality, it usually means an offer toward the final phase of the process of reaching agreement.<sup>15</sup>

Proposals should change an opponent's expectations about the outcome of the dispute in two ways: (1) they should change the opponent's expectations about one's own minimum disposition by making the opponent believe that one will insist upon certain terms, and (2) they should change an opponent's anticipation concerning his own minimum terms by changing his mind about what he is trying to get so that he will accept what appears to him to be his opponent's irreducible minimum. Thus proposals are intended to influence an opponent so that he will make better terms available.

The A.T.A.'s Proposals The A.T.A.'s negotiating proposals were characterized by their concreteness and firmness, and thus seem to have made the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education believe that the terms proposed by the A.T.A. were very close to its minimum disposition on each item. For example, the A.T.A. Executive Council's repeated insistence on three representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board to two for



the A.S.T.A. and that the Chairman of the Board must be the President of the A.T.A. seems to have influenced the A.S.T.A.'s expectations about the minimum terms for which the A.T.A. would accept the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board by Order-in-Council. Moreover, the A.T.A.'s insistence, in public, that the Department of Education must accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments seems to have influenced the Minister's expectations about the terms for which the A.T.A. would accept agreement. This may have helped to change the Minister's mind about accepting A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments despite the questionable legality of doing so, once the Minister had become anxious to have a settlement before a provincial election was announced.

#### Failure of the A.S.T.A. to Advance Concrete Proposals

A tactical error made by the A.S.T.A. lay in its failure to submit concrete proposals to either the Minister of Education or the A.T.A. after the first proposal was given to the Minister following the 1965 Annual Convention, and a second one for basing salary evaluations on certification was made in May, 1966. Both these proposals were too general in nature to represent sound bargaining positions. The list of items submitted by the A.S.T.A. (Appendix C) for possible inclusion in the Memorandum of Agreement was only submitted after the A.T.A. had proposed a Memorandum of Agreement and after the Minister of Education had asked that such a list be prepared. Even at the meeting of March 20, 1967 at which the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. and the Executive Director of the A.S.T.A. met with the Registrar of the







Department of Education to draw up an outline of a Memorandum of Agreement, the A.S.T.A. Executive Director had no concrete recommendation in the form of writing. The Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. took into the meeting a draft of a Memorandum of Agreement representing his and his colleagues conception of what the Memorandum of Agreement should look like in its finished form. The Assistant Executive Secretary informed this writer that "the basic structure and most of the content in the document (Appendix E) reflected a draft which I had prepared in advance of the meeting."<sup>16</sup>

Judging from the outcome of the debate at the Annual Convention in Calgary, in 1966, at which time the A.S.T.A. reaffirmed the position that the Minister of Education should assume responsibility for evaluations, and also from the absence of any systematic negotiating strategy, it would appear that the A.S.T.A. was content to let the Department of Education act as a sort of bargaining agent for it. Although the A.S.T.A. demanded that a Teacher Qualifications Board be established by Order-in-Council, no concrete proposals were put forth in writing with respect to the form and content of such an Order-in-Council. The preparation and planning of the Order-in-Council seems to have been left entirely to the officers of the Department of Education. In contrast, the record shows that in the afternoon of December 19, 1966, immediately following the meeting at which the A.S.T.A. proposed the Order-in-Council and the A.T.A. proposed an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act, the President of the A.T.A. submitted a draft of a proposed amendment of the Act to the Minister of Education (supra, p. 210).



This mechanism was not accepted as a means of establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board but the submission of the proposal illustrates the aggressive nature of the A.T.A.'s strategy and presented in writing the conditions with respect to the form of a Teacher Qualifications Board for which the A.T.A. would accept agreement.

Several reasons may account for the failure of the A.S.T.A. to prepare concrete written proposals. First, the A.S.T.A. lacked a number of persons competent and experienced in negotiations and therefore the significance of such proposals may not have been brought to the attention of the Executive. Second, the A.S.T.A. changed Executive Directors part way through the negotiations, that is, in the summer of 1966. The new Executive Director probably had not adjusted to the demands of his office sufficiently to be able to plan and lead a systematic attack against the more aggressive and more highly organized administrative officers of The Alberta Teachers' Association. Finally, and perhaps more significantly, the internal conflict in the A.S.T.A. Executive Council resulting in much intraorganizational bargaining unquestionably weakened the A.S.T.A. position and denied the Table Officers the advantage of a clear and precise estimate of the probable outcome of the several sub-issues which could be combined into a formal over-all set of terms that could be presented at the negotiating table. Indeed, the nature of the objective to which the A.S.T.A. had become committed dictated that the A.S.T.A. delegate much of its decision-making responsibility to the Minister of Education. Some of the urban trustees recognized the constraints which the A.S.T.A. policy resolution of 1966 placed on the Executive and moved an amendment which



would drop the A.S.T.A.'s insistence that the Minister of Education control evaluations so that a compromise could be worked out directly with the A.T.A. without the help of the Department of Education. The absence of concrete proposals limited the amount of influence which the A.S.T.A. was able to exert over the A.T.A.'s expectations in the manner described above and it was therefore not able to induce the A.T.A. to make better terms available. A senior officer of the Department of Education compared the negotiating strategies of the two Associations in the following way:

The A.S.T.A. people acted like 'Babes in the Woods.' They didn't seem to know what they were doing. The A.T.A. officers on the other hand used their power well. They knew what they wanted and stuck to it, giving only on the minor points. They didn't make one false move in negotiating procedure.

#### Method of Reaching Terms of Agreement on Administration of Evaluations

The sub-issue related to administration of evaluations was the first one settled and the method of reaching an agreement on it was simply the acceptance by the A.S.T.A. of the first proposal put forth by the A.T.A. That is not to say that the A.S.T.A. accepted the A.T.A.'s proposal immediately or that it was accepted willingly. Nonetheless, by the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement the A.S.T.A. agreed to advise all prospective immigrant teachers to apply to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service for Statements of Qualifications for salary purposes. The A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service consisted of a Qualifications Secretary who issued the Statements of Qualifications and a Qualifications Committee of four members to deal with difficult cases. This service was set up by A.T.A. bylaw and was not altered







through negotiation.

Although the A.S.T.A. was willing to recognize the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service in January, 1967, it anticipated that the Department of Education's Evaluation would continue to operate and be available to teachers and school boards, if they chose to use it. Figures 11 to 14 show that this situation obtained right up to March 14, 1967 at which time the Minister of Education agreed to accept A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments and thereby all but disbanded the Department's Evaluation Service except for the purpose of evaluating teacher qualifications for Foundation Program payments to school boards that do not recognize the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board. (In 1968 there were only about ten of these.)<sup>17</sup>

#### Method of Reaching Agreement on the Establishment of the Teacher Qualifications Board

The second major sub-issue was the method of establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board. This seems to have been the most difficult sub-issue to resolve because, as was pointed out earlier, it was more readily identified with the commitment to principle made by each party. It became necessary to find a mechanism for establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board, acceptable to both parties, without the appearance of having broken its commitment by accepting it. The method found was the Memorandum of Agreement and the discovery of it and the timing of its introduction into the dispute illustrates the fine negotiating skill of the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A.



TABLE VII

MAJOR SUB-ISSUES BETWEEN THE A.T.A. AND THE A.S.T.A. AND THE  
METHOD OF REACHING TERMS OF AGREEMENT

Sub-issues	Substance of sub-issues	Methods of reaching terms of agreement
1 Administration of Evaluations	A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service Registrar of the Department of Education Either A.T.A. or the Registrar	Eventual acceptance of the A.T.A.'s first proposal
2 Method of establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board	By A.T.A. bylaw By an amdenment to <u>The Teaching Profession Act</u> By Order-in-Council By some other legislation By Memorandum of Agreement	"Focal point"
3 Composition of Teacher Qualifications Board	The number of A.T.A. representatives versus the number of A.S.T.A. representatives	Compromise
4 Chairmanship of the Teacher Qualifications Board	The A.T.A. President Any member of the Board	<u>Quid pro quo</u>
5 The purpose of the Teacher Qualifications Board	Evaluations for salary purposes Evaluation for salary and certification Evaluation for salary and Foundation Program	"Focal point"
6 Function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service	Limited to Foundation Program Available to teachers and school boards for salary determination	Eventual acceptance of the A.T.A.'s first proposal



The need to discover another alternative. By December 1966, it had become clear to the Assistant Executive Secretary that the A.T.A. was not going to be able to achieve a Teacher Qualifications Board through an A.T.A. bylaw or an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act. "The Crisis in Alberta Education had effectively erected a road block which prevented the A.T.A. from achieving this goal and it became apparent to me that we had to find another way," <sup>18</sup> the Assistant Executive Secretary said. The question then became which, if any, of the many alternatives available for settling the issue was appropriate. By January, 1967 at least five major alternatives had been advanced, none of which seemed acceptable from either the A.T.A. or the A.S.T.A. points of view. These alternatives were: (1) an A.T.A. bylaw, (2) an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act, (3) an Order-in-Council, (4) an appendage to the University Co-ordinating Council, (5) an ad hoc piece of legislation. The first two alternatives were unacceptable to the A.S.T.A. for reasons previously stated. The third alternative was unacceptable to the A.T.A. because an Order-in-Council was considered "too easily changed." The fourth alternative was never fully explored. The Dean of Education, University of Alberta, had suggested it and then had withdrawn his suggestion because he "did not think it would work."<sup>19</sup> The fifth alternative may have become necessary if the issue had not been resolved and salary negotiations had broken down at the local level. However, the Minister of Education did not favour it and moreover, it probably could not have been achieved in time to prevent salary negotiation breakdown.





"Discovery" of the Memorandum of Agreement. Since none of the available alternatives was acceptable another one had to be found. What was needed was a "focal point," some notch on the range of preferences, qualitatively differentiable from the continuum of all possible alternatives and on which the expectations of both parties could be brought into convergence. Reference to Figure 8, page 247, will show that the "focal point" logically lay somewhere in the "neutral" zone of preferences because only in this zone could either side be reasonably expected to dig in its heels and retreat no further. As Schelling has pointed out, "If one is to make a finite concession that is not to be interpreted as a capitulation, he needs an obvious place to stop."<sup>20</sup> The task was to find or create some prominent outcome that would satisfy the condition of neutrality and therefore be acceptable to both sides. Normally in negotiations one would expect such a point to be provided by a mediator's suggestions,<sup>21</sup> but in this case it was provided by the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. At least two factors provided the focal point on which the idea of the Memorandum of Agreement occurred to the Assistant Executive Secretary. One was the former informal arrangement called the Salary Appendix Committee by which the parties had been able to develop principles of evaluation used by the University of Alberta's Evaluation Committee. The second factor was a cue in the letter from the Minister of Education to the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A. on May 5, 1966, in which the Minister suggested that a body concerned with evaluation for salary purposes might come into existence either by statute or "by agreement among the interested



parties" (supra, p. 133). From these two ideas gradually emerged the concept of the Memorandum of Agreement as a mechanism for setting up and legitimizing the whole evaluation machinery.

Timing of the offer of a Memorandum of Agreement. Perhaps the best indication of the negotiating skill of the officers of the A.T.A. can be seen in the timing of the offer of a Memorandum of Agreement. Reference to Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 will show that the proposal to establish a Teacher Qualifications Board by Memorandum of Agreement marked the final offer in a sequence of concessions made by the A.T.A. from its original position. A comparison of Figures 12 and 13 will show that the proposal was made after the A.S.T.A. agreed to accept two representatives on the board to three A.T.A. representatives, and had agreed to accept A.T.A. administration of evaluations as well as the A.T.A. President as Chairman. Had the A.T.A. representatives proposed the Memorandum of Agreement before these concessions were made, it is highly likely that they never would have been made.

The Executive Secretary and the President of the A.T.A. carried a pencil-written draft of a Memorandum of Agreement around in their pockets for a few weeks, before the idea was even suggested to the Executive Council of the A.T.A. for its consideration and approval.<sup>22</sup> There were many reasons for not publicizing the idea of a Memorandum of Agreement immediately. First, it was important that the idea not leak to the A.S.T.A, because if the A.S.T.A. had received an indication of the A.T.A.'s minimum disposition on this item earlier it would have jeopardized the A.T.A.'s bargaining position. Although the A.T.A.



officers held the solution of the dispute in their pockets, they acted "as if" they might accept an Order-in-Council which was high on the A.S.T.A.'s order of preference, if the necessary concessions were made by the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education. Only after the necessary concessions were made did the A.T.A. present the idea of a Memorandum of Agreement which was accepted almost immediately by the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education. Another reason why the idea was not presented earlier to the A.T.A. Executive Council was because it was absolutely necessary that the Executive Council support the idea and this was only possible after it became clear that all other alternatives were unattainable and the Memorandum of Agreement represented the best possibility of a solution.

Method of Reaching Agreement on the Number of Representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board

Neither the Department of Education nor the universities seemed to have been concerned about the number of representatives allotted to them on the Teacher Qualifications Board by the A.T.A. proposal. The issue was strictly between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. and the method of resolving it was a compromise. Originally, the A.T.A. proposed that the A.S.T.A. be allotted one representative on the Teacher Qualifications Board while the A.T.A. would have four including the Chairman, who would be a non-voting member, except in instances of a tie-vote. The two universities and the Department of Education would each have one representative. This ratio of four A.T.A. members to four others would have guaranteed control of the Board by the A.T.A.<sup>23</sup> The A.S.T.A.







objected to this arrangement and demanded equal representation on the Board with the A.T.A. although the A.S.T.A. never did suggest what it thought the appropriate number of representatives from each group should be. The A.T.A. made a concession on this point and proposed two representatives from the A.S.T.A. and two from the Department of Education. This would have increased the number of representatives on the Board to ten distributed as follows: A.T.A., four members including the Chairman, each university, one member, the Department of Education, two members and the A.S.T.A., two members. By this time the A.T.A.'s suspicion that a connection existed between the A.S.T.A.'s policy resolution of 1965 and the recommendation of the President of the University of Alberta that evaluations be transferred to the Registrar of the Department of Education had been removed and the A.T.A. felt reasonably certain that it could count on the support of university representatives on issues of a professional nature that might be in dispute on the Board. With the universities' support, the A.T.A. could count on a possible voting strength of five to four even without the vote of the Chairman. The A.T.A. held out on this point until the final phase of the negotiations when it yielded to the A.S.T.A. demand that the A.T.A. be restricted to a total of three representatives including the Chairman who would be allowed voting privileges. The A.T.A. accepted this condition because its voting strength on the Board would be unchanged by virtue of the Chairman's right to vote on all questions. As was pointed out earlier, the A.S.T.A. made a concession by granting the A.T.A. one more representative on the Board than the



A.S.T.A. because it appeared that such a concession was necessary to win A.T.A. acceptance of the Order-in-Council, which at the time seemed to be the only way that the A.S.T.A. Executive Council could satisfy its membership's commitment to a neutral body.

#### Method of Reaching Agreement on the Chairmanship of the Board

The A.T.A. had become committed to a position which required that the Chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board be the A.T.A. President. The A.S.T.A. was committed to a "neutral body" and the officers could not agree to signing a Memorandum of Agreement which spelled out that the A.T.A. President must be Chairman of a board established by it. In order that a final settlement could be reached a "trade-off" or a quid pro quo had to be arranged. At first the A.S.T.A. representatives expressed a willingness to nominate the A.T.A. President as Chairman as a condition for the A.T.A. acceptance of the Order-in-Council. The A.S.T.A. wanted this same arrangement to obtain in exchange for its acceptance of the Memorandum of Agreement but the A.T.A. wanted a more definite provision in exchange for reducing the number of A.T.A. representatives from four to three. The terms of agreement finally arrived at was that the Chairman of the Board should be "one of the three A.T.A. members" and that the Chairman would have full voting privileges. In return for this concession, the A.T.A. agreed to support the A.S.T.A.'s nomination of the Department of Education's Evaluation Officer as secretary of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board, at the first meeting, instead of an A.T.A. employee.



Method of Reaching Terms of Agreement on the Purpose of the Teacher Qualifications Board

Three possible purposes were put forth for which the Teacher Qualifications Board could be used: (1) evaluation for salary purposes only; (2) evaluation for salary, certification and Foundation Program; and (3) evaluation for salary and Foundation Program only. The purpose finally agreed to was the third one stated--evaluation for salary purposes and Foundation Program payments. Although the A.S.T.A. resolution called for the Teacher Qualifications Board to determine policy for both certification and salary determination, this could only have been possible if the Board was completely controlled by the Department of Education, an alternative which the A.T.A. would not accept. The purpose of the Teacher Qualifications Board was determined by a "focal point." This focal point was the precedent set by the University of Alberta's Evaluation Committee, which evaluated for salary purposes and Foundation Program payments.

Method of Reaching Agreement on the Function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service

The issue over the function of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service was largely between the A.T.A. and the Minister of Education, and the resolution of it came when the Minister accepted the A.T.A.'s demand which was that the Department's Evaluation Service be limited to administration of the Foundation Program and only for those school boards which did not use the A.T.A.'s evaluations for salary purposes. The reasons for the Minister agreeing to this have already







been suggested.

### VIII. SHIFTING EVALUATIONS

This section will examine briefly the shifting evaluations of the negotiators in terms of (1) the criteria of evaluation, and (2) the objectives for which the parties negotiated.

#### Criteria of Evaluation

The criteria of evaluation provide the "yardsticks" for measuring how much the parties would gain or lose by accepting proposed terms. The criteria indicate what trades are equitable and they establish the benchmark by which negotiators judge whether or not a demand is reasonable, a concession adequate, or a compromise fair.<sup>24</sup> Ikle<sup>24</sup> has pointed out that the evaluation criteria do not exist independently of the negotiation process, but they are, in fact, nothing more than the beliefs held by the negotiators and are constantly modified through negotiation.<sup>25</sup> Only after an agreement has been concluded may one, with the advantage of historical hindsight assess how an agreement worked out and determine if one side gained more than the other, whether a gamble paid off, and so on.

#### Break-even Points

In order to evaluate whether his party would gain or lose by accepting a certain term of agreement, a negotiator must have some sort of break-even point by which he can measure his gains and losses. Negotiators often shift break-even points in the course of negotiation suggesting one reason why evaluations are so unstable.



The A.S.T.A.'s original break-even point. At the beginning of the dispute the A.S.T.A. seems to have used the status quo as its break-even point. That is, any arrangement for evaluating teachers' qualifications for salary purposes which did not change the relationship which existed between teachers and school boards prior to 1965 would be evaluated as neither a gain nor a loss. For this reason, the A.S.T.A. preferred an arrangement which would assign responsibility for evaluation of teacher education to what it considered to be a "neutral body," that is, a body established by and responsible to the Minister of Education. Any arrangement which would transfer any part of the evaluating process to the A.T.A. was evaluated as a "loss." Reference to Figure 10, page 254, will show that each of the major sub-issues proposed by the A.T.A. Draft Bylaw of 1966 represented a loss to the A.S.T.A. because each one lay on the minus side of the break-even point, that is, the neutral zone. Because of this the A.T.A.'s proposal was vigorously opposed by the A.S.T.A. and a counter-proposal made which would, in effect, move each sub-issue back into the neutral zone, or over to the plus side of it. For example, the A.S.T.A. demanded equal representation as a condition of neutrality, a board established by Order-in-Council, removing it from the control of either party, a Chairman elected from among the members, ensuring a neutral point of view.

Shifting the A.S.T.A.'s break-even point. The following statement appears in an editorial in the July, 1967 issue of The Alberta School Trustee, which commented on the recently-signed Memorandum of Agreement



establishing the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board.

The Memorandum of Agreement was the result of delicate negotiations among the Department of Education, Alberta Teachers' Association, and Alberta School Trustees' Association. At times the delicacy seemed to be lost in a labyrinth of manoeuvres that were not always tender and considerate of the other's feelings. It cannot be maintained in any situation where negotiations are occurring anyone wins or loses in the absolute sense. All parties in the process gain a little and lose a little. Hopefully, the end result is an agreement that the parties in negotiation can accept and work with.<sup>26</sup>

The editorial went on to demonstrate the advantages of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board and by implication suggested that as far as the A.S.T.A. was concerned it got a "good bargain" in signing the Memorandum of Agreement. If one compares the bargaining positions of the A.S.T.A. as shown in Figure 9 with the actual terms agreed upon as shown in Figure 15 one might question how the A.S.T.A. could claim to have gained even a little in terms of its break-even point. Similarly, if one compares the bargaining positions of the A.T.A. on Figure 9 with the final points of agreement shown on Figure 15, it can be seen that the A.T.A. did not lose on any item, in terms of the A.S.T.A.'s break-even point but did in fact gain on all of them. The final terms of agreement gave the A.T.A. substantially what it asked for (in the 1964 proposal) on the administrative aspects of evaluations. Moreover, the A.T.A. actually gained ground on the policy aspect of evaluations since the board established by Memorandum of Agreement is completely separate from any direct control by the Department of Education as would not have been the case if the board had operated under the Board of Teacher Education and Certification as the A.T.A. had originally proposed. How can one explain, therefore, the belief held by the A.S.T.A. negotiators that they won "a little"







and the A.T.A. lost "a little" and that no one won or lost in the "absolute sense"? The explanation lies, it seems, in the fact that the A.S.T.A. shifted its break-even point to a new status quo during the course of the negotiations.

The A.S.T.A.'s second break-even point. The A.T.A.'s bargaining positions shown in Figure 10 represent more than bargaining positions. These positions do, in fact, represent a fait accompli. By December, 1966, the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Service was operating. A Teacher Qualifications Board had been established, was functioning and had been recognized by the Department of Education and the universities of Alberta, all of whom had appointed representatives to it. The brief presented to the Minister of Education and the Provincial Cabinet by the A.S.T.A. on December 20, 1966 indicated that the A.S.T.A. recognized this fact. The brief stated: ". . .it is almost a fait accompli with an official Department member as a party to the principles of evaluation established by the Teacher Qualifications Board" (supra, p. 177). Therefore, what, in August, 1966, had been viewed as a new situation, was by December, 1966 seen not as a departure from an earlier status quo, but, in fact, as a new status quo from which any improvement could be evaluated as a gain and any deterioration as a loss. The fait accompli had become the new break-even point. Comparing the final terms of agreement (Figure 15) with the new status quo (Figure 9) it can be seen that the A.S.T.A. did gain a little and the A.T.A. did lose a little.

The A.T.A.'s break-even line. The A.T.A. clearly did not use a



status quo as a break-even point but used instead a "certain long-term development as natural or fixed in conformity with a fundamental historical trend as a break-even line."<sup>27</sup> There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the natural historical trend by which the A.T.A. measured its gains and losses was the progression toward increased professional autonomy by teachers. For example, the A.T.A. Executive Officers stated from the beginning the view that evaluation of teacher qualifications is a professional task. In The ATA News, February, 1966, it was claimed that because the Association was ready to assume responsibility for evaluations, it indicated "both a developing maturity and a growing sense of professional responsibility" (supra, p. 104). Addressing teachers at a conference in Banff, in August, 1967, the President of the A.T.A. discussed the recent "accomplishments" of the A.T.A. Referring to the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board he said:

. . . despite the fact that the board is an independent one established in a way other than that which we envisioned originally, these developments are a further step on our road to complete professional status.<sup>28</sup>

In a statement appearing in The ATA News, February, 1967, the former President of the A.T.A. clearly demonstrated that the A.T.A. viewed the issue over evaluations as a segment of the rising curve of a historical trend toward complete professional status.

. . . thirty years ago, after a long hard struggle, the right for teachers to bargain collectively was gained by the Association. . . . The present concern of the Association about evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes reflects a second struggle of teachers--the struggle to gain recognition as a profession. . . . Once this second struggle is won the stage will be set for the third one--the right of the individual teacher to be recognized as a professional.<sup>29</sup>



The rising curve toward complete professional status was the break-even line for the A.T.A. To the A.T.A. any agreement which simply continued the status quo, that is, the situation before 1965, was evaluated as a loss. The break-even line of the A.T.A. remained fixed throughout the negotiations and thus the A.T.A.'s evaluations were more constant and less easily influenced by the arguments of the A.S.T.A., the Department of Education, the universities or the newspapers. A fact which led an officer of the Department of Education to observe, "They knew what they wanted and they stuck to it."

#### Measuring the Size of Gains and Losses

In addition to selecting a break-even point to separate the plus from the minus side, a negotiator must evaluate how large his potential gains or losses will be. There is usually no way in which a negotiator can measure the size of gains and losses numerically, especially when money is not involved. Instead, he estimates the magnitude of gains and losses intuitively. These estimates of size are therefore highly subject to change as negotiations progress. Several criteria seem to determine the way in which negotiators measure the magnitude of gains and losses.<sup>30</sup> Some of these are: (1) infatuation with detail which may cause a negotiator to attach great importance to a minor issue; (2) the amount of effort required to obtain certain terms which may make them seem more valuable than if they were obtained easily; (3) an agreement may seem particularly valuable simply because the available terms are the best ones which could conceivably have been obtained; (4) emphasis on an even distribution.







Examples of the Shifting Evaluations of the Parties with Respect to Magnitude of Gains and Losses

In an exploratory study such as this it is impossible to analyse each concession made and every offer given. However, a few examples will serve to illustrate the shifting evaluations of the parties with respect to the perceived magnitude of the gains and losses. Special emphasis is placed on the possible distortion of the evaluations made.

Possible distortion of some A.S.T.A. evaluations. The A.S.T.A. appears to have placed as much emphasis on the attainment of minor items as it did on at least one major one. Originally, the A.S.T.A. insisted on the administration of evaluations by the Department of Education. Later, the A.S.T.A. expressed a willingness to grant the A.T.A. control of the administrative aspect of evaluations but held out stubbornly for equal representation on the Teacher Qualifications Board and maintained stiff opposition to the A.T.A. President as Chairman. Perhaps, as Iklé suggests, the infatuation with detail and the emphasis on an even distribution made these items seem much larger than the item concerned with administration. Possibly the A.S.T.A. may have been more successful in attaining its original objective if it had conceded to the A.T.A.'s demands regarding the number of representatives and the Chairmanship of the Board (as it eventually did) earlier, in exchange for less A.T.A. control over administration.

Possible distortion of some A.T.A. evaluations. The A.T.A. may also have placed an over-emphasis on the details related to the composition of the Teacher Qualifications Board. Clearly, it was the A.T.A.'s



insistence on more board representation than the A.S.T.A. and its demand for the A.T.A. President as Chairman which stiffened the resistance of the A.S.T.A. to the A.T.A.'s total plan for an evaluation service. These items seem to have been highly valued by the A.T.A. because at the time they appeared to be the best terms that could conceivably have been obtained from the A.S.T.A. It is possible, however, that if the A.T.A. had given ground on these items, after an appropriate period of stalemate, it may have induced the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education to accept an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act which represented a higher order of preference to the A.T.A. than the Memorandum of Agreement.

#### Shifting Objectives and Uncertain Goals

A negotiator's evaluations depend in large part upon the goals set and the specific objectives sought. If a negotiator sets modest goals his gains may seem to be more substantial than if he sets more ambitious ones. Furthermore, goals, as well as the criteria for evaluating them, frequently change through the course of negotiation as "offered terms may be improved, threats may be withdrawn, new inducements may be added and the balance of forces may shift."<sup>31</sup> A close analysis of the data gathered reveals that the A.S.T.A.'s goals were more modest, more uncertain and thus more easily modified than those of the A.T.A. which seemed to be more ambitious, more specific, and hence less easily modified.

#### The A.S.T.A.'s Goals

The A.S.T.A., as the defensive party in the negotiations for redistribution of the right and responsibility for evaluation of teacher



education, seems to have entered into negotiations with no truly definite goal in mind other than to prevent deterioration of the status quo. The ten-point policy resolution adopted by the 1965 Annual Convention was too detailed to represent a good statement of general policy but, on the other hand, too general and vague to represent a firm bargaining position. After it was seen that this resolution would have been difficult to implement, the A.S.T.A. developed another goal which would have made salary determination contingent upon certification.<sup>32</sup> Although this proposal was more specific in nature it represented too great a departure from the traditional system of evaluation and certification to be easily adopted by the Minister of Education especially since it was antithetical to the A.T.A.'s objective at the time. The resolution adopted by the 1966 Annual Convention was even more general in nature than the 1965 resolution. The debate which accompanied its passage demonstrated how completely uncertain the A.S.T.A. was of the goals which it hoped to achieve. It is not surprising therefore, that the A.T.A., with its aggressive strategy and determination, was able to modify the goals of the A.S.T.A. so that what eventually emerged as a specific negotiating goal seemed to represent a compromise of the several goals held by A.S.T.A. members.

An example of a shift in the A.S.T.A.'s goals. The acceptance by the A.S.T.A. of the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service, which represented an important sub-issue in the total dispute, illustrates how an organization, in the process of negotiation, may change its evaluation of the outcome of an issue as a consequence of attaching different







values to the same object at different times. Originally, the A.S.T.A. was "unalterably opposed" to the A.T.A. taking over administration of evaluations because it feared that the A.T.A. could "even within approved policies. . . limit the number of immigrant teachers with drastic accumulative effects on teacher supply" (supra, p. 160). This fear prompted the A.S.T.A. Executive Council to oppose the A.T.A. plan to take over evaluations and led to the introduction of the resolution at the 1965 Annual Convention calling for the Minister of Education to take over the administration of evaluations. This took place several weeks before the A.T.A. moved to establish a policy-setting body, by Association bylaw. The possibility of the A.S.T.A. agreeing to an A.T.A. Evaluation Service in December, 1965 would have been very remote indeed. However, by January, 1967 (see Figure 11) the A.S.T.A. seemed to place less importance on the matter of administration of evaluations than it did on the locus of control of the policy-setting body, and was willing to grant the A.T.A. the right to administer evaluations if the A.T.A. would agree to the establishment of a policy board by Order-in-Council as proposed by the Deputy Minister of Education.

Several factors may have caused the A.S.T.A. to shift its value with respect to administration of evaluations. One was the change in A.S.T.A. presidency to one who expressed less opposition to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service than his predecessor. Another factor was the success of the A.T.A.'s tactics in convincing at least some of the A.S.T.A. members that the fears that the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service would discriminate against immigrant teachers and that



it would attempt to take over certification from the Department of Education were groundless. Because of the commitment of the A.S.T.A. to a "neutral body" and the desire of the A.S.T.A. officers to negotiate an agreement that would satisfy that commitment, a greater value seems to have been placed on the achievement of a policy-setting body by Order-in-Council than on the administrative aspects of evaluation. In January, 1967, the A.S.T.A. was therefore willing to give up the objective it came to value less (administration) for one it valued more (policy determination).

#### The A.T.A.'s Goals

The A.T.A. objectives in the form of proposals were always stated in a specific and positive manner. This is not to suggest, however, that the A.T.A. did not change the objectives which it pursued through negotiation as situations changed and as former objectives appeared unattainable.

Examples of changes in the A.T.A.'s goals. By its first proposal presented to the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, in October, 1964, the A.T.A. sought only the right to administration of evaluations, being satisfied to let policy determination for evaluations reside under the control of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification, on which the A.T.A. had equal representation with the A.S.T.A. and had only four representatives on a board of eighteen. The Board of Teacher Education and Certification could not decide on a procedure for determining policy and eventually the groups represented



on the B.T.E.C. moved to have administration of evaluations as well as policy determination transferred to the Department of Education. This caused the A.T.A. to develop a new goal which was to gain control of the policy-setting board as well as the administrative machine. The strategy and tactics developed in the winter and spring of 1966 were directed toward attaining that goal and success was almost achieved. However, by virtue of the fact that the A.S.T.A. refused to appoint a member to the Teacher Qualifications Board and the presence of the Department of Education's Evaluation Service made it quite clear to the A.T.A. that complete control of policy determination through A.T.A. bylaw was out of the question. A search began for a new objective which was to prevent control of the policy board from reverting to the Department of Education. This goal was pursued through the immediate objective of an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act as a means of establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board. When the attainment of this appeared unlikely, a final objective in the form of the Memorandum of Agreement was sought and achieved.

#### The Question of Which Party Won

Conclusions about which party won in the negotiations depend upon which break-even point one uses to assess the gains and losses of each side. If one uses the original status quo as a break-even point then clearly the A.T.A won a great deal because it won the right to operate an evaluation service. It also gained the largest number of representatives on the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board as well as the right to name the Chairman of the Board. Finally, it gained the advantage of





having the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board and the administrative service housed in Barnett House. If however, one uses the new status quo, that is, the situation which obtained after the A.T.A. established its Teacher Qualifications Service as a break-even point, then it may be demonstrated that the A.T.A. lost some ground and the A.S.T.A. gained. The A.S.T.A. could point to the fact that it won more representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board than the A.T.A. was first prepared to give it and it could claim to have effected a compromise from four to three with respect to the number of A.T.A. representatives. Finally, it could argue that it got a neutral board of the kind that it wanted, that is, one that was not a creature of the A.T.A.

If one measures gains and losses in terms of the A.T.A.'s break-even line, that is the historical trend to complete professional autonomy, the A.T.A. just about broke even. It gained control of the administrative aspects of evaluation but lost nominal control of the policy-setting board.

#### X. THE ROLES OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE DISPUTE

The third parties directly involved in the dispute between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. were the universities of Alberta and the Department of Education. Although each of these groups tried various ways to help the parties come to terms of agreement, it is doubtful if any one of them made any significant contribution in helping to bring about the final settlement.

In order to assist disputing parties to reach an agreement, a



third party may perform two functions, one accommodative, the other normative.<sup>33</sup> The officers of the Department of Education and the universities attempted both approaches, but did not use either of them very effectively, perhaps because one function interfered with the other.

#### Accommodative Function

The accommodative function of a third party in dispute settlement involves an attempt to encourage the parties to reach an agreement by themselves. The third party does everything in his power to bring the parties together; he attempts to allay distrust, remove the causes of friction and promotes good feelings between the disputing parties so that the proper atmosphere for accommodation will prevail. To perform an accommodative role effectively, a third party must win and retain the confidence of each party so that each will entrust confidential information to him. In this way he may be able to get concessions from the two sides that will actually bring them to agree.

#### Normative Function

The normative function of a third party involves the making of recommendations or "awards" stating what, in the opinion of the third party, the parties ought to do to achieve an agreement. For example, if he tells a party that the other party's position seems not unreasonable, he is applying a standard or norm of what is or what is not reasonable. Although third parties, in attempting to bring about dispute settlement generally use both normative and accommodative approaches, they



ought to use normative pressures on the parties in isolation of each other because, to pass judgement on one party in the presence of the other often incurs the displeasure and distrust of one for the other. It may also discredit the third party in the eyes of the disputants and undermine his usefulness.

### Third Party Roles of the Department of Education and the Universities

To be effective in helping disputing parties reach a settlement, the third party has to be a neutral. All the officers of the Department of Education and the Deans of Education of the universities claimed to have been "strictly neutral" in the dispute between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. Although they perceived themselves as such, there is no evidence that either the A.S.T.A. or the A.T.A. perceived them as neutral.

### A.S.T.A. perception of the role of the Department of Education.

One spokesman for the A.S.T.A. said, "We felt some people in the Department of Education were on our side, some were against us and a third group wanted to find a middle road." The A.S.T.A. had wanted the Minister of Education to play more of a normative role and thought he should have intervened in the dispute much earlier. The "Crisis in Alberta Education" was an attempt to force the Minister into this role. When it was learned that the Minister of Education had appointed representatives to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board, the A.S.T.A. perceived the Minister of Education to be more favourable to the A.T.A. cause and his accommodative potential was somewhat weakened vis-à-vis the A.S.T.A.





A.T.A.'s perception of the role of the Department of Education.

It seems that in the beginning the A.T.A. preferred that the function of the Department of Education be limited to an accommodative function, if any function at all. The A.T.A. had specifically asked the Minister of Education to take "no action" in the evaluation issue. After the conflict between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. became very intense the A.T.A. thought the Minister of Education should have done more to bring about an accommodation, but it objected to the action he took. The A.T.A. perceived the Minister of Education as "wanting to do nothing in the hopes that the issue would be settled by the two parties themselves, or would simply go away."<sup>34</sup> The A.T.A. felt that the Minister had yielded to A.S.T.A. pressure in establishing an evaluation service for Foundation Program payments and perceived the proposed Order-in-Council as a further attempt by the Department of Education to appease the A.S.T.A. These actions on the part of the Department of Education served to bring the A.T.A. into direct confrontation with it so that any possibility of the Minister playing a strictly mediating role was destroyed.

A.S.T.A.'s perception of the role of the universities. The Deans of Education, like the Minister of Education, were perceived as playing ambivalent roles in the dispute by both the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. The perception of the A.S.T.A. of the position of the University of Alberta at the beginning of the dispute was that the University wanted out of the evaluation business and did not particularly care who took it over. Later the A.S.T.A. perceived the universities as favouring the



A.T.A. position especially with regard to the administration of evaluations. This may have been one reason why the A.S.T.A. yielded to the A.T.A. demand on this item.

A.T.A.'s perception of the role of the universities. The A.T.A. felt that the Deans of Education and the Presidents of the universities leaned toward the A.S.T.A. position, in the early stages of the dispute. This perception was probably brought about as a consequence of the normative view expressed by the President of the University of Alberta in his letter to the Minister that the Registrar of the Department of Education should do evaluations along with certification, particularly since this recommendation came just three days after the approval by the A.S.T.A. of a similar policy. Later, the A.T.A. perceived the universities as taking no firm stand on the issue other than "We are through with it."<sup>35</sup> The A.T.A. officers believed that the universities could have induced a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the A.S.T.A. if they had taken a firm position in favour of the A.T.A. at the beginning.

Actual role of the Deans of Education. The Deans of Education, especially the Dean of Education of the University of Alberta, who was more directly involved in evaluations, used a normative approach to try to help the parties reach an agreement more than an accommodative one. The Dean did attempt an accommodative approach on one occasion when, at the request of the A.T.A., he arranged an informal meeting between the Presidents of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. during the A.S.T.A. Annual



Convention in Calgary to help them try to find a solution to the impasse. The Dean said he left the meeting feeling "more discouraged than encouraged" that a settlement would be reached. The Dean attended all meetings called by the Minister of Education up to and including the meeting of January 4, 1967, when the Order-in-Council was presented and discussed. At the meetings which he attended, the Dean made suggestions which he hoped would produce a "workable solution" and discouraged the Department of Education from insisting on a legal solution. The Dean tried to maintain a neutral attitude throughout. After January 4, 1967, the University of Alberta had completely discontinued its Evaluation Committee and since the Dean was no longer directly involved in the evaluation process he felt he should withdraw from direct participation in the dispute. The Dean was concerned that peace be restored to the educational family and made it clear that his services would be available if needed to help the parties reach a settlement.

Actual role of the Department of Education. The role played by the Minister of Education was more or less accommodative but as has been pointed out, action which the Minister was forced to take and normative recommendations made (for example, the Order-in-Council) tended to weaken his accommodative approach.

The Minister apparently did not discern the degree of commitment made by the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. or the implications of this commitment until a point was reached where it was almost impossible for him to use his "good office" to break the deadlock. The Minister seems to have viewed the problem of evaluation of teacher education as an







administrative problem rather than as a political one. He tended, therefore, to look for an arrangement which would have been the best administratively rather than looking for the best politically. The Minister pursued a course of action which, he hoped, would terminate in a system of evaluations under the control of the universities. The Minister's interpretation of the contract with the University of Alberta for the training of teachers was that it implied evaluation of teacher education as well. He hoped that when new contracts would be prepared after the University of Calgary became completely autonomous, in 1966, that it could be spelled out that the Universities would be responsible for evaluation. Thus, the Minister of Education did not attempt to settle the issue between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. because he had hoped that the issue would be settled through the universities.<sup>36</sup> The universities opposed the Minister's interpretation of the teacher training contract with the Department of Education and steadfastly refused to have any part of evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes. Meanwhile, the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. had been allowed to become committed to positions which led to a very bitter and lengthy dispute.

The Minister did not call the parties to a first meeting until May 15, 1966, at which time firm commitments had already been made. The parties had privately hoped the Minister would call them together again soon after the May meeting but as has been indicated the Minister had hoped to reach an agreement with the universities for evaluating teachers' qualifications,<sup>37</sup> and therefore did not reconvene the parties



again until December 19, 1966, and only then at the request of the parties themselves. The Minister held several meetings with the parties individually but there is no evidence that these meetings were instrumental in bringing about concessions from either party. The Minister did convene the last three meetings which led to a final agreement.

The Deputy Minister tried his hand at mediating the dispute (supra, p. 169) in the spring of 1966 with indications of some success but the untimely publication of the "Crisis in Alberta Education" created a temporary stress on the informal relationships among the parties and aborted the Deputy Minister's mediating efforts.



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IX

<sup>1</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, 5, May 13, 1966.

<sup>2</sup>Since the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board has more A.T.A. representatives than representatives from any other group, and has an A.T.A. representative as Chairman, and meets at A.T.A. headquarters, it could hardly be considered neutral in a narrow sense of the word. Because the Board was established by Memorandum of Agreement rather than by A.T.A. bylaw, the A.S.T.A. considered that the condition of a neutral body was satisfied. The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Newsletter, 6:2, March 28, 1967.

<sup>3</sup>Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 22.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>5</sup>Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 42.

<sup>6</sup>Schelling, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>7</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A., December 18, 1967.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>A search through the "letters to the editor" sections of newspapers revealed very few letters from private citizens expressing alarm.

<sup>10</sup>Neil W. Chamberlain, A General Theory of Economic Process (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 82.

<sup>11</sup>Ratio of inducement to agree in this context is related to the term minimum disposition used by Ikle. That is to say, the greater the ratio of inducement to agree, the more likely a party is to make concessions lowering his minimum disposition, or in terms of Ikle's model moving it in a direction favourable to the opponent.

<sup>12</sup>Fred Charles Ikle and Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiation as a Process of Modifying Utilities," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6:22, March, 1962.

<sup>13</sup>Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 192.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.





<sup>16</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 29, 1967.

<sup>17</sup>The Alberta School Trustees' Association, Collective Bargaining Kit for Alberta School Boards (Edmonton: The Alberta School Trustees' Association, 1968), p. 58.

<sup>18</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 29, 1967.

<sup>19</sup>Interview with the Dean of Education, University of Alberta, November 23, 1967.

<sup>20</sup>Schelling, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Interview with the Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 24, 1967.

<sup>23</sup>This proposal was drawn up at a time when the A.T.A. Executive Council suspected that because of the University of Alberta's support of the transfer of evaluations to the Department of Education that political pressure was being exerted on the Universities by the A.S.T.A. and in this case the A.T.A. could not necessarily count on the voting support of University representatives on the proposed Teacher Qualifications Board. It was necessary therefore that the board be composed in such a way that the A.T.A. could control its major decisions.

<sup>24</sup>Ikle, op. cit., p. 167.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>"Editorial," The Alberta School Trustee, 37:2, July, 1967.

<sup>27</sup>Ikle, op. cit., p. 168.

<sup>28</sup>Address by the President of The Alberta Teachers' Association to the A.T.A. Annual Banff Conference, August 13, 1967. (Mimeographed.)

<sup>29</sup>The ATA News, 1, February, 1967.

<sup>30</sup>See Ikle, op. cit., pp. 170-75 for a full discussion of the criteria for measuring the magnitude of gains and losses.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>32</sup>Interview with the Past-President of the A.S.T.A., December 18, 1967.

<sup>33</sup>H. D. Woods and Sylvia Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1962), p. 185.



<sup>34</sup>Interview with the Assistant Executive Secretary of the A.T.A., November 29, 1967.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Interview with the Minister of Education, December 12, 1967.

<sup>37</sup>A Memorandum of Agreement was effected between the Board of Governors of the University of Calgary and the Minister of Education on July 18, 1966, in which the University of Calgary agreed to train teachers and recommend them to the Minister of Education for certification but no provision was made in the Memorandum of Agreement for evaluating teachers' qualifications for salary determination, or Foundation Program payments.



## CHAPTER X

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

#### I. SUMMARY

##### Summary of the Purpose and Method

The purpose of this study was to examine the negotiations which took place among The Alberta Teachers' Association, the Alberta School Trustees' Association and the Department of Education over the redistribution of the right and responsibility for evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes.

First, the literature of negotiation and bargaining theory was surveyed and reviewed for the purpose of gaining insights into the theoretical aspects of the negotiation process and also for the purpose of finding a suitable model of negotiating behaviour as a guiding frame of reference for data collection, organization and interpretation. A model of political negotiation developed by Ikle and Leites appeared to be the most appropriate one for this purpose. The model was modified to accommodate the morphology peculiar to the particular case investigated.

Data were gathered from such documentary sources as were made available to the writer by the respective associations. These sources included periodical articles, organizational newsletters, correspondence, briefs, bulletins and reports. Newspapers provided another valuable source of documentary information. Executive Council minutes of the associations were not made available, but interviewees frequently





consulted these and other confidential sources of information in responding to the writer's questions.

The other major source of information was interviews with the persons directly involved in the negotiations. Fourteen of the fifteen persons requested consented to personal interviews with the writer. Some persons were interviewed twice.

### Summary of the Findings

Redistribution of the right and responsibility for evaluating years of teacher education for salary purposes became necessary because the University of Alberta decided to discontinue the evaluation service which it had provided. When The Alberta Teachers' Association learned of the intention of the University of Alberta to discontinue its service, it decided that this function should be performed by the teachers' professional association and consequently developed a plan which would assign responsibility for administration of evaluations to the A.T.A. and policy determination to a committee of the Board of Teacher Education and Certification. In October, 1964, the plan was presented to the Board of Teacher Education and Certification where it was approved in principle. It was subsequently endorsed by the President of the University of Alberta but rejected by the Alberta School Trustees' Association. In April, 1965, the plan was approved by the Annual Representative Assembly of the A.T.A. and thus became official policy of that association.

During the next year the Board of Teacher Education and Certification debated the matter of evaluation on several occasions and on October



25, 1965, approved a policy which would link evaluation for salary determination to evaluation for certification and assign this function to a single body residing outside the universities. In November, 1965, the A.S.T.A.'s Annual Convention approved a similar policy calling for evaluation for certification and salary determination to be administered by the Registrar of the Department of Education in accordance with policies laid down by a neutral body under the Minister of Education. The President of the University of Alberta recommended a similar course of action to the Minister of Education in December, 1965.

The A.S.T.A. opposed the A.T.A. control of administration of evaluations because it was feared that this would give teachers an advantage over trustees at the bargaining tables in negotiating salary schedules by (1) determining the basis of their own salary entitlement, and (2) influencing salary levels by controlling teacher supply through discouraging the entry of immigrant teachers by harsh evaluation practices. The A.S.T.A. preferred a neutral evaluation agency which would not change the status quo in the bargaining relationship between teachers and trustees.

The Executive Council of The Alberta Teachers' Association became greatly alarmed at the events which aimed to transfer evaluations from the University of Alberta to the Department of Education. Not only did the A.T.A. consider that the determination of what constitutes a year of professional service is a professional task but it feared that if evaluations were controlled by the Department of Education political pressures could be brought to bear to lower standards of teacher education.



Thus a conflict developed between the values and preferences of the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. This conflict created an issue over evaluations which divided the associations for nearly two years.

To prevent the likelihood of the evaluation function reverting to the Department of Education, the Executive Council of the A.T.A. developed a plan by which the A.T.A. would administer evaluation policies which would be determined by a board established by A.T.A. bylaw and on which the A.T.A. would have the largest single representation. This plan was approved by the 1966 Annual Representative Assembly along with a resolution which gave the A.T.A. Executive Council authority to proceed with the implementation of it. At the same time, the A.T.A. Annual Representative Assembly approved a plan to establish a Membership Eligibility Board which would issue certificates of membership in The Alberta Teachers' Association.

The A.S.T.A. perceived in the move by the A.T.A. to establish these bodies a threat to public control of education in Alberta. The A.S.T.A. believed that the A.T.A. had embarked on a course to gain ultimate control of certification of teachers. The A.T.A.'s plan was vigorously opposed by the A.S.T.A. which continued to push for the task of evaluations to be assumed by the Department of Education.

Despite the opposition of the A.S.T.A. and criticism from the press, the A.T.A. proceeded to establish an evaluation service. Necessary staff and material resources were acquired and the other parties were invited to name representatives to the Teacher Qualifications Board and Qualifications Committee, in April. Because of the strong opposition







of the A.S.T.A. to the plan and the uncertainty of the situation created by the A.T.A.'s action none of the parties invited to do so appointed representatives.

In May, 1966, the Minister of Education, who had taken no direct action in the developing dispute between the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. because he had hoped to persuade the University of Alberta and the University of Calgary to provide a joint evaluation service as an alternative to the A.T.A. plan, called a meeting of the four parties to try to find a "mutually acceptable" solution to the problem. Although several alternatives were discussed no mutually acceptable solution was found and the meeting broke up with the A.T.A. representatives expressing a firm determination to proceed with their plan.

In June, 1966, the A.T.A. Executive made some minor revisions in the proposed composition and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board which seemed to satisfy the universities and the Minister of Education because each of them appointed representatives to the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Board. The A.S.T.A., however, refused to appoint a representative or send an observer to the meetings of the board. The A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Office opened on August 1, 1966, and began issuing statements of qualifications.

The A.S.T.A. Executive, alarmed at the unilateral action of the A.T.A., and annoyed because the Minister of Education was apparently disregarding its plea for government action to ensure that the control of the education system would remain with the "elected representatives of the people," published a pamphlet entitled "Crisis in Alberta



Education." The authors of the pamphlet claimed that the province faced a crisis because control of public education was in danger of being usurped by the A.T.A.

Political pressures created by the publication of the pamphlet resulted in a decision by the Minister of Education to set up an evaluation service in the Department of Education ostensibly for the administration of the Foundation Program, although the service also provided statements of evaluation to teachers for salary determination.

The A.T.A. saw in the Department of Education's evaluation service a threat to its own service because the availability of the Department's service minimized the possibility of evaluations becoming the exclusive right and responsibility of the teaching profession. The A.T.A. therefore employed a strategy which aimed to persuade the Minister of Education to either abandon the government's service completely or limit its operation to Foundation Program administration. Tactics used by the A.T.A. included threats, warnings, arguments and attempts to arouse public opinion against the Department of Education's evaluation service. The major weapon in the A.T.A.'s offensive arsenal was a threat of salary negotiation breakdown at the local level as teachers became embroiled with trustees in a contest over the recognition of evaluations by the Teacher Qualifications Board in collective agreements.

None of the A.T.A.'s tactics were immediately effective in modifying the Minister's position because the Minister had already become committed to the position that he could not accept the A.T.A. evaluations for Foundation Program payments as long as the A.S.T.A.



disagreed to the A.T.A.'s plan. Therefore, the A.T.A. was obliged to negotiate directly with the A.S.T.A. to reach a settlement that would be acceptable to the three parties.

In the meantime, cracks began to form in the A.S.T.A.'s defensive position. In December, 1966, a new President was elected who was not as strongly opposed to the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Service as the previous president had been. A heated debate took place at the A.S.T.A. Annual Convention of 1966 over a resolution confirming the stand on evaluations. Although the resolution was passed, the debate revealed that many trustees did not support the official A.S.T.A. policy which called for the Minister of Education to control evaluations.

The new A.S.T.A. Executive Council set as an immediate objective a resolution of the dispute with the A.T.A. and on December 17, 1966, invited the Executive Council of the A.T.A. to a dinner meeting and direct negotiations between the two groups got underway. A series of meetings followed during the next four months.

The A.S.T.A. Executive made the first concession which was that it was prepared to recognize the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service as well as the Department of Education's evaluation service allowing school boards and teachers to choose whichever one they wished for evaluation purposes. The A.S.T.A. continued to demand a neutral body, established by Order-in-Council with equal representation from the A.T.A. and the A.S.T.A. The A.T.A. opposed an Order-in-Council and proposed, instead, the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board by an amendment to The Teaching Profession Act. The A.S.T.A. and the







Minister of Education rejected this proposal.

At a meeting on January 4, 1967, the Deputy Minister of Education proposed an Order-in-Council which would create an independent board to establish principles for the evaluation of teachers' credentials. The A.S.T.A. accepted the proposal but the A.T.A. reserved judgement on it.

The A.T.A. Executive Council decided at a meeting in January that as a condition for accepting the Order-in-Council as a means of establishing the Teacher Qualifications Board the following minimum terms would have to be met: (1) the A.T.A. must have more representatives on the Board than the A.S.T.A., (2) the Chairman of the Board must be the A.T.A. President, (3) the Department of Education must recognize the A.T.A. Statements of Qualifications for Foundation Program payments, (4) the Department of Education must discontinue its evaluation service for teachers and school boards. The A.T.A. held firmly to these conditions and in order to force the Minister of Education and the A.S.T.A. to accept them continued to engage in extranegotiatory activity designed to heighten the perception of the costs of disagreeing to these conditions.

In February, 1967, the A.S.T.A., in an effort to prevent salary negotiations from breaking down at the local level conveyed a willingness to make the concessions necessary to meet the A.T.A.'s minimum terms, provided that the A.T.A. would accept an Order-in-Council.

In the meantime, the A.T.A. Executive Council had decided that a Memorandum of Agreement would be a more acceptable method of establishing the Teacher Qualifications Service. Both the Minister of Education and



the A.S.T.A. accepted this idea and a series of meetings were held to negotiate the details for inclusion in the Memorandum of Agreement.

The final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Minister of Education, the President of the A.T.A. and the President of the A.S.T.A. on March 23, 1967, provides for a Teacher Qualifications Board with three A.T.A. representatives, two A.S.T.A. representatives, two Department of Education representatives and one from each university. The Chairman of the Board is a member of the A.T.A. The A.S.T.A. agrees to request all member boards to inform prospective immigrant teachers to apply to the office of the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service for Statements of Qualifications of years of teacher education for salary purposes. The Department of Education agrees to accept for Foundation Program purposes Statements of Qualifications issued by the A.T.A. Teacher Qualifications Service.

## II. CONCLUSIONS

### Conclusions about the Model of Political Negotiation Used in the Analysis

In part, Ikle's model of political negotiations was found to be adequate for analysing certain aspects of the case. It was found to be particularly useful for organizing the data which related to the negotiations proper. It was helpful in explaining the cause of the major issue and sub-issues and for tracing the steps in the process of reaching terms of agreement on each sub-issue.

Some features of the model restricted its use in analysing all aspects of the case. The model is a one-dimensional model based on a



single utility scale. It would appear that this would restrict its use as a framework of analysis of an instance of complex negotiations that involves several bargaining ranges on independently disputed alternatives. To reach an over-all agreement, negotiators must combine several outcomes on several bargaining ranges involving comparisons between different utility scales. Not only are these comparisons made by negotiators unstable, but, as was pointed out in the last chapter, the utilities underlying the comparisons are unstable as well. Analysis becomes a highly complex task and clearly a simple one-dimensional utility scale would not be adequate.

For the purposes of analysis in this case an attempt was made to create a one-dimensional utility scale so that it was possible to accommodate all the sub-issues on the one scale. Hazards involved in doing this were recognized. The scale is descriptive and positions were placed on it in a more or less arbitrary way, but the data seemed to suggest that this was possible.

The utility scale was based on a range of preferences for control of evaluations. The preferences were arranged on a continuum extending from complete control of evaluations by the A.T.A. at one pole to a preference for complete control by the Department of Education at the other. This scale seemed to be adequate for analysing the kinds of utility comparisons the parties made on such sub-issues as the employer of the qualifications officer and staff and the mechanism for establishing a Teacher Qualifications Board and Teacher Qualifications Committee because the choice arrived at for settling each of these issues could be





placed conceptually at some position on the scale. There may be some question, however, if one can legitimately include items such as the number of representatives on the Teacher Qualifications Board and the selection of the Chairman of the Board on the same utility scale. The assumption made in these instances was that the preferences which each party had for these items related to its basic utility, that is, neutrality of the Teacher Qualifications Board on the part of the A.S.T.A. and professional recognition and control on the part of the A.T.A. For example, it was the A.S.T.A.'s preference for a neutral body which induced it to demand equal representation with the A.T.A. and the A.T.A.'s preference for professional control of evaluations that led it to demand more A.T.A. representatives and to demand that the A.T.A. President be Chairman of the Board.

Another problem encountered in the use of the model grew out of the ex post facto nature of the study. It was impossible to determine, in a precise way, at the point in time at which the data were collected what each party's estimate of the opponent's minimum disposition or estimated probable outcome may have been on each sub-issue at different stages in the negotiations or, if, in fact, one party attempted to estimate the minimum dispositions of the other. Unfortunately, therefore, the analysis was restricted to the use of a greatly simplified version of Ikle's model because the reconstruction and analysis of the case could only involve the minimum dispositions and actual bargaining ranges at different points in time. Only these were easily determinable from the data.



In order to make use of Ikle's concepts of "estimated minimum dispositions," "estimated bargaining ranges" and "sham concessions," it would be necessary to study an on-going instance of negotiations or to interview the negotiators immediately after decisions were made at the bargaining tables.

A third limitation of Ikle's model from the point of view of this study is its failure to take into consideration the broader bargaining moves or extranegotiatory actions. These formed a large part of the strategy used by the negotiators in this case. In a sense, Ikle's model serves as a sort of meter that gauges the surface manifestations of negotiations. It does not account for the dynamic forces that take place beneath the surface of negotiating activity as the parties join battle in a power struggle. To make the analysis more complete and to examine and interpret the effects of the extranegotiatory moves made by the parties, Chamberlain's model of bargaining power was used as well as Schelling's assumptions about the power of commitment.

It would seem logical to conclude that Ikle's model of political negotiation would be most useful for the analysis of direct negotiations made at the bargaining table, especially if the issues in dispute were such that the underlying utilities could be easily measured in numerical scales, for example, monetary items, items of distance or time intervals. The model has limited use for analysing complex instances of negotiation involving extranegotiatory moves and where choices have to be made on the basis of comparisons between several different non-commensurable utilities.



### Conclusions About the Negotiation Process

The case illustrates the concept of negotiation as a process by which one party attempts to modify the utilities of an opponent, so that one will seek terms of agreement more favourable to oneself. The process, in this case, involved the exchange of proposals as well as extranegotiatory activities to back up the proposals and increase the bargaining power of the parties. An examination of the data led to the following conclusions about the process.

1. The extranegotiatory activity engaged in by both parties had more effect on the process of modifying utilities and determining the outcome of the issue than the negotiations proper.

2. The Alberta Teachers' Association was able to modify the minimum disposition of the Alberta School Trustees' Association with respect to the administration of evaluations by effecting a fait accompli through the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Service. In time, the A.S.T.A.'s break-even point for measuring gains and losses shifted from an original status quo where A.T.A. control of administration was considered a loss to a new status quo where A.T.A. administrative control was considered neither a gain nor a loss.

3. The Alberta School Trustees' Association was able to modify the minimum disposition of the A.T.A. with respect to the establishment of the policy-setting body by precipitating political action which forced the Minister of Education to establish an evaluation service which, in effect, functioned in competition with the A.T.A.'s Teacher Qualifications Service. This compelled the A.T.A. to propose terms more





favourable to the A.S.T.A. on the establishment of the policy body in order to safeguard the exclusive right to administer evaluations by its own service.

4. By threatening strike action and performing extranegotiatory activities to establish the credibility of a strike threat, the A.T.A. was able to increase the perception of the costs of the officers of the A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education of disagreeing to the A.T.A.'s minimum terms for the composition and function of the Teacher Qualifications Board. The A.S.T.A. and the Minister of Education consequently modified their own minimum dispositions and agreed to terms consistent with the A.T.A.'s minimum conditions.

#### Conclusions About the Outcome of the Issue

Conclusions about which party won the greater proportion of its preferences in the outcome of the issue depend upon which break-even point one uses for assessing the division of gains and losses. Therefore, one might arrive at any one of the following sets of conclusions.

1. If one uses the original status quo, that is, the situation that existed before August, 1966, as a break-even point, the A.T.A. won the greater amount in terms of its originally-expressed preferences. It won the right to administer evaluations; it won the largest single representation on the Teacher Qualifications Board; it won the right to nominate the Chairman of the Teacher Qualifications Board; it prevented control of both the administration of evaluations and the policy-setting body from going to the Department of Education. The A.S.T.A. lost its preference for having salary determination linked to certification and



administered by the Registrar of the Department of Education; it lost in its demand for equal representation with the A.T.A. on the policy-setting body and it was unsuccessful in its effort to have the policy-setting body established by Order-in-Council.

2. If one uses the status quo established by the fait accompli, that is, the situation after the A.T.A. began operating its Teacher Qualifications Service as the break-even point for assessing gains and losses, the A.T.A. lost on several points and the A.S.T.A. gained on some. The A.T.A. lost its preference for the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board by A.T.A. bylaw. The A.S.T.A. won more representatives on the Board than the A.T.A. was first prepared to give it; the A.S.T.A. forced the A.T.A. to reduce the number of A.T.A. representatives from four to three; the A.S.T.A. gained a neutral body in the sense that it was not a creature of the A.T.A.

3. If one uses the notion of a historical trend toward complete professional autonomy of teachers as a break-even line, the A.T.A. lost just about as much as it gained. It won the right to administer evaluations but lost the right to control the policy-setting body.

#### Conclusions About the Participation of "Third Parties"

Attempts by third parties, especially the Deans of the Faculties of Education, the Minister of Education and senior officers of the Department of Education to help the parties reach accommodation were largely ineffective. The normative roles played by these third parties tended to weaken their accommodative functions by distorting the protagonists' perceptions of their declared neutrality.



### III. IMPLICATIONS

The findings of this study have implications both for the development of public policies in education and for the functions of educational administrators.

Byrne<sup>1</sup> claims that there is a predisposition in Canada to seek provincial solutions to local problems despite the trend toward autonomous school districts. This study which examined the issue over evaluation of teacher qualifications for salary determination suggests that the tendency identified by Byrne may indeed exist, at least in Alberta. Certainly what was essentially a local conflict between teachers and trustees over the matter of evaluation was resolved by negotiations between the central executives of the teachers' and trustees' associations.

Several other issues can currently be recognized which, although having implications for the exercise of local authority and decision-making, will undoubtedly require solution at the provincial level, either because the developing conflicts transcend local boundaries or because the solutions may require changes in existing provincial legislation. Whether teachers in Junior Colleges should be certificated or not, whether principals and other supervisory personnel should be excluded from the bargaining units or not, whether Alberta should adopt zone bargaining instead of local bargaining over salaries are some of the questions presently being debated by teacher and trustee groups. Because, for the most part, these issues represent conflicts in the values and goals of the teachers' and trustees' associations, the resolution of them will probably require sustained negotiation and bargaining





between these groups and the provincial government.

If public policy on the above issues and other matters is likely to be influenced or determined by the outcomes negotiated by the teachers' and trustees' associations as it was in the case investigated in this study, there are implications in the findings for the development of government education policy in the future. In order that government policy serve the best interests of the public and not the aspirations of one or the other of the political interest groups whose bargaining may affect that policy, it is necessary that a balance of power exist between the conflicting parties so that one may act as a counter-vailing power to the other. This study has shown that bargaining power depends upon both organizational resources and negotiating skills. Therefore, it would seem desirable for the trustees' associations throughout Canada to acquire with public money the same amount of resources as the teachers' professional associations are able to acquire by their own efforts. It would seem desirable, as well, for the officers of all associations whose bargaining activity is likely to influence government policy to acquaint themselves with the skills and techniques of negotiation so as to be in positions to secure optimum advantages for both the associations which they represent and the general public.

Educational administrators, whether at the provincial or local level may find themselves caught in the "cross fires" as political interest groups bargain over scarce community resources or as they attempt to influence public policy with regard to educational matters. It would be to the advantage of educational administrators to familiarize



themselves with the theory and practice of negotiation so as to understand the dynamic forces which may shape the policies they are expected to implement. Moreover, a knowledge of the negotiation process would help equip educational administrators for the mediating roles which they may be obliged to perform.

If this study has drawn to the attention of educational administrators the importance of understanding the negotiating process, or if it has aroused the interests of other researchers in Educational Administration, the efforts of the writer will have been rewarded.



## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER X

<sup>1</sup>T. C. Byrne, "The Emergent Role of the Superintendent," The ATA Magazine, 48:10, February, 1966.





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Interview with the Admissions Registrar of the University of Alberta, June 14, 1967.

Interview with the Dean of the Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, November 23, 1967.





## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

## THE PROPOSED ORDER-IN-COUNCIL

Edmonton, Friday, January 6, 1967

To His Honour

The Lieutenant Governor in Council:

Whereas there is need for an independent board representative of various organizations to establish principles for the evaluation of the credentials of teachers, and

Whereas it is deemed expedient and desirable to establish this board through an Order of the Executive Council,

Therefore, the undersigned has the honour to recommend as follows:

1. That the Lieutenant Governor in Council order the establishment of a board to be known as the Teachers Qualifications Board.
2. That the membership of this board, the method of appointment, and the term of office be as follows:
  - (a) One representative of the University of Alberta to be appointed by the President of that institution for a term to be determined by the President.
  - (b) One representative of the University of Calgary, appointed by its President, for a term to be determined by him.
  - (c) One representative of the Department of Education, appointed by the Minister of Education, for a term to be determined by the Minister.
  - (d) Three representatives of the Alberta Teachers' Association to be appointed by the Executive of that Association for such terms as are determined by that Executive.
  - (e) Three representatives of the Alberta School Trustees' Association to be appointed by the Executive of that Association for such terms as are determined by that Executive.
3. That the Chairman of the Board shall be elected for a one-year term by the majority vote of the members of the Board, and that the representative from the Department of Education shall act as Chairman



until such time as this election takes place.

4. That the Board shall have the authority to make such by-laws as are necessary for the conduct of its business, and further,
5. That the purposes of the Board shall be as follows:
  - (a) To develop principles which shall provide a basis for the evaluation of teachers' credentials or qualifications in terms of years of teacher education.
  - (b) To advise the Minister with respect to these principles providing a basis for evaluating the education of individual teachers to facilitate the administration of the School Foundation Program.
  - (c) To advise any committees directly involved in the evaluation of teachers' qualifications, such as the Teachers' Evaluation committee of the Alberta Teachers' Association, with respect to principles basic to the assessment of years of teacher education held by individual teachers.
  - (d) To serve as a board of review in the application of these principles by any committee or official involved in evaluating teachers' credentials in order to establish the years of teacher education held by individual teachers.

Respectfully submitted,

Minister of Education





## APPENDIX B

## CLAUSES SUBMITTED BY THE A.T.A. FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN

## A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1. The agreement should be executed in behalf of the Department of Education by the Minister; in behalf of the Alberta School Trustees' Association by the president; and in behalf of The Alberta Teachers' Association by the president.
2. The agreement should become effective when signed by the three parties; and should continue in effect until terminated by one year of notice given by any of the parties to the agreement.
3. Notice to amend the agreement could be proposed by any of the parties at any time. Amendments could take effect subject to unanimous consent of all of the parties.
4. The ATA would agree to continue operation of its Teacher Qualifications Service, and will cooperate with the Office of the Registrar of the Department of Education to this end.
5. The ATA will undertake to provide as speedy a service as is possible on the basis of the documents submitted.
6. The ATA undertakes to establish a Teacher Qualifications Board composed of representatives of the ASTA, the Department of Education, each university which is under contract to the Department to prepare teachers, and the ATA.
7. The ATA agrees that one of the functions of the TQB will be to prescribe procedures for review and appeal of any Statement of Qualification issued to any teacher.
8. The ATA will undertake to have publicized the bases for evaluation of teacher qualifications as determined by the TQB.
9. The ATA undertakes to receive representations by letter, telephone, or in person about statements of qualification.
10. The ASTA will undertake to appoint representatives to the TQB.
11. The ASTA will undertake to advise all member boards that an agreement recognizing the ATA-TQS has been signed in behalf of the Department of Education, the ASTA, and the ATA.



12. The ASTA will undertake to request that all member boards inform prospective immigrant teachers to apply for statements of qualification from the ATA-TQS.
13. The Department of Education will undertake to restrict its evaluation service to that required for administration of the school foundation program.
14. The Department of Education will evaluate qualifications of teachers not under contract to an Alberta school board for the purpose of determining whether such teachers are entitled to be issued with an Alberta teaching certificate only.
15. The Department of Education will undertake to inform all prospective immigrant teachers to apply for statements of qualification from the ATA-TQS.
16. The Department of Education will undertake to cooperate with the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service.
17. The Department of Education will undertake to accept for school foundation program purposes statements of qualifications which are accepted by school jurisdictions for salary purposes.



## APPENDIX C

## SUGGESTED A.S.T.A. ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN A POSSIBLE

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

## I. SUGGESTED PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT

The parties to the agreement shall be the Department of Education, the Alberta Teachers' Association, and the Alberta School Trustees' Association.

## II. SUGGESTED OBJECTIVES OF THE AGREEMENT

The general purpose of the agreement should be to establish an independent evaluation service for the evaluation of teacher education for salary purposes that is mutually acceptable to all the parties of this agreement. A further purpose is to make provision for the expression of the special interests of all parties to the agreement in the matter of salary evaluation.

## III. PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

To realize the above objectives, the organizational structure should provide for a policy-setting board under which an administrative body would operate.

## IV. SUGGESTED QUALIFICATIONS BOARD AND FUNCTIONS

1. To develop and establish principles which shall provide a basis for the evaluation of teachers' credentials or qualifications in terms of years of teacher education.
2. To advise any committees or persons directly involved in the evaluation of teachers' qualifications with respect to principles basic to the assessment of years of teacher education held by individual teachers.
3. To serve as a board of review in the application of these principles by any committee or official involved in evaluating teachers' credentials in order to establish the years of teacher education held by





individual teachers.

4. To serve as a final board of appeal for teachers or boards.

5. To make whatever regulations appear necessary to govern such matters as payment of the costs to operate the service, meeting dates, notices of meetings, and other related matters.

#### V. SUGGESTED QUALIFICATIONS BOARD AND MEMBERSHIP

Membership in the qualifications board shall consist of one representative each from the University of Alberta, University of Calgary, and University of Lethbridge; two representatives each from the Department of Education and the Alberta School Trustees' Association; and three representatives from the Alberta Teachers' Association.

QUESTION: Is it understood that this Memorandum of Agreement, though excluding the universities as parties to the agreement, in no way infringes upon the right of the universities to establish programs designed to educate prospective teachers and their privilege to recommend to the Minister suitable candidates for teacher certification?



## APPENDIX D

## SUGGESTIONS BY THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION FOR INCLUSION IN A

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

The evaluation group offers an expert consultative service to the teachers and school boards of this Province. Its legal position derives from its inclusion in the collective agreement. It is not necessary, therefore, that the body be established by order in council; or that it derive its status from an institution or organization within the province. (c.f. the Salary Appendix Committee). The body should be completely independent of the policies or pressures of the various organizations from which its membership is drawn.

Composition

Two principles should govern the membership:

1. The evaluation group should contain the most experienced and knowledgeable persons available.
2. The membership should be wide enough to include all vitally interested parties.

It goes without saying that the best informed and experienced personnel should be recruited to develop policy and solve difficult or unusual problems in evaluation. It is also evident that confidence in and acceptance of the service will result from an understanding of the working of the group which can only be obtained through participation in the meetings. The membership should be drawn from the A.T.A., the A.S.T.A., the three universities and the Department of Education.

The number of representatives from each organization should not be a matter of critical concern, if the group can operate completely independently. The composition of the present Qualifications Board, as revised, would be quite satisfactory.

Program Fund Evaluation

It is questionable whether the Department should be dependent on any external evaluation service for the payment of grants. This involves not only the possibility of incurring criticism for dependency on such an agency but also the matter of efficiency in relation to the computerizing of grants data.



Incidentally, should the grants formula be altered to eliminate the need for evaluations, it might well become unnecessary for the Department to participate in the salary evaluation process, unless to bring its experience to bear on evaluation decisions.





## APPENDIX E

PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT REGARDING THE EVALUATION OF  
TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS FOR SALARY PURPOSES

This agreement is executed among the Department of Education, The Alberta Teachers' Association, and The Alberta School Trustees' Association.

Whereas it is deemed desirable by the parties to this agreement to cooperate in the establishment of a Teacher Qualifications Board for the development of policies and principles which shall be the basis on which evaluation of teacher qualifications for salary purposes shall be made.

NOW THEREFORE THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH: THAT THE PARTIES DO HEREBY AGREE:

1. A Teacher Qualifications Board shall be established which shall consist of one representative of each of the University of Alberta, the University of Calgary, the University of Lethbridge; two representatives each from the Department of Education, and The Alberta School Trustees' Association; and three representatives from The Alberta Teachers' Association.
  - 1.1 The chairman of the TQB shall . . .
    - 1.1.1 The chairman shall, in addition to his duties as chairman of board meetings, be entitled to express views, make motions, and vote on each and every question coming before the board at any regular or special meeting.
  - 1.2 Each member of the board, other than the chairman, shall hold office for two years from the effective date of his appointment.
  - 1.3 Should a member of the board be unable or unwilling to complete his term, the organization appointing him shall be entitled to appoint an alternate member to serve the balance of his term.
  - 1.4 A quorum of the board shall be six members.
  - 1.5 The board shall meet at least twice during each calendar year and on as many other occasions as is necessary to deal with the business of the board.
2. It shall be the duty of the TQB:
  - 2.1 to develop and establish principles which shall provide the basis for evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes, and to authorize publication of such principles from time to time;



- 2.2 to advise the ATA Teacher Qualification Service and any other persons directly involved with evaluation of teacher qualifications, for salary purposes, with respect to the principles which have been adopted by the board;
- 2.3 to serve as a board for final review and appeal in any dispute which may arise concerning a statement of qualifications issued from the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service or from the Department of Education Foundation Program Fund Evaluations Service.

3. The Alberta Teachers' Association undertakes to:

- 3.1 continue to operate its Teacher Qualifications Service, and will cooperate with the office of the Registrar of the Department of Education to this end;
- 3.2 to accept regulations and recommendations made by the board to The Alberta Teachers' Association regarding the administration, personnel, and facilities required for the proper operation of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service;
- 3.3 to provide as speedy and efficient a service as is possible on the basis of the documents which are submitted by applicants for statements of qualifications;
- 3.4 to publicize the principles for evaluation of teacher qualifications which have been approved by the TQB;
- 3.5 to receive representations in writing, by telephone, and by personal interview concerning any statement of qualification which has been issued by the Teacher Qualifications Service office.

4. The Alberta School Trustees' Association undertakes to:

- 4.1 publicize the principles for evaluation of teacher qualifications which have been approved by the TQB;
- 4.2 advise all boards which are members of the ASTA that this memorandum of agreement which establishes a TQB has been signed by representatives of the Department of Education, the ASTA, and the ATA;
- 4.3 request all member boards to inform prospective immigrant teachers to apply for statement of qualifications from the office of the ATA-TQS.

5. The Department of Education undertakes to:

- 5.1 restrict its evaluation service to that required for administration of the school foundation program;
- 5.2 evaluate qualifications of persons applying for initial Alberta teacher certification and communicate such information to ATA-TQS and other persons directly involved with the evaluation of teacher qualifications for salary purposes;



- 5.3 inform all prospective immigrant teachers to apply for statements of qualifications from the office of the ATA-TQS;
- 5.4 accept for school foundation program purposes statements of qualifications issued by the ATA-TQS to teachers employed by any school jurisdiction which accepts such statements for salary purposes;
- 5.5 facilitate the exchange of information between the Registrar of the Department of Education and the ATA-TQS.

## 6. Duration

The agreement shall become effective when signed by the three parties; and shall continue in effect until terminated by one year of notice given by any of the parties to the agreement.

## 7. Amendments

Notice to amend this agreement can be proposed by any of the parties, in writing, at any time. Amendments shall be considered by the board as soon as is reasonably possible following the giving of such notice and shall take effect subject to unanimous consent of all the parties to this agreement.





## APPENDIX F

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

## REGARDING THE EVALUATION OF TEACHER QUALIFICATIONS FOR SALARY PURPOSES

This agreement is executed among the Department of Education, The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association.

Whereas, it is deemed desirable by the parties to this agreement to cooperate in the establishment of a Teacher Salary Qualifications Board for the development of policies and principles which shall be the basis on which evaluation of teacher qualifications for salary purposes shall be made,

Now Therefore this Agreement Witnesseth that the Parties do Hereby Agree -

1. A Teacher Salary Qualifications Board shall be established which shall consist of one representative of each of the University of Alberta, the University of Calgary, the University of Lethbridge; two representatives each from the Department of Education and the Alberta School Trustees' Association; and three representatives from The Alberta Teachers' Association.
  - 1.1 The Chairman of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board shall be one of the representatives of The Alberta Teachers' Association.
    - 1.1.1 The chairman shall, in addition to his duties as chairman of board meetings, be entitled to express views, make motions and vote on each and every question coming before the board at any regular or special meeting.
  - 1.2 Each member of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board, other than the chairman, shall hold office for two years from the effective date of his appointment.
  - 1.3 Should a member of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board be unable or unwilling to complete his term, the organization appointing him shall be entitled to appoint an alternate member to serve the balance of his term.
2. It shall be the duty of the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board -
  - 2.1 to develop and establish principles which shall provide the basis for evaluation of years of teacher education for salary purposes and to authorize publication of such principles from time to time;



- 2.2 to advise the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service, and any other persons directly involved with evaluation of teacher qualifications for salary purposes, with respect to the principles which have been adopted by the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board;
- 2.3 to serve as a board for final review and appeal in any dispute which may arise concerning a statement of qualifications issued from the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service or from the Department of Education Foundation Program Fund Evaluations Service;
- 2.4 to adopt bylaws for its own operation not inconsistent with other provisions of this agreement.
- 3. The Alberta Teachers' Association undertakes -
  - 3.1 to continue to operate its Teacher Qualifications Service and will cooperate with the office of the registrar of the Department of Education to this end;
  - 3.2 to operate its Teacher Qualifications Service within the policies and principles established by the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board;
  - 3.3 to inform all prospective immigrant teachers to apply to the office of its Teacher Qualifications Service for a statement of qualifications of years of teacher education for salary purposes;
  - 3.4 to provide as speedy and efficient a service as is possible on the basis of the documents which are submitted by applicants for statements of qualifications;
  - 3.5 to publicize the principles for evaluation of teacher qualifications which have been approved by the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board;
  - 3.6 to receive representations in writing, by telephone and by personal interview concerning any statement of qualifications which has been issued by the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service.
- 4. The Alberta School Trustees' Association undertakes -
  - 4.1 to publicize the principles for evaluation of teacher qualifications which have been approved by the Teacher Salary Qualifications Board;
  - 4.2 to advise all boards which are members of the Alberta School Trustees' Association that this memorandum of agreement which establishes a Teacher Salary Qualifications Board has been signed by representatives of the Department of Education, The Alberta Teachers' Association and the Alberta School Trustees' Association;
  - 4.3 to request all member boards to inform prospective immigrant teachers



to apply to the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service for a statement of qualifications of years of teacher education for salary purposes.

5. The Department of Education undertakes -

- 5.1 to restrict its evaluation service to that required for administration of the school foundation program;
- 5.2 to assess qualifications for the purposes of establishing entitlement to teacher certification and to communicate such information to the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service and to other persons directly involved with the evaluation of teacher qualifications for salary purposes;
- 5.3 to inform all prospective immigrant teachers to apply to the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service for a statement of qualifications of years of teacher education for salary purposes;
- 5.4 to accept for school foundation program purposes statements of qualifications issued by the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service to teachers employed by any school jurisdiction which accepts such statements for salary purposes;
- 5.5 to facilitate the exchange of information between the registrar of the Department and the office of the ATA Teacher Qualifications Service.

6. Duration

The Agreement shall become effective when signed by the three parties, and shall continue in effect until terminated by one year of notice given by any of the parties to the agreement.







## 7. Amendments

Notice to amend this agreement can be proposed by any of the parties, in writing, at any time. Amendments shall be considered by the parties as soon as is reasonably possible following the giving of such notice and shall take effect subject to unanimous consent of all the parties to this agreement.

Signed this twenty-third day of March, A.D. 1967

On behalf of the Department of Education

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Minister

On behalf of the Executive Council, The Alberta Teachers' Association

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President

On behalf of the Executive Council, the Alberta School Trustees' Association

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President















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